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1. INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary society is complex and rapidly changing. Governments are expected to 
adapt to these changes, to serve the public good, and to prevent contradictions, lacunae, 
and overlaps (Peters, 1998) in their policies. Especially when governments face crises or 
new demands—from, for instance, citizens—they are expected to adapt swiftly. The recent 
financial crisis, for instance, shocked many countries and placed extra attention on the 
capacity of governments to respond adequately. Other problems, like developing an 
integrated approach to youth in trouble, require a quick response that distinguishes among 
the needs of individual youngsters. Programs to reduce administrative burdens are another 
example. These programs ask for adaptation of the governmental apparatus and its 
processes to prevent unnecessary procedures for citizens and companies. To effect (swift) 
adaptation, political leaders, and the organizations under their remit, have to coordinate 
themselves accordingly. Is a government apparatus geared towards adapting to such sudden 
crises and newly introduced objectives? Some authors claim that public organizations tend to 
remain rather fixed (e.g. Parsons, 2002a), while not adapting practices if the environment 
changes can lead according to others to low performance (e.g. Gumport & Sporn, 1999; 
Lombardo & Mulligan, 2003).  
This thesis focusses on coordination arrangements for cross-cutting policy objectives and 
on the process in which organizations cope with these coordination arrangements, and adapt 
(or not) to comply with them (Gumport & Sporn, 1999, p. 18). This is called organizational 
adaptation, which refers to a process in which changes are instituted in the organization 
(Cameron, 1984, p. 123). The central question in this thesis is:  
 
What explains organizational adaptation to cross-cutting policy objectives? 
 
Since horizontal cross-cutting policy objectives pose extra challenges for political or 
administrative actors, this thesis explores programs to coordinate such issues. In this 
context, ‘horizontal’ refers to situations that involve organizations at the same level of 
government. The decision-making processes to coordinate such issues transcend single 
organizational boundaries, as well as policy sectors and fields. Policy programs set up to 
coordinate such policy issues (Rittel & Webber, 1973) have a strong impact on all processes 
in a given policy field, and often require special (coordination) attention from multiple actors, 
who have their own resources and interests. Moreover, cross-cutting policy programs require 
actions from multiple organizations to fulfil their objectives. In such situations, there exists, 
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according to Howlett (2009), an inherent danger of losing the coherence, consistency, and 
convergence needed for a coordinated response. As a result, the coordination and 
implementation of cross-cutting-policy programs is highly complex, in terms of 
interdependencies among actors, uncertainty about risks and consequences of actions, and 
divergence in viewpoints and values of stakeholders (Head, 2008; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). 
Coordinating the organizational adaptation process also contributes to complexity. According 
to Head and Alford (2013), this multi-actor complexity creates ‘messy’ coordination 
arrangements.  
1.1. SUB QUESTIONS 
This thesis will address the coordination arrangements first by studying how different 
cross-cutting policy objectives in the Flemish government, such as austerity measures, 
administrative simplification, and integrated youth care are coordinated. After describing 
these issues, this thesis will map out and analyze the deployed coordination arrangement to 
determine whether certain theory-based policy issue characteristics—for example, political 
urgency, interdependencies, and focus—can explain its type.  
  
Two questions guide this part:  
RQ1. How does the Flemish government organize the coordination of specific cross-
cutting policies? 
RQ2. What policy issue characteristics explain the type of coordination arrangement 
deployed in cross-cutting policies? 
 
The second part of this thesis, meanwhile, examines to what extent and how public 
organizations cope with pressures stemming from these coordination arrangements and 
adapt to cross-cutting objectives. It studies the extent of organizational adaptation to cross-
cutting policy objectives in organizational goals and structures by ten specific organizations 
in the Flemish government. This study determines which theory-based organizational 
characteristics can explain the extent of organizational adaptation and how the coordination 
arrangement influences this process.  
 
Three questions guide this part:  
RQ 3: To what extent does the degree of coupling of the coordination arrangement 
(tightly or loosely coupled) explain the extent to which organizations adapt to cross-
cutting policy objectives? 
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RQ 4: Which organizational characteristics explain the extent to which organizations 
adapt to cross-cutting policy objectives?  
RQ 5: How does the coordination arrangement (tightly or loosely coupled) interact with 
the organizational characteristics to explain organizational adaptation to cross-cutting 
policy objectives? 
 
Figure 1 shows the research design, the research questions and main concepts of this 
thesis.  
 
FIGURE 1: RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
1.2. THE RELEVANCE OF COORDINATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION 
Coordination, both as concept and as a public administration practice, has existed for 
decades (Hood, 2005). This thesis will connect the concept of coordination to organizational 
adaptation. As Morgan (1997) explains, organizations are open systems, and there is no 
‘good way’ to coordinate them; the coordination arrangement always needs to fit the cross-
cutting policy objective at hand and the structure of organizations, otherwise they will not 
adapt. In other words, the design of the coordination arrangement needs to fit both the policy 
issue characteristics and the organizational characteristics. The research design of this 
thesis concerns these two major needs to unravel this academically and socially relevant 
puzzle.  
Coordination is defined as “the instruments and mechanisms that aim a voluntary or 
forced alignment of tasks and efforts of organizations within the public sector” (Bouckaert, 
Peters, & Verhoest, 2010, p. 16). Forced alignment has proved difficult and is, therefore, 
frequently criticized. Scharpf (1994, p. 16), for instance, claims that: 
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 “… the advantages of hierarchical coordination are lost in a world that is characterized 
by increasingly dense, extended, and rapidly changing patterns of reciprocal 
interdependence …”.  
Ostrom (1990, 1999, 2005, 2010a), meanwhile, writes that focusing solely on coercive 
instruments (e.g. sanctions and restrictions) that make organizations adapt, instead of defect, 
is too narrow. Governments design coordination arrangements to ensure task 
implementation and programmatic operational success (Marsh & Mcconnell, 2010). The 
collection of coordination instruments established to steer one cross-cutting policy objective 
or program is called a coordination arrangement. These are designed and, therefore 
changeable. They often evolve and can be conceived of in many different ways. 
Scholarly literature often analyzes coordination arrangements as ideal types (Bouckaert 
et al., 2010; Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998; Thomson, Perry, & Miller, 2009) — for instance, the 
market-hierarchy-network typology. In practice, governments use increasingly hybrid types of 
coordination arrangements, which are always dynamic and unstable (Hood, 2000). Achieving 
precision, by unravelling these hybrid mixes, remains important in order to design new 
coordination arrangements or reform existing ones (Ostrom, 1986). Knowing more about how 
to apply coordination approaches to cross-cutting policy asks us to understand the actors, 
the positions they hold, the actions requiring coordination, and the policy issue 
characteristics. Furthermore, no comparative studies deal with the question how precisely 
cross-cutting policy objectives are adapted into the structures and goals of individual 
organizations and how to strengthen this process. This is what the thesis aims to do.  
Many scholars claim that coordination, and organizational response to new demands, 
has become far more complex, because of organizational autonomy and the complexity of 
policy problems (Bogdanor, 2005; Bouckaert et al., 2010; Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; 
Peters, 2004; Pollitt, 2003). In fact, fragmentation was introduced through various waves of 
reforms to the public apparatuses. From the traditional Weberian apparatus to New Public 
Government (NPM) (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011) to New Public Governance (Osborne, 2010), 
government continually reinvents itself to cope successfully with policy problems. NPM 
reforms merged a traditional Weberian bureaucracy with a more instrumental orientation of 
general management borrowed from the private sector (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011, p. 8), via 
agencification. In this context, agencification refers to the creation of semi-autonomous 
organizations that operate more distantly from the central government and carry out public 
tasks (regulation, service delivery, policy implementation) in a relatively autonomous way. In 
other words, there is less hierarchical and political influence on daily operations and more 
managerial freedom (Talbot, 2004, p. 5). Additionally, the coordinating power of central 
departments is reduced and the autonomy of line departments is strengthened. Public 
organizations with far-reaching managerial autonomy make the task of steering cross-cutting 
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policy processes in a hierarchical way more difficult for central governments and other 
responsible political and administrative principals (Exworthy & Powell, 2004; Jessop, 1997).  
Within the Flemish government, which this thesis analyzes, agencification has resulted in 
particular features. Though Flanders remains a region within the federal state of Belgium, it 
has its own parliament, elected via a proportional voting system, and multi-party coalition 
cabinets (Brans & Hondeghem, 2005). There are four structural features which make 
hierarchy-based and tightly-coupled coordination in Flanders particularly difficult. First, the 
cabinet in Flanders relies on consensus politics; no minister supersedes another, and the 
cabinet decides in a collegial manner. The minister president is primus inter pares but has no 
formal authority to instruct other ministers. Second, since the major administrative reform of 
2006 (Better Governmental Policy reform, also called ‘BBB’), the three central departments 
responsible for finances, budget, and cross-cutting policies no longer hold the authority to 
control and instruct line departments and agencies. The BBB reform left mechanisms for 
horizontal and cross-cutting coordination across the 13 ministries underdeveloped. Third, the 
BBB reform led to massive new agencification, while maintaining many pre-existing 
agencies. This reform created 13 departments, 62 departmental and public law agencies, 
and maintained 120 pre-existing agencies (including private law agencies), some of which 
overlap with the new agencies. This layering of ‘old’ and ‘new’ organizational forms, and the 
resulting lack of transparency, is certainly not unique in Europe and beyond (for an overview 
of agencification in 30 countries, see Verhoest, Van Thiel, Bouckaert, & Lægreid, 2011). 
Fourth, and unique to Flanders, departments have no supervisory power over agencies (not 
even those in their ministry), and agencies are not obliged to report to their ministerial 
department. These strictly non-hierarchical relations between departments and agencies 
create competition among departments and agencies for tasks (like policy development or 
policy coordination) and power. In most ministries, relations among departments and 
agencies are conflictual (Rommel & Christiaens, 2009, p. 86). These features make the 
Flemish government an extreme case of agencification in Europe, and they seem to 
necessitate loosely coupled or network type of coordination, because the relationships 
between organizations are strictly non-hierarchical.  
1.3. THEORETICAL EMBEDDEDNESS 
Comparative and explanatory studies are rare in coordination literature, as the research 
field is young and without full-fledged theories (6, 2005, p. 52; Beuselinck, 2008). Therefore, 
this thesis builds on rational choice theory to explain organizational adaptation. To study 
coordination arrangements, this thesis uses the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) 
Framework of Rational Choice scholar Elinor Ostrom (Orton & Weick, 1990; Ostrom, 2010a). 
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Then, to compare coordination arrangements, it uses the concept of ‘coupling’, which refers 
to control (Benz, 2007; Chisholm, 1992; Orton & Weick, 1990). In tightly coupled 
arrangements, authority, instruction, or command are the causal mechanisms. Tight 
coupling, which Chisholm (1992) defines by transitivity and asymmetry, signifies situations 
where superiors determine the actions of subordinates. A loosely coupled coordination 
arrangement is exactly the opposite: roles, tasks and problem definitions are set not by an 
authority, but by the organizations or members themselves.  
To explain organizational adaptation to coordination arrangements for cross-cutting policy 
objectives, this thesis employs two competing perspectives, both based on Rational Choice 
Theory: the principal agent - and the stewardship model. The stewardship perspective is 
seen as a rational theory, because even altruism is regarded by some actors (impure 
altruism - Andreoni, 1990) as self-interest. For instance, because an actor gains by 
cooperating, as he or she is intrinsically public service motivated or garners respect. In this 
way, even the stewardship perspective on organizations is a rational perspective, although 
more positive. In the adaptation process, actors can either behave as an ‘agent’ or ‘steward’. 
While the ‘agency perspective’ is based on organizations as ‘self-serving agents’ and goal 
incongruence, the stewardship model emphasizes collectivistic behavior, trust, and goal-
convergence, rather than self-interest (Schillemans, 2013; Van Slyke, 2007). Thus, both 
perspectives establish a framework for exploring how public organizations adapt to cross-
cutting policy objectives and cope with coordination arrangements.  
1.4. THESIS OUTLINE 
Following the research questions, this thesis starts with a theoretical framework in 
chapter two, which consists of two major concepts: coordination arrangements and 
organizational adaptation. The theoretical framework discusses and operationalizes the 
concepts and presents hypotheses. Chapter three contains the methodological design of this 
thesis. It describes the data collected to study the coordination arrangements and how they 
are analyzed. The second part of this chapter, meanwhile, explains how organizational 
adaptation is studied. Chapter four studies the coordination arrangements deployed in three 
cross-cutting policy objectives; it describes and maps each arrangement, using the Analysis 
and Development Framework of Elinor Ostrom (2005). Chapter five describes the extent to 
which organizations adapt to these three cross-cutting policy objectives by examining 
organizational documents, structures, and goals. It also describes how organizational 
characteristics and the coordination arrangement can explain this process. The thesis ends 
with conclusions and a discussion in chapter six. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
This chapter develops a theoretical framework to study coordination arrangements 
deployed in cross-cutting policy objectives and organizational adaptation, in response to 
these coordination efforts. Coordination and organizational adaptation are major topics in 
Public Administration. In this chapter these concepts are defined, as well as operationalized, 
on the basis of existing literature. A theoretical framework is a structure that allows for study 
and analysis of existing social phenomena in a systematic manner. Another purpose of the 
theoretical framework is to identify data which are needed to study certain objects. The 
theoretical framework specifies the way in which I, as a researcher, interpret the concepts of 
coordination arrangement and organizational adaptation. Furthermore, this chapter tries to 
give an account of state-of-the-art literature about this topic.  
The first part of this chapter focuses on coordination arrangements. This part addresses 
theories that stem from rational choice, because cross-cutting policy objectives typically 
present autonomous actors with a social dilemma in which they can cooperate or defect 
(Joaquin, 2008). To make a thorough description and comparison of coordination 
arrangements possible, rational choice theory is combined with the Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework of Elinor Ostrom (2005, 2010b). Rooted in rational choice 
theory as well, this framework consists additionally of many elements that emanate from 
policy (network) analysis literature. The part about coordination arrangements concludes with 
hypotheses about which policy issue characteristics explain the type of coordination 
arrangement deployed in specific cross-cutting policy objectives. Two research questions 
guide the first part of the theoretical framework:  
RQ1. How does the Flemish government organize the coordination of specific cross-
cutting policies? 
RQ2. What policy issue characteristics explain the type of coordination arrangement 
deployed in cross-cutting policies? 
The second part of this thesis focusses on organizational adaptation, in which a 
theoretical framework is developed to study organizational adaptation. For the definition of 
organizational adaptation, this part of the framework mainly builds upon organization studies. 
The agency perspective and the stewardship perspective, based on rational choice theory 
are presented as competing theories to explain organizational adaptation. The three 
research questions guiding the second part are:  
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RQ 3: To what extent does the degree of coupling of the coordination arrangement 
(tightly or loosely coupled) explain the extent to which organizations adapt to cross-
cutting policy objectives? 
RQ 4: Which organizational characteristics explain the extent to which organizations 
adapt to cross-cutting policy objectives?  
RQ 5: How does the coordination arrangement (tightly or loosely coupled) interact with 
the organizational characteristics to explain organizational adaptation to cross-cutting 
policy objectives? 
2.1. DEFINITION OF CROSS-CUTTING POLICY OBJECTIVES 
Cross-cutting policy objectives are defined in this thesis as horizontal issues, policy 
issues which challenge organizations at the same level of government, transcend 
organizational boundaries, as well as policy sectors and fields, and have an impact on 
multiple processes. The Cabinet’s Office Review (2000b) on cross-cutting policies states that 
they have many stakeholders, are hard to monitor, and run greater risks in terms of 
communication problems. To coordinate the policy to resolve these issues they must receive, 
according to Van Bueren (et al., 2003) special attention from multiple actors with different 
interests, knowledge and resources. The common characteristic is that cross-cutting policy 
objectives are impossible to solve by a single individual or organization (Boyle, 1999; Dietz, 
2003). Safeguarding a coordinated response and, especially, creating policy cohesion and 
coherence in the case of cross-cutting policy objectives is a major challenge for governments 
(Boyle, 1999; Jessop, 1997; Peters, 1998).  
According to Head and Alford (2013), the multi-actor complexities and the subsequent 
interdependencies between organizations involved in cross-cutting policy objectives lead to 
uncertainty. As a consequence, coordination arenas tend to be messy and uncoordinated 
(Klijn, 2007). Cross-cutting policy objectives can bring about different types of uncertainty. 
First, substantive uncertainty, which relates to the content or the definition of the policy 
problem. Substantive uncertainty refers to the conflicting understandings, lack of knowledge, 
or indefinite information about the nature of the problem. Secondly, strategic uncertainty 
relates to the uncertainty that develops when actors’ strategies are unexpected or when 
actors are unsure about the proper course of action within the cross-cutting policy 
coordination arena. Separate or even conflicting strategies may lead to deadlocks and create 
burdens in the policy coordination process. Alternatively, this uncertainty could also 
incentivize actors to combine their expertise and produce tailor-made and harmonized 
strategies (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Thirdly, institutional factors also generate complexity in 
coordination arenas (March & Olsen, 2010; W. R. Scott, 1992). Institutional uncertainty 
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suggests that cross-cutting policy coordination arenas do not only involve many policy actors, 
but also that these actors come from diverse institutional backgrounds, are socialized in 
different settings, and have a different set of rules with which they are ‘geared’ within the 
coordination arena (Dietz, 2003; March & Olsen, 2010). In addition to different backgrounds, 
actors must also contend with resources (i.e. expertise, time, money and staff), necessary to 
tackle the cross-cutting policy objective, scattered across different organizations (Van Bueren 
et al., 2003).  
The question of how to coordinate cross-cutting policy objectives is closely related to the 
discussions about ‘joined-up-government’ and ‘whole of government’ approaches. Scholars 
who have researched these themes extensively (6, 2004; Alexander, 1995; Askim, 
Christensen, Fimreite, & Lægreid, 2009; Bogdanor, 2005; Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; 
Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) write that such approaches have multiple aims. Firstly, such 
initiatives are set up to bundle together all the information necessary to approach the policy 
problem. Secondly, they stimulate innovative practices because they bring together people 
with different expertise, professions, and know-hows in a way that reduces substantive 
uncertainty. Thirdly, they aim to diminish inconsistencies between organizational policies and 
regulation, which reduces strategic uncertainty. This is done through addressing issues 
univocally, with, for instance, coherent programs. Fourthly, they are established to improve 
service delivery, create seamless service, or to offer clients and citizens one-stop-shops 
(single-point-of-contact) or one integrated approach. Fifthly, they aim to efficiently and 
effectively use resources by removing overlaps, lacunae, and redundancies. The latter two 
aims could reduce the institutional uncertainty (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Peters, 1998; Pollitt, 
2003). 
Posing the above concepts and uncertainty types would suggest that cross-cutting 
policies are wicked problems. The author of this thesis would argue that all wicked problems 
have, to a certain extent, a horizontal or cross-cutting nature, but not all cross-cutting policy 
objectives are highly wicked. Rittel and Webber (1973) were the first to talk about ‘wicked 
problems’. Probably the most important characteristic of these problems is that they are 
socially pluralistic, in that they have multiple stakeholders and bundle interests and values. 
Most authors pose that the higher the three types of uncertainty and the higher the value 
conflicts, the more wicked a policy issue is. See, for instance Figure 2, from Batie (2008, p. 
1185). 
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FIGURE 2: HIGH UNCERTAINTY AND VALUE CONFLICTS MAKE POLICY ISSUES WICKED (BATIE, 
2008, P.1185) 
 
 
Head and Alford (2013) argue that there are different kinds of wicked issues, but they all 
possess a few properties which make them hard to solve (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Firstly, 
wicked problems remain difficult to describe in terms of content and nature. Second, such 
problems do not adhere to the fixed and sectoral silos of government. In other words, they 
are cross-cutting in terms of geography, ideology and expertise. Third, such problems are 
complex, non-linear, and often need a system change, and, therefore, require a long time 
scale. Fourth, they are socially constructed and, therefore, contested. Fifth, there are no 
optimal resolutions to such problems. Finally, they often bear enormous costs for the 
government and have many consequences for society, the economy, and the environment 
(Bellamy, 2006; Head & Alford, 2013; Rittel & Webber, 1973; Van Bueren et al., 2003).  
As described by Turnpenny et al. (2009) not all uncertain, complex, and high-stake 
issues are 'wicked' in the same way (e.g. local versus global issues; differences in 
involvement of stakeholders in different capacities). Whether a policy issue is ‘wicked’ is hard 
to establish. There are different conceptual views on the definition, which proves that the 
concept is hard to operationalize. This, combined with the notion that some wicked issues 
are wicked because of the institutional complexity of the coordination arrangement, means 
that this thesis will not use ‘wickedness’ as an concept. Instead of the ‘wicked issue’, this 
thesis uses the concept of horizontal cross-cutting policy objective.  
2.2. COORDINATION OF CROSS-CUTTING POLICY OBJECTIVES  
In this part, we dive into the literature about coordination and the logic of collective action. 
The aim is to build a body of literature to study the coordination of cross-cutting policy 
objectives. The study of coordination arrangements consists mainly of efforts to construct 
taxonomies and typologies of coordination instruments, on the basis of their characteristics. 
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Coordination instruments can all be subsumed under typologies, but purely focusing on 
typologies risks ‘hollowing out’ the term ‘coordination’. In this part I try to go beyond those 
typologies —for instance the Hierarchy-Market and Network typology— and create a more 
holistic view of coordination arrangements, based on the Institutional Analysis and 
Development framework of Ostrom (2005). This holistic view will be the analytical framework 
to study coordination arrangements in the Flemish government.  
 THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
The focus of this thesis is on cross-cutting policy objectives which are consciously 
coordinated, bottom-up or top-down, by use of coordination instruments and mechanisms, 
i.e. coordination arrangements (6, 2014). This coordinated response attempts to optimize the 
coherence and consistency of political/administrative decisions as well as the organizational 
adaptation (Wollmann, 2003, p. 594). The organizational response to coordination of cross-
cutting policy objectives is seen in this thesis as a collective action, it faces the same 
challenges as a collective action situation: free-riding, no adaptation, or defection (Askim, 
Christensen, Fimreite, & Lægreid, 2010; Dietz, 2003).  
Organizations tend to prioritize the tasks which are of primordial importance and for 
which they are accountable and, subsequently, benefit them most (6, Leat, Seltzer, & Stoker, 
1999; Boyle, 1999). When confronted with conflicting demands, individual organizations 
(e.g., departments or agencies) need to make choices that prioritize these demands and their 
relationships with routine tasks. This makes us wonder how such cross-cutting policy 
objectives can be coordinated in a way which leads organizations to adapt instead of defect. 
Cross-cutting policy objectives could result in a ‘tragedy of the commons’, as it is very 
unlikely that organizations could ‘pay’ the associated cost (e.g. energy, staff, and budget), 
especially when the expected cost of adaptation outweighs the potential benefit (Ostrom, 
2007a).  
Together with Garrett Hardin’s ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968), the ‘logic of 
collective action’, developed by Olson (1971), laid the basis for many studies about how 
groups with a common interest behave under a model of rational choice. Hardin placed a set 
of phenomena on the research agenda, which could be referred to as ‘social dilemmas’, and 
launched the concept of the tragedy of the commons. Classic examples of ‘tragedies of the 
common’ are sustainable development, poverty, and land sharing. Hardin and Olson 
specifically challenged the assumption that individual actors would voluntarily act toward a 
common outcome (Kollock, Argyle, Hinde, Groebel, & Ostrom, 1992, p. 5). Earlier studies of 
complex networks have proven that organizations and their members are partly motivated by 
self-interest (Provan & Milward, 2001). Even altruism could be regarded as a reward for 
some actors (impure altruism, Andreoni, 1990). In this way, even the stewardship 
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perspective on organizations is a rational perspective, although more positive (Davis, 
Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; Van Slyke, 2007). If actors continuously make cost-benefit 
analyses before they choose a course of action, why would they ever choose to cooperate to 
collective action?  
The ‘tragedy of the commons’ idea rests on the assumption that a group can have a 
common interest but an individual member can have no interest to ‘pay’ for the provision of 
that common interest. In other words, individuals are rational beings who will make cost-
benefit analyses about certain situations before they will voluntarily contribute to a common 
goal. Even more extreme, according to rational choice theory, individuals would rather see 
others contribute the entire cost. Once an individual's cost-share investment exceeds the 
benefit that can be derived from a common achievement, they will not (or stop to) contribute 
(Olson, 1971, p. 21).  
Free riding is a central concept within the ‘logic of collective action’ (Ostrom, 1997). Free-
riders are those who benefit from the provision of a common outcome without bearing any of 
the costs. In the collective action in which most organizations or individuals choose to 
cooperate, the organizations who defect are the free riders because they do not reciprocate 
cooperation (Hardin, 1968; Kollock et al., 1992; Olson, 1971). A coordination arena is a 
‘tragedy’ when most organizations choose to defect instead of cooperate. We can formally 
call a situation a ‘tragedy of the commons’ if a group of organizations is unable to achieve the 
common outcome and organizational utility becomes the only consideration (Hardin, 1968; 
Olson, 1971).  
According to Scharpf (1990, 2000), rational models do not heed the institutional 
complexity inherent to the coordination arena. In other words, actors are always rationally 
bounded in the case of multi-actor complexity. ‘Bounded rationality’ is a state in which 
individuals cannot process all available information and alternatives; their rationality is, 
therefore, limited (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; Scharpf, 1990; Simon, 1991). This leads to 
a situation in which the actor takes "satisficing" decisions, instead of a fully rational choice 
(Simon, 1961; Daft & Wiginton, 1979). In conventional theoretical prisoner’s dilemmas, actors 
do not know what other actors decide. Therefore, they decide not to risk ‘paying’ for the 
common outcome. The prisoner’s dilemma—a two-player game—presents an already 
difficult decision story. The multitude of actors and strategies involved in coordination and 
implementation of cross-cutting policy objectives, however, presents actors with even more 
complex situations and cost-benefit analyses (Klijn, 2007; Scharpf, 1997).  
In some coordination and implementation processes, there is no ‘grand scheme’ to 
coordinate actions, yet every actor chooses his or her own strategies (Hanf & Scharpf, 1978). 
Hence, the question arises what an organization, a minister, the center of government, or 
‘the collective’ can do to prevent ‘a tragedy’, and, furthermore, how all these different 
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strategies and processes could still lead to effective coordination efforts. Many authors 
recommend preventing ‘tragedies’ through ownership rights, privatization, or central 
regulating agencies—coercive methods, in other words (Harvey, 2011; Ostrom, 1990). 
Ostrom (1990) and also Hardin (1968) would consider this ‘one-size-fits-all-solution’ too 
narrow, because it does not seem to work in a coordination arena with multiple stakeholders, 
institutions, and interests. Yet, at the same time, a contingent approach is very costly to 
create and hard to establish (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; Lægreid, Sarapuu, Rykkja, & 
Randma-Liiv, 2014).  
Ostrom (1990) argues that one needs mixtures of coercive and deliberative instruments 
to coordinate the arena and actors. While rational models provide much insight, 
organizations are not always (or not only) motivated by extrinsic rewards and incentives, and 
they are not always fully rational, especially not in the case of multi-actor complexity. 
Therefore, other authors (Jessop, 1997; Ostrom, 1990; Scharpf, 1994; Van Bueren et al., 
2003) claim that commonly sharing, deciding, and using deliberative methods, under 
particular rules-in-use strategies, can help create both consensus and coherent policy. 
Ostrom (1990) shows that individuals can, and often do, devise smart and sensible ways to 
manage coordination arenas to benefit both the collective and the individual. Therefore, this 
thesis provides a fine-grained analysis framework to assess coordination arrangements.  
 CONCEPT OF COORDINATION 
In this thesis coordination is defined as the instruments and mechanisms:  
 
 “which aim to enhance the voluntary or forced alignment of tasks and efforts of 
organizations within the public sector. These mechanisms are used in order to create a 
greater coherence, and to reduce redundancy, lacunae and contradictions within and 
between policies, implementation, or management” (Bouckaert et al., 2010, p. 16).  
 
The collection of instruments and mechanisms put in place to steer one cross-cutting 
policy objective or program is called a coordination arrangement. Coordination has both a 
process and an outcome dimension (Beuselinck, 2008). Scholars who define coordination as 
an outcome (Peters, 1998, p. 296) see coordination as ‘an end-state in which the policies 
and programs of government are characterized by minimal redundancy, incoherence and 
lacunae’. Others (6, 2005, p. 48; Mulford & Rogers, 1982, p. 12) underline the more dynamic 
perspective of coordination. Wollmann (2003, 594), for instance, sees coordination as a 
process. According to him coordination is: 
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‘the attempt to optimize the coherence and consistency of political decisions as well as 
policy implementation across policies … across actors and stakeholders … across levels’ 
(Wollmann, 2003, p. 594).  
This thesis focusses on the latter: coordination as a process. This thesis, explicitly, does 
not use the concept of ‘governance’, because it implies involvement of private actors, 
citizens, or NGOs in the decision-making process in order to provide common goods. The 
term governance refers to the ‘cooperative state’, to co-production and co-creation with 
private markets and citizens (Benz, 2007; Osborne, 2010; Windhoff-Héritier, 2002). The 
focus of this thesis is on coordination arrangements within the administrative apparatus, 
among public sector organizations. Furthermore, it focuses on coordination arrangements 
that are deliberately shaped by a political level, center of government, or individual 
organization to make policy preparation and organizational adaptation more smooth and 
coherent.  
It is, nowadays, common to distinguish three families of coordination instruments: 
markets, hierarchies, and networks (Alexander, 1993; Bouckaert et al., 2010; G. Thompson, 
Frances, Levacic, & Mitchell, 1991). Behind these families, there are different mechanisms 
and logics—e.g. price, authority. and consensus (Bouckaert et al., 2010; A. Jordan & Schout, 
2006; Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998). Others names for the market hierarchy network, with 
reference to like-wise mechanisms, include: command, exchange and dialogue (Jessop, 
2009); hierarchical (command based on authority), market (exchange, based on price) or 
solidarity-association (consensus/agreement based on trust) (Alexander, 1995), hierarchies, 
markets and clans (Durant, 1992), and ‘sticks, carrots and sermons’ (Bemelmans-Videc, 
Rist, & Vedung, 2003). 
 
Hierarchy  
The first family of coordination instruments consists of authoritarian or supervisory 
instruments, such as orders and prohibitions (e.g. mandated ministers, rules, and 
regulations), called the hierarchy mechanism. The mechanism is derived from the idea of 
rational bureaucracy proposed by Max Weber. This ideal model for organization of the 
government, according to Weber, resembles a pyramidal structure, with a strong focus on 
strict formal procedures and authority (Verhoest, Bouckaert, & Peters, 2007). The 
mechanism is based on authority and control (Bouckaert et al., 2010). In this ideal type, 
coordination is organized in a top-down manner—in other words, with direct control and 
formalized rules. Scholars assume that hierarchy leads to norms and standards, routines, 
inspection, and intervention (Bouckaert et al., 2010; Lance, Georgiadou, & Bregt, 2009). As a 
consequence, there is a clear definition of tasks. Subsequently, it is clear who bears the final 
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responsibility and who has accountability. As the actors find themselves in positions 
according to a certain hierarchy, coordination can be effected in a coercive manner.  
There are drawbacks to hierarchical coordination, however. At the top of ‘the hierarchical 
pyramid’, for instance, the principals overseeing the process tend to lose touch with the 
administrative base—i.e. the street-level bureaucrats—and, therefore, seem to be ‘in an ivory 
tower’ (Cabinet Office, 2000a). Furthermore, the information exchange between the base 
and the top can be a difficult process, in terms of both overload and deficit (Peters, 1998). 
Given the limited autonomy of the lower layers of the hierarchy, it remains a rigid and 
inflexible way to coordinate (Verhoest, Legrain, & Bouckaert, 2003, p. 25). On the one hand, 
the hierarchical mechanism can orient the behavior of organizations in particular directions, 
so that they take (cross-cutting) action which they otherwise might not (Alexander, 1995). On 
the other hand, because the lines of authority are organized mostly in a vertical manner, it is 
often harder to coordinate horizontal or cross-cutting initiatives.  
 
Market  
Another family embraces financial means: the market mechanism, which has its origins in 
the "invisible hand" of Adam Smith (A. Jordan & Schout, 2006). Coordination in a market-like 
manner is based on general economic principles, such as competition and trade. It assumes 
that agents act rationally and aim for profit-maximization. Proponents of this mechanism 
suggest that it will automatically result in a better allocation of resources and, subsequently, 
efficiency gains. One factor that plays a significant role in the market mechanism is 
information (Peters, 1998, p. 298). To speak of competition in a given market, the market 
must be transparent and accessible. In other words, everyone should have all existing 
information. This information may, for instance, relate to the quality and the price of certain 
products or services. Secondly, there should be several suppliers and buyers, so that a 
choice can be made between the suppliers by the consumers. A monopoly of one provider 
qualifies as a market failure.  
The market mechanism ideal type is less applicable to the study of coordination 
arrangements within the government. Its relevance is, therefore, not big enough to be used in 
the rest of this thesis. Some of the aforementioned characteristics — e.g. the ‘invisible hand’ 
and the ‘free market’ —are not compatible with the idea in which the government is shaped. 
A focus solely on the government apparatus—like this thesis does—means that a totally free 
market is not present, because, for instance, pre-established lines of control and 
responsibility in the apparatus divide certain tasks to certain actors.  
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Networks 
This family comprises communicative tools, which may focus on consensus building, 
information sharing, and determining common goals and visions. If there are no hierarchical 
positions, and when there is no competitive market, the network mechanism will be the only 
thing on which one can fall back. The network mechanism receives more attention within the 
government context, partly because of the governance concept and the New Public 
Governance idea (Osborne, 2010), both of which are gaining ground in the public sector. The 
use of networks as a ‘physical structure’ that creates a web of juxtaposed actors or 
organizations would lead to shared values, common problem analyses, consensus, loyalty, 
reciprocity, trust, informal evaluation, and reputation (Bouckaert et al., 2010, p. 35). 
According to classical network theory, there are some conditions that must be met before we 
can speak of a network. The actors within a network work together to achieve common goals 
(Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). The different actions of the actors should be coordinated in the 
network in order to achieve policy coherence (Peters, 2004). Moreover, there is mutual trust 
needed and a shared commitment (Bouckaert et al., 2010, p. 53; Mcguire & Agranoff, 2011).  
 
Besides classifying coordination instruments under the umbrella of different mechanisms, 
there is also another way to distinguish between types of instruments. An instrument is either 
focused on management or structure (Bouckaert et al., 2010; Verhoest et al., 2007). 
Structural coordination instruments try to reshuffle and (re)install organizational structure. 
Thus, there is a creation of new structures or a restructuring of current structures. 
Management instruments, meanwhile, try to coordinate the adaptation process through 
management of the organization (e.g. performance agreements, indicators). Within this 
dichotomy, a clustering of coordination instruments would look like the overview in Table 1. 
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TABLE 1: CLUSTERS OF COORDINATION INSTRUMENTS (BOUCKAERT ET AL., 2010, P. 41; 
VERHOEST ET AL. 2007) 
 Underlying mechanism 
Management instruments Hierarchy Market Network 
Bottom-up and interactive strategic management  
result oriented financial management systems oriented on 
information exchange and consolidation according to policy 
portfolios 
   
top-down and unilateral strategic management    
traditional input oriented financial management systems    
result oriented financial management systems focused on 
incentives for units 
   
Inter-organizational learning: Culture management (e.g. by 
means of training, rotation, career management, internal job 
market) Competence and information management 
   
Procedural instruments concerning mandated consultation 
and review, mechanism depending on compulsory nature 
   
Structural instruments Hierarchy Market Network 
Reshuffling of competencies: Organizational merger or 
splits; centralization (decentralization) 
   
Reshuffling of lines of control: Establishment of a specific 
coordinating function or entity; lines of control 
   
Regulated markets: internal markets, quasi-markets, 
voucher markets and external markets 
   
Systems for information exchange    
Advisory bodies & consultative/deliberative bodies    
Entities for collective decision making    
Common organizations (partnership organization)    
Chain management structures    
 
Focusing on ‘ideal type’ coordination mechanisms and instruments creates a risk of 
‘hollowing out’ the concept coordination, because we know nothing about the deployment 
(how is the arrangement used), the actors (who is coordinating and who is being 
coordinated), and the strength (power, loss of autonomy, intrusion) of the coordination 
arrangement. These families or mechanisms are ideal types; governments, however, and de 
facto, use increasingly hybrid mixes of coordination mechanisms, which are always dynamic 
and unstable (Hood, 2000). We know, for instance, that we can place certain instruments 
under different mechanisms (Lindblom, 2001). A network with a lead organization has, for 
instance, both network and hierarchy elements. In research, this tends to lead to the 
conclusion that coordination arrangements are hybrid (Hood, 1995). Alexander (1995), for 
example, points out that networks as structures can be used when co-ordination is price-
based (market-based) as well as when it is trust-based (i.e. network-based). Furthermore, 
‘trial and error’ processes and the inevitable alterations that follow the policy design phase 
often lead to hybrid coordination arrangements (Christensen & Lægreid, 2012). These 
coordination arrangements, which get their form over time, are often layered upon existing 
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steering structures or poorly integrated in existing structures. Indeed, they are an amalgam of 
rules and instruments (Christensen & Lægreid, 2012; Jessop, 1998; Streeck & Thelen, 
2009). 
Learning how to apply coordination approaches to cross-cutting policy requires to 
understand the specificity of the coordination arrangements. Understanding such specificity, 
in turn, remains important in efforts to design new coordination arrangements or reforming 
existing ones (Ostrom, 1986). Unraveling the hybrid mixes is important; therefore the 
Hierarchy-Market-Network typology is left in this thesis. The concept of ‘coordination area’ 
and the IAD framework are used to provide a fine-grained possibility to describe coordination 
arrangements and will be elaborated and operationalized in the following paragraphs. This 
provides an opportunity to answer the first research question (RQ 1): How does the Flemish 
government organize the coordination of specific cross-cutting policies? 
2.3. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT (IAD) FRAMEWORK 
According to (Ostrom, 2005) every policy situation has a few general building blocks, and 
she calls the aggregate of these building blocks the ‘coordination arena’. The notion of 
coordination arena found its way into the policy analysis literature beginning with the 
publications of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom (Kollock et al., 1992). A coordination arena is a 
conceptual ‘unit of analysis’ (Ostrom, 2007b, p. 27), and it can be used to study actors, 
(inter)actions, and positions within an arrangement established to coordinate policy actors 
and actions. ‘Arena’ refers to a social space where actors choose and change strategies that 
lead to changes in the decision and adaptation process. Those actors have diverse 
(organizational) preferences: they interact and exchange resources (time, and services), 
solve problems, and create conflict (Van Bueren & ten Heuvelhof, 2005).  
Arthur Benz (2007) uses the term ‘connected arenas’ to indicate that there is more than 
one arena in which actors ‘play’. While the coordination arena is where all actors involved in 
a certain policy issue come together, this arena remains connected to other arenas, such as 
the organizational arena or the home organization. The organizational arena determines for a 
large part the behavior of an actor in the coordination arena. The outcome of a coordination 
arena is based upon the extent of organized (or collective) action between independent 
organizations, in cooperation, to achieve a goal (Ostrom, 2005, p. 6). Actors are subject to 
various factors determining their behavior, which is formed through particular positions, 
interests, power, and rules that define the many particular arenas (Benz, 2007). Ostrom and 
her colleagues developed the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework to 
study coordination arenas (see Figure 3). The IAD framework is envisioned as a toolkit of 
elements that an institutional analyst can use to study the actors and actions in a 
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coordination arena. Its descriptive nature, but still systematic approach to describe policy 
issues makes the coordination arena concept fruitful for comparisons across coordination 
arrangements, while simultaneously keeping the rich descriptions of the cases. Studying 
configurations of characteristics within the coordination arena could lead to an understanding 
of the coordination of cross-cutting policy objectives (Timmermans, 2001, p. 322).  
The IAD framework builds heavily on rational choice theory, but, at the same time, it has 
a strong sociological approach in that it tries to be an encompassing framework to analyze 
policy situations (Ostrom, 2005). Zooming in on a coordination arena obviously means a 
simplification of the complexity inherent in the coordination arena. Interactions, outcomes, 
and, especially, causalities within the coordination arena are hard to study, but a thick 
description of the main actors, their positions and actions gives a thorough understanding of 
the policy situation.  
 
FIGURE 3: INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK (OSTROM, 2005, P. 189) 
 
Within the Institutional Analysis and Development framework there are seven elements 
which describe the coordination arena (Ostrom, 2005, 2007b, p. 27):  
1) the participants,  
2) their positions,  
3) the actions, 
4) the control,  
5) information,  
6) the outcomes, and  
7) the cost-benefit analyses.  
 
How actors adapt depends on the rules of the game and pressures to which actors are 
exposed in the coordination and home arenas, the way arenas are linked, and the strategies 
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that actors apply (Benz, 2007). While the IAD framework helps to explain different aspects of 
the coordination arena, we need a way to systematically compare the coordination arenas 
and the arrangements. Therefore, all the elements of the IAD framework will be 
operationalized on a 4-point ‘scale’, which allows us to compare different coordination 
arrangements via these elements. The scale ranges from (1) tightly coupled coordination 
arrangements to (4) loosely coupled coordination arrangements. Coupling, a causal concept, 
refers to control and the coupling of actors and participants to the coordination arena and 
arrangement. The coordination arrangement, operationalized as the rules of the game (and 
further elaborated upon in the next paragraphs), i.e. either more tightly or more loosely 
coupled, defines how stringently the environment presses the organizations to adapt 
(Cameron, 1984).  
In tightly coupled arrangements, authority constitutes the prime causal factor to put 
pressure on the organizations (Chisholm, 1992). Tightly coupled arrangements are defined 
by transitivity and asymmetry, which means that superiors determine (i.e., ‘cause') the 
actions of subordinates. Rational system analysts claim that such ideal type arenas exist and 
are, for instance, situations in which the ‘arena’ decides and all the organizations adapt (W. 
R. Scott, 1992, p. 284). Hierarchy and control are sometimes met with reluctance by 
organizations. This occurs because tight coupling can endanger or diminish the autonomy of 
organizational arenas (Benz, 2007; W. R. Scott, 1992). The coordination arena is tightly 
coupled with the organizational arena if institutional rules strictly determine how participants 
adapt to the policies (Benz, 2007).  
A loosely coupled arrangement lies on the other end of the scale. This loose coupling 
concept is similar to self-organization (Benz, 2007) and, according to Jessop (1998), 
especially useful in the cases of operational autonomy, reciprocal interdependence, and 
shared interests or projects. Participants have leeway, which they can use to deal with 
conflicting or complex demands. Interaction and communication occur not as a consequence 
of instruction or command, but voluntarily on the basis of perceived needs, and trust. Not 
adapting (deviant behavior) may lead to distrust, but usually this does not lead to the 
exclusion of participants (Jessop, 1998). Actors who are included in the coordination arena 
are determined by the issue and the need, not because of the organization chart (Chisholm, 
1992; W. R. Scott, 1992). Roles and actions are continuously adjusted on the basis of 
experience, and tasks are generally established by negotiation. Some networks are loosely 
coupled arenas because they are trust-based, include autonomous participants, and are not 
guided by binding rules. Roles and definitions of tasks are set not by any principal, but by the 
organizations and actors themselves. These kinds of voluntary negotiations have a self-
reinforcing mechanism, because they integrate participants in a rather loose manner (Benz, 
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2007). Because such systems are flat—there is no one ‘center of authority’—they may 
appear disordered (Chisholm, 1992, p. 54; Landau, 1991).  
Loosely coupled coordination arrangements have independent components (the 
organizations and participants of the arena), whereas tightly coupled arrangements have 
responsive components that do not act independently (Benz, 2007). Elmore (1979, p. 608) 
argues that tightly coupled arrangements lead to more checks and decision points, which 
create, in turn, possibilities for diversion and delay. In a loosely coupled arrangement in turn, 
discretion works as an ‘adaptive device’:  
 
‘Standardized solutions, developed at great distance from the problem, are notoriously 
unreliable; policies that fix street-level behavior in the interest of uniformity and consistency 
are difficult to adapt to situations that policymakers failed to anticipate (Elmore 1979, p. 608)’. 
 
Both types of coupling are failure prone (Benz, 2007; Jessop, 2003). Benz (2007, p. 14) 
writes, for instance, that if rules of connected arenas are mismatched, policy implementation 
and decision making are both likely to end in impasse. In loosely coupled arenas, 
mismatching has less negative impact, because the rules do not steer the actions of the 
participants as much but provide the participant leeway to adjust in the most suitable way. 
The following paragraphs will describe the elements of the Institutional Analysis and 
Development framework, which leads to a rich and fine-grained method to score coordination 
arrangements on all their elements. In Annex 1, an overview of all the elements is provided.  
 BOUNDARY RULES – PARTICIPANT CONSTELLATION  
The first element of the IAD framework are the participants (Ostrom, 2005, p. 38). 
Boundary rules describe how exclusive or open the coordination arena is: who is obliged to 
cooperate, which actors are included, which are not, and what the exit options are. These 
boundary rules have either a voluntary or obliged character and tell participants the rules of 
conduct within the coordination arena (Ostrom, 2005). Organizations are considered to be 
the participants in this thesis. Like Herbert Simon (1991), this does not mean that we ignore 
the individual level; rather, it is simply a way of to focus on the aggregate level.  
To operationalize this dimension, two elements are combined: the level of 
institutionalization (based on: Jordan and Schubert, 1992; Waarden, 1992) and the diversity 
of participants (based on: Bouckaert et al., 2010). The combined dimension is called 
participant constellation. How open or closed the coordination arena is can be described by 
the level of institutionalization, which ranges from stable to unstable (G. Jordan & Schubert, 
1992). Van Waarden (1992) describes institutionalization as one of the key differences 
between coordination arenas. A tightly coupled participant constellation is highly 
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institutionalized, formal, obliged and restricted in terms of access to new participants. An 
open, ad hoc participant constellation, based on voluntary participation, is a loosely coupled 
arena.  
For the diversity of the participants, a distinction is made between vertical and horizontal 
linkages, in line with Bouckaert et al. (2010). Cross-cutting policies go beyond the boundaries 
of single organizations and policy sectors, and cut across ministries. One could think of 
vertical linkages between levels of government of one ministry—e.g. central governments, 
departments and agencies—or horizontal linkages within one level of government—e.g. 
organizational actions—within multiple ministries. In loosely coupled arrangements, the 
participant constellation is highly diverse, and the boundaries are open, fluent, and 
accessible to new participants. In tightly coupled arrangements (see left column in Table 2), 
the participant constellation is closed, and clusters participants from one ministry. The four 
institutionalization forms in Table 2 are borrowed from Van Waarden (1992, p. 35) and 
combined with the vertical/horizontal linkages of Bouckaert et al. (2010). This dimension 
does not concern the centralization of power or the positions in the coordination 
arrangement. It merely concerns the access and boundaries of the constellation.  
 
TABLE 2: BOUNDARY RULES – PARTICIPANT CONSTELLATION  
(1) Participant 
constellation: tight 
(2) (3) (4) Participant 
constellation: loose 
Closed/restricted, 
ordered linkages, 
Multi-level (more 
than two) linkages 
within the ministry 
Permanent 
coalition multi-level 
(more than two) 
linkages within the 
ministry 
Ad-hoc relationships 
(based on committee-, 
advisory work). Multiple 
juxtaposed agencies or 
departments, cross-
ministry 
Open/fluent, ad-hoc 
temporary, horizontal 
linkages, Multiple 
juxtaposed agencies, 
departments and 
external stakeholders  
 
 POSITIONS RULES – POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS 
Secondly, next to the participant constellation, participants are, because of rules, 
agreements and mandates situated in different (formal) positions (Ostrom, 2005, p. 42). The 
state machinery positions, as well as the positions in a network or a coordination arena 
determine the extent of power a certain actor has (Klijn, 2007) and his or her bargaining and 
veto power. Lukes (2005) defines power in terms of whose interests are concerned and 
served when the outcome is reached. He sees power as a reality in interrelations, rather than 
an individualistic trait. Pfeffer (1994) describes that being in a good place is the most 
important thing. This good place is defined by him as: having control over resources, access 
to information about the participants, activities, the strategies of others and the process, and 
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formal authority (e.g. a mandate) (Pfeffer, 1994, p. 69). Administrative and political position 
rules determine who is obliged or mandated to take certain actions (Ostrom, 2005).  
 
Position rules - political position 
The political level chooses different strategies, ranging from highly coercive (tightly 
coupled) to not coercive, with voluntary or no agreements (loosely coupled). These strategies 
determine the positions of the politicians when they have to steer and get organizations to 
adapt. In other words, this strategy is their ‘backup’ on which they can fall back in their 
relation with organizations. Following Alexander (1995) and Mulford and Rogers (1982), we 
will describe the political positions by their level of coerciveness or voluntarism.  
Van der Doelen (1998) helps us operationalize this dimension (see Table 3). He 
describes, with respect to regulatory instruments, an interesting development. He explains 
that the trend is to move away from unilateral, coercive government regulation toward 
bilateral, voluntary agreements, concluded between actors. The first are highly coercive and 
tight arrangements. An unilateral coercive government arrangement ((1) in Table 3) leads to 
a broad horizontal coercive backup for individual ministers, which tightly couples all ministers 
and the organizations under their remit. The interministerial committee is a temporary 
coalition between a few ministers, which couples the ministers and their organizations to 
each other. The forms on the right side of Table 3 are less coercive and loosely coupled 
arrangements. Column (3) of Table 3 is a negotiated agreement between actors via codes of 
conduct, gentlemen’s agreements, contracts, and covenants. Although structured with a lead 
minister, the ‘backup’ is a voluntary agreement. The last form is also lead minister governed, 
but without a written agreement.  
 
TABLE 3: POSITION RULES - POLITICAL POSITIONS 
(1) Highly coercive: tight (2) (3) (4) Low coercive: 
loose 
Unilateral coercive 
government regulation 
(with executive orders)- 
agreement, strong 
position entire 
government 
Interministerial 
committee, bi- or 
multi-lateral 
agreements 
Lead minister 
governed - 
negotiated 
covenants, without 
regulation or 
executive orders  
Lead minister 
governed, with 
voluntary 
contribution, no 
written agreement 
 
Administrative position rules – structuration 
When focusing on administrative position rules, we can focus on how the arrangement is 
structured (see Table 4). This dimension builds heavily on the work of Provan and Kenis 
(2008). Coordination arrangements may be, at one extreme, collectively structured (i.e. 
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shared) by a separately created administrative organization (Provan & Kenis, 2008). The 
administrative organization type of coordination is a form in which a separately created unit 
coordinates the arena and the actions (Provan & Kenis, 2008). An arrangement coordinated 
by a separately created administrative organization is the most highly structured and most 
tightly coupled form of coordination. At the other extreme, the administrative positions may 
not be structured at all and, therefore, participant governed, which is a very loose type of 
coupling. In this arrangement, members themselves govern their actions which they 
contribute to cross-cutting policy objectives. Another example of loose coupling occurs when 
the network (or collective body) acts as the basic entity where activities are coordinated. The 
arena functions as a collective structure in which consensus can be reached. Column 2 of 
Table 4 describes an arrangement in which a single coordination arena participant takes on 
the role of a lead organization (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 235) — a form of coordination 
where one organization within the coordination arena assumes the leading role.  
 
TABLE 4: ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION RULES – STRUCTURATION 
(1) Highly structured: 
tight 
(2) (3) (4) Low level of 
structuration: loose 
Administrative 
organization governed 
(separately created) 
Lead organization 
(either department or 
agency) governed  
Network governed  Internally participant 
governed  
 
 CHOICE RULES - ROOM FOR ACTION  
Thirdly, participants have different options for action (Ostrom, 2005, p. 45), informed by 
their positions, roughly divided into cooperation or defection. The choice rules determine the 
action capacity of a participant ascribed to a particular position, and they prescribe if the 
participant must, must not, or may take action in various situations. Ostrom (2005) 
distinguishes between rules, norms and strategies. The Attributes, Deontic, Aims, 
Conditions, and Or else (ADICO) grammar can help us study if a cross-cutting issue’s 
mission statement consists of a rule, norm or strategy. 
1. Attributes: who is addressed by the cross-cutting issue mission? 
2. Deontics: tell something about the prescriptive nature of a cross-cutting objective. If a 
deontic exists, we know that something is obliged, permitted, and forbidden. This 
deontic is identified by words like may, should, and must.  
3. Aims: what is the aim of the actions involved in attaining the cross-cutting objective? 
4. Conditions: under what circumstances the attribute should do something, what is 
stated in the aim; for instance, in which period, by which deadline etc.  
5. Or else: the sanction if the participant does not follow the new demands.  
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Cross-cutting policy objectives that contain each of the aforementioned components are 
characterized as rules (ADICO). In a policy issue where there is a guiding rule, there is a 
strong degree of certainty (Basurto, Kingsley, McQueen, Smith, & Weible, 2010) about what 
is expected of the participants and tightly couples them to the cross-cutting policy objectives. 
Objectives containing the first four components (ADIC) are characterized as norms. 
Objectives which only contain an Attribute, Aim, and Condition (AIC) are considered to be 
strategies (Siddiki, Weible, Basurto, & Calanni, 2011). Finally, the loosest arrangement is a 
statement, which consists of an attribute (A) and an Aim (I). Table 5 shows all these forms 
schematically.  
 
TABLE 5: CHOICE RULES - ROOM FOR ACTION – ADICO SCHEME 
(1) Rule (ADICO): 
tight 
(2) Norm (ADIC) (3) strategy (AIC) (4) Statement 
(AI): loose 
All the elements Attribute, Aim, Condition 
and Deontic  
Attribute, Aim, and 
Condition  
Attribute, Aim  
 INFORMATION RULES – ACCESS AND INTENSITY OF THE INTERACTION  
The fourth element of the IAD framework (see Table 6) is the information a participant 
has about how to reach the cross-cutting objective and the tasks of the other participants. 
Tight and loose arrangements can both have frequent and numerous information channels. 
This dimension, however, does not stress the frequency or the amount of information; rather, 
it stresses the kind of information (Ostrom, 2005). Hood (1991) distinguishes between 
information that tightly and loosely couples organizations. Tight coupling happens when 
responsibilities are ex ante thoroughly described, involving separation of ‘coordination’ and 
‘implementation’ activities. There are two tight types: one in which everybody has the same 
standardized information and another in which the organizations only have information about 
their own, separate tasks (Hood, 1991, p. 12; Keohane & Grant, 2005, p. 34). As it is the 
actor with the most amount of information who has a dominant position (Peters, 1998, p. 
298), the latter can lead to information protection and ‘bargaining’. In the situation of 
incomplete information and deficits, the strategies of the participants are ‘messy’ and 
uncoordinated (Ney, 2006).  
One of the looser types of coupling are processes like ‘notice and comment’ procedures 
(Hood, 1991, p. 13). In these procedures, either a political or an administrative coordinator 
sets up and coordinates a participative process to comment on a policy plan. In the loosest 
type of information intensity, there is a rich exchange of information, “with a relatively high 
degree of 'slack' to provide spare capacity for learning or deployment” (Hood, 1991, p. 15). 
Information, here, is seen as a collective asset. Participants of such loose arenas 
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communicate on an impersonal, rather than formal, level with each other, which can result in 
more ‘noise’ and different conceptions of the task at hand (Beekun & Glick, 2001, p. 232). 
Furthermore, participants who do not participate in the coordination process lack the 
information of those who do.  
 
TABLE 6: INFORMATION RULES - ACCESS AND INTENSITY OF THE INTERACTION 
(1) Tight and formal 
information 
(2) (3) (4) Loose and 
informal 
information 
Direct formal 
information, 
standardized 
information. 
Everybody the same 
task and information 
Direct formal 
information, 
standardized 
information. Everybody 
different task  
Information from a 
coordination function, 
with possibility to 
‘notice and comment’  
Informal 
communication, 
information with 
room to maneuver.  
 AGGREGATION RULES – POWER DISTRIBUTION  
The fifth element is the control that participants in the coordination arena have, how 
power is played out, how participants can affect the outcome, and how they reach final 
decisions (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Aggregation rules determine, for instance, whether a 
decision by a single or multiple participants is needed to proceed to action and the 
implementation phase. In other words, aggregation rules can be symmetric (e.g., unanimity, 
or voting schemes for instance) or non-symmetric—e.g. a leader takes a decision on behalf 
of the others, such as chairman or lead organization (Ostrom, 2005).  
Compared to the administrative position rules, this dimension describes how participants 
come to decisions in the coordination arrangement. The position rules explain how the 
positions and the arrangement are structured. How power and authority are played out 
remains central to the coordination concept (Newman, 2001). The literature tends to focus on 
three distinct forms, unicentric (tightly coupled), multicentric (having more than one 
authority), and pluricentric (loosely coupled) (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998; Powell, 1990; G. 
Thompson et al., 1991). The role of higher authorities in a unicentric form is not to gain or to 
monopolize power but to perform roles that ‘normal’ participants are unable to perform: 
foreseeing threats, disasters, and deadlock, and undertaking long term planning (Mulgan, 
1997 cited in: Parsons, 2002). Table 7 shows all these forms schematically. 
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TABLE 7: AGGREGATION RULES – POWER DISTRIBUTION 
(1) Non-symmetric, low 
power distribution: tight 
(2) (3) (4) Symmetric, high 
power distribution: 
loose 
Leader takes 
decisions, with 
mandate, sanctions – 
incentives 
Unicentric, e.g. 
coordinator without 
sanctions – incentives 
Multiple participants, 
democratic 
decision-making  
Pluricentric; 
coordinators in 
multiple 
organizations  
 
 PAY-OFF RULES - COST BENEFIT ANALYSES  
The cost-benefit analysis that the participant makes, about the utility that he or she gains 
by either cooperation or defecting, is the sixth element of the IAD framework (Ostrom, 2005). 
The ‘pay-off’ can be an either an extrinsic reward or sanction, or an intrinsic valuation (e.g. 
joy, shame, guilt, Ostrom, 2005, p.52). In government organizations, the payoffs are highly 
institutionalized through accountability arrangements. Accountability can have a few 
influences on policy coordination. Firstly, making organizations accountable places emphasis 
on goal formulation and achievement. Secondly, accountability systems can enable 
participants to comprehend the potential benefits of and pay attention to targets. Thirdly, 
detecting and resolving overlap and conflicts can be a collective goal (Özerol, Bressers, & 
Coenen, 2012).  
Fox (2007) helps to operationalize this dimension by discussing two basic dimensions of 
accountability:  
1. Answerability ‘soft face’, for instance peer review– the loosest type of accountability, 
which signifies dissemination and access to information (see (4) in Table 8).  
2. The ‘hard face’ form of accountability, which includes answerability plus the possibility 
of sanctions. Answerability means that organizations have the obligation to answer 
questions regarding their decisions and actions to a certain coordination function 
(Fox, 2007 cited in: Schedler, 1999).  
Type (2) and (3) in Table 8 are types of institutional answerability: one type without 
inspection, sanctions, or rewards, and the other with these. The tightest form is what Fox 
(2007) calls the hard accountability type: performance-based accountability with sanctions 
and the possibility to investigate actual institutional behavior.  
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TABLE 8: PAY-OFF RULES - ACCOUNTABILITY 
(1) Hard Accountability (2) (3) (4) Soft 
Accountability 
Performance-based 
accountability, with sanctions 
or rewards, with possibility to 
investigate  
actual institutional behavior 
(e.g. inspections) 
Institutional 
answerability to 
specific 
coordination 
function, with 
sanctions or 
rewards  
Institutional 
answerability to 
specific 
coordination 
function, no 
inspections, 
sanctions or 
rewards 
Dissemination and 
access to 
information, no 
sanctions or 
inspections - Peer 
review  
 
 SCOPE RULES - INTENSITY  
Lastly, the scope rules describe the range of possible outcomes, and they specify the 
ultimate goal that must be achieved (Ostrom, 2005, p.209). They affect what is allowed, 
mandated, or forbidden in order to reach the cross-cutting objectives. These are the 
envisioned outcomes, not on the level of the participants, but on level of ‘the collective’. The 
scope is, in the majority of instances, explicated in general mission statements. A loosely 
coupled arrangement is, for instance, a cross-cutting policy program in which organizations 
are appointed as a ‘supplier’ to the program and in which there are only informal contacts 
(Keast, Mandell, Brown, & Woolcock, 2004). The coordination arrangement can also 
stimulate or facilitate cooperation, coordination or collaboration between participants (based 
on: Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). Cooperation is the exchange of information between 
organizations. The function of the coordination arrangement is coordination, when 
participants coordinate independent actions. The last scope, and the tightest way of coupling, 
is an intense mode of collaboration in which organizations create or collaborate to invent 
something new (e.g. a managerial system). Table 9 presents an overview of all the scope 
types.  
 
TABLE 9: SCOPE RULES: INTENSITY (KEAST ET AL., 2007) 
(1) High intensity: tight (2) (3) (4) Low 
intensity: 
loose 
Collaboration: synergize to 
create something 
new/systems change 
Coordination of otherwise 
independent action; joint 
effort/joint planning 
Cooperation: 
dialogue, 
information sharing 
Informal 
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The paragraphs above set up an analytical framework to study the different elements of 
coordination arrangements. In Annex 1 all the aforementioned tables are merged into one 
overview table.  
A tightly coupled coordination arrangement has a closed and restricted participant 
constellation in which a (political) leader takes decisions and is aimed at collaboration, it is 
based on unilateral agreements, rules and performance based accountability, and is 
governed by an administrative organization and direct formal information channels.  
A loosely coupled coordination arrangement has an informal, open and temporary 
participant constellation, in which multiple organizations take their separate decisions and 
govern their own actions, it is lead minister governed based on a mission statement, 
information exchange happens through informal communication channels and the 
accountability system is based on peer review.  
The literature points us towards three policy issue characteristics which can explain why 
a coordination arrangement gets its particular form. The political urgency, the 
interdependencies and the focus of the policy issue are hypothesized to have an influence on 
the form of the coordination arrangement. In the following paragraph these policy issue 
characteristics are explained.  
2.4. HYPOTHESES: INFLUENCE OF POLICY ISSUE CHARACTERISTICS  
The first part of this chapter defines and operationalizes the coordination arrangement as 
the collection of instruments and rules that guide participants and their positions, room for 
action, abilities to control, avenues to information, outcomes and cost-benefit analyses. Such 
an arrangement is deployed to steer organizational adaptation to cross-cutting policy 
objectives. This paragraph presents the hypotheses concerning the first part of the thesis.  
Some authors (Alexander, 1995; Peters, 1998; Turnpenny et al., 2009) suggest that the 
'character' of the policy issue can provide an indication for an appropriate means to 
coordinate a cross-cutting policy objective. The literature points to different characteristics of 
policy issues, which are assumed to explain the functioning of the coordination arrangement 
(either loosely or tightly coupled). These characteristics include political urgency, 
interdependencies, and the focus of the cross-cutting policy objective itself. These 
hypotheses are the theoretical basis to answer the second research question (RQ2): What 
policy issue characteristics explain the type of coordination arrangement deployed in cross-
cutting policies? The policy issue characteristics are explained in the following paragraphs.  
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 POLITICAL URGENCY 
The political urgency of a policy problem can influence the either tight or loose coupling of 
the coordination arrangement. Here, the word urgency stresses both the political salience of 
the problem and the time horizon that is envisioned to achieve the cross-cutting policy 
objectives. Kickert (2012), for instance, claims that the choice for either a tight (hierarchical) 
or loose (network) approach depends on the importance and acuteness of a policy issue. 
The current paragraph will first address salience and then the time horizon.  
Political salience signifies an issue's importance and the degree to which it is a problem 
(Wlezien, 2005, p. 555). An issue is important if many people care about it—for instance, 
health care (Green-Pedersen & Wilkerson, 2006) or, in the case of this thesis, integrated 
youth care. Something is only a problem if there are causal social conditions—in the case of 
poverty, for instance: high unemployment, inflation, and low GDP (Wlezien, 2005). The 
austerity measures investigated in this thesis are both important—people care about the high 
taxes and government spending—and problematic—because of the financial crisis. We can, 
therefore, call them salient. Peters (2011) suggests that when governments face politically 
salient problems, they tend to fall back on hierarchy and shift responsibility upwards to the 
highest level of government, to presidents, prime ministers and central departments. In other 
words, policy issues that could be successfully dealt with through market mechanisms or 
networks are driven towards hierarchy-based approaches because of limited timespans and 
political urgency. The approach to the crisis is, hence, politicized (Peters, 2011). When policy 
issues are urgent and linked to crises, the public generally wants political leaders to solve the 
issues and, therefore, holds them accountable. Political leaders, in turn, are very attentive to 
these issues and use their hierarchical position to impose priorities via tightly coupled 
coordination arrangements (Kickert, Randma-liiv, & Savi, 2013; Peters, 2011; Stern & 
Sundelius, 1997). 
Concerning the time dimension, we learn from Jessop (1998) that different coordination 
arrangements can be chosen to handle different time horizons. Although some scholars (e.g. 
Jones & Baumgartner, 2008) say that ‘new issues’ can be pressed successfully without the 
short time horizon, it is precisely this short time horizon that seems to effect a tight, rather 
than loose, approach. Jessop (1998) suggests that the loose approach with an open 
structure is well suited for policy issues with a long time horizon, because it preserves 
flexibility. Some authors (e.g. Peters, 2011) suggest that a loose involvement of actors in 
early stages slows down the decision-making process but may deliver better information and 
improve the quality of decisions. In case of short-term objectives, the involvement of, for 
instance, high-level civil servants from line departments and agencies could be important 
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because politicians and central departments need sufficiently detailed and high-quality 
information (e.g. Kickert, 2012; Levine, 1978; Pollitt, 2010). 
On the one hand, there are scholars who suggest that some cross-cutting policy 
objectives call for a hierarchical, centralized, top-down approach—for instance, in times of 
budget crises (Behn, 1985; Levine, 1978). On the other hand, there are scholars who claim 
that a decentralized and loose approach might be a good choice for governments, because 
organizations need room to maneuver and experiment. 
When we specifically focus on the austerity measures, we see that the cutback literature 
describes that such an issue calls for a hierarchical, centralized, top-down approach (Behn, 
1985; Levine, 1978). Behn (1985) argues that political leadership should be aggressive, 
sometimes coercive in this situation; a political leader must define the overarching issues and 
the specific cuts and build political support. Seeking bottom-up involvement in the early stage 
of austerity measures might be wise, but using a network-based, loosely coupled approach 
throughout the whole process would create turf wars and conflicts, as organizations remain 
unlikely to volunteer in organizational decline. Schick (1986) even writes that unconstrained, 
bottom-up processes in the context of austerity measures lead to conflictual situations during 
negotiations between the politically-responsible leaders and the line ministries or agencies 
facing cuts. Civil servants in line departments and agencies, furthermore, tend to become 
demoralized in the ‘cutting back’ process because of the tighter controls and less budgetary 
discretion (Schick, 1988, p. 529). In order to maintain progress and to deal with conflictual 
situations, top-down hierarchy could be exercised.  
 
Based on previous studies, the hypotheses are that: 
- H1a. Tightly coupled coordination arrangements are deployed to coordinate politically 
urgent policy issues—i.e. cross-cutting policy objectives which are political salient and 
have short time horizons.  
- H1b. Loosely coupled coordination arrangements are deployed to coordinate policy 
issues which are less urgent—i.e. cross-cutting policy objectives which are less 
politically salient and have long time horizons.  
 INTERDEPENDENCIES  
There is a range of different strategies and tools to coordinate the multi-actor 
coordination arena. When conducting actions, organizations can be totally independent, but 
frequently, and especially in the case of cross-cutting policy objectives, there are 
interdependencies between actors (Chisholm, 1992). In line with Lindblom (1959) and 
Chisholm (1992), interdependencies are defined as:  
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“occurring whenever actors interfere with or contribute to the goal achievement of another 
actor, either by direct impact or through a chain of effects that any given actor only can 
continue through effects by others” (Chisholm, 1992, p. 43). 
 
 An organizations’ interdependence with other organizations causes uncertainty for an 
organization. Even if the organization achieves an understanding of such relations, it may not 
be able to control these relations satisfactorily. According to O’Toole and Montjoy (1984, p. 
492), “The result of policy implementation depends on the type of interdependence required”. 
O’Toole and Montjoy (1984) make a typology of different kinds of interdependence. 
Interdependence ranges, according to them, across a continuum from pooled to sequential to 
reciprocal.  
1. Pooled interdependence occurs when the organizations have to fulfill actions but are 
not dependent on each other in doing so. An example of this is a cross-cutting 
program in which every organization has to deliver the same action—in other words, 
‘across-the-board-policy’ (percentage budget cut, research budget, good governance 
guidelines, etc.). These kinds of policy programs often need only a low degree of 
coordination or no coordination at all, and they deliver quick results. 
2. Sequential interdependence is a situation in which the output of one unit is the input 
of another—i.e. a chain. This is an intermediate form of interdependence, as an 
organization has its own task, but a delay or breakdown in the chain can affect others 
vis-a-vis implementation.  
3. Agencies are reciprocally interdependent if they must adjust mutually to coordinate 
actions. Such interdependencies require bargaining about the interdependencies and 
the substance of the policy issues. This creates both opportunities and difficulties. 
The organizations pose contingencies for each other, which:  
 
“include high levels of uncertainty for the participants […] Situations of reciprocal 
interdependence contain sufficient uncertainty to allow participants to resort to "games" or 
"ploys" in their quest to reach agreements on favourable terms” (O’Toole Jr. & Montjoy, 
1984, p. 494). 
 
These different patterns of independencies inherently lead, according to Jessop (1997), 
to different coordination arrangements. Scharpf (Scharpf, 1994, p. 37) writes:  
 
“… the advantages of hierarchical coordination are lost in a world that is characterized by 
increasingly dense, extended, and rapidly changing patterns of reciprocal interdependence, 
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and by increasingly frequent, but ephemeral, interactions across all types of pre-established 
boundaries, intra- and interorganizational, intra- and intersectoral, intra- and international”. 
 
Even more strongly, Jessop (1997) writes that interactions characterized by reciprocal 
interdependence are resistant to tightly coupled coordination arrangements—they do not 
accept top-down command or lead organizations. Hood (1991) explains that, in situations of 
pooled interdependence, when goals are fixed and segmented, one does not need slack and 
room to maneuver. Pooled interdependence leads to standardization of norms and a 
technological infrastructure of reporting that tightly couples every organization to the cross-
cutting policy objectives. Some might argue that low interdependence could also mean that 
there is no interest in coupling (or coordination). As said before, indeed pooled 
interdependence often means less coordination. Moreover, this thesis focuses on different 
cross-cutting policy objectives, including those with low interdependence in which there is an 
interest in coordination.  
In the case of reciprocal or sequential interdependence, a tightly coupled arrangement is 
not suitable because it is not attuned to fast-changing interactions and reciprocal 
relationships (Scharpf, 1994). Furthermore, a tightly coupled approach could provoke 
resistance from the implementing organizations if they are interdependent. They do not 
accept top-down command.  
 
Based on previous studies, the hypotheses are that: 
- H2a. Tightly coupled coordination arrangements are deployed to coordinate cross-
cutting policy objectives that are characterized by low interdependence (pooled 
interdependence). 
- H2b. Loosely coupled coordination arrangements are deployed to coordinate cross-
cutting policy objectives that are characterized by high interdependence (reciprocal 
interdependence). 
 FOCUS 
The either externally or internally oriented focus of policy issues can affect the design of 
the coordination arrangement. By externally, we mean aimed at the society, citizens, or 
companies, whereas by internally, we mean focused on managerial issues and other 
government organizations. Internally oriented types of cross-cutting policies deal with the 
management of the internal administration (e.g. rationalization of management support 
functions, austerity measures). Externally oriented types, meanwhile, deal with large social 
issues (e.g. poverty, sustainable development).  
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According to Bekkers et al. (2013), research has shown that a strong external focus on 
customers brings about an impetus to meet and engage the stakeholders in policy decisions 
in order to improve services, products, and processes. In a situation where the policy issue is 
externally focused a loosely coupled approach is more likely, as it gives organizations room 
to maneuver. Policy issues with specific tasks and activities or more managerial and internal 
issues go well together with a short time horizon and tight coupling (Jessop, 1998). The 
expectancy is that internal or managerial issues, in which goals are more easily explicated, 
are coordinated with tightly coupled arrangements. A tightly coupled approach works in the 
case of activities with a few dividable tasks, which are concrete, specific, explicit, and 
standardized. When goals are specifically defined and tightly coordinated, it becomes clearer 
which tasks must be fulfilled with which target groups. It makes it easier for organizations to 
prioritize the cross-cutting policy objective (Christensen, Lægreid, Roness, & Røvik, 2007, p. 
81).  
According to Elmore (1979), tight coupling is too rigid and difficult to change to new 
situations. The traditionally vertical oriented government, where the focus is on internal 
departmental practices and hierarchical relationships, works as a disincentive for street-level 
bureaucrats (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004; Elmore, 1979). According to Head (2008), street-level 
bureaucrats look through the lens of practical knowledge and favor processes, relationships, 
and networks with clients, customers, and umbrella organizations in order to achieve 
sustainable results. Politicians are, according to Head (2008), “inherently impatient for 
results” and would consider such a process too time-consuming. 
 
Based on previous studies, the hypotheses are that: 
- H3a. Tightly coupled coordination arrangements are deployed to coordinate cross-
cutting policy objectives which are operational and focused on concrete, specific 
internal management issues. 
- H3b. Loosely coupled coordination arrangements are deployed to coordinate cross-
cutting policy objectives which are focused on externally oriented issues. 
 
Table 10 summarizes the hypotheses concerning the coordination arrangements. 
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TABLE 10: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CROSS-CUTTING POLICY PROGRAMS 
Level of political urgency H1a. High H1b. Low 
Interdependencies H2a. Pooled H2b. Reciprocal 
Focus H3a. Internal H3b. External 
Expectation Tightly coupled approach Loosely coupled approach 
2.5. ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION TOWARDS CROSS-CUTTING POLICY 
The environments that organizations inhabit, and the management demands that they 
face, change constantly. In this thesis, we consider adaptation as a way in which 
organizations can deal with these environmental demands. Cross-cutting policy objectives 
are seen as one of these new demands for public organizations. Hardin (1968) states that 
policy problems based on the logic of collective action have no technical solution. They 
require change in human behavior and “adaptivity” of organizations (Ostrom, 1990, p. 29). An 
effective organization should adapt strategically to enhance and maintain policy effectiveness 
(J. Thompson, 1967), yet many tend to remain rather fixed according to some authors (e.g. 
Parsons, 2002). If core practices stay the same while the environment changes, low 
performance outcomes are likely (Gumport & Sporn, 1999; Lombardo & Mulligan, 2003).  
This thesis focusses on coordination arrangements for cross-cutting policy objectives and 
on the process in which organizations cope with these coordination arrangements, and adapt 
(or not) to comply with them (Gumport & Sporn, 1999, p. 18). In order to define 
organizational adaptation, this part of the analytical framework mainly builds upon 
organization studies. Indeed, it provides a framework to answer the research questions. The 
agency perspective and the stewardship perspective, based on rational choice theory, are 
presented as competing theories of explanation. This section will conclude hypotheses that 
give a theoretical answer to the third, fourth and fifth research question:  
- RQ 3: To what extent does the degree of coupling of the coordination arrangement 
(tightly or loosely coupled) explain the extent to which organizations adapt to cross-
cutting policy objectives?  
- RQ 4: Which organizational characteristics explain the extent to which organizations 
adapt to cross-cutting policy objectives?  
- RQ 5: How does the coordination arrangement (tightly or loosely coupled) interact 
with the organizational characteristics to explain organizational adaptation to cross-
cutting policy objectives? 
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 THE CONCEPT OF ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION 
Organizational adaptation is the process in which organizations cope and weigh 
environmental demands and the adaptation required to comply with them (Gumport & Sporn, 
1999, p. 18). The concept of organizational adaptation stems from the open systems 
perspective on organizations (W. R. Scott, 1992), and it refers to:  
 
“modifications and alterations in the organization or its components in order to adjust to 
changes in the external environment. Its purpose is to restore equilibrium to an imbalanced 
condition. Adaptation generally refers to a process, not an event, whereby changes are 
instituted in organizations. Adaptation does not necessarily imply reactivity on the part of an 
organization (i.e., adaptation is not just waiting for the environment to change and then 
reacting to it) because proactive or anticipatory adaptation is possible as well. But the 
emphasis is definitely on responding to some discontinuity or lack of fit that arises between 
the organization and its environment” (Cameron, 1984, p. 123) 
 
Many dimensions of adaptation have been studied, including restructuring, improved 
performance, reorganization, revised autonomy, and accountability (Gumport & Sporn, 1999; 
W. R. Scott, 1992). Yet many scholars remain puzzled about whether or not institutions 
under pressure adapt to new problems and demands (Cameron, 1984; de Zilwa, 2010; 
Gumport & Sporn, 1999). McLauglin (1987) describes a model of policy implementation, 
which he calls locally defined change, that covers the concept of adaptation. With this term, 
he states that  
 
“implementors at all levels of the system effectively negotiate their response, fitting their 
action to the multiple demands, priorities, and values operation in their environment and the 
effective authority of the policy itself” (McLaughlin, 1987, p. 175).  
  
The concept of adaptation is closely linked to institutional isomorphism (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977), which argues that the survival of organizations depends on the level of incorporation 
of external structures and demands. This legitimizes organizations and shows their 
commitment to principals and peers (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 359). While this concept 
refers to the similarity of certain processes or structures of one organization with those of 
another, this thesis stresses the extent to which an organization adapts, aligns, and 
integrates cross-cutting policy objectives into its own organization. Adaptation, then, refers to 
the process of instituting structural changes prompted by the environment into the 
organization. The concept nuances the classification of organizational responses to new 
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policies from the dichotomous ‘cooperate’ and ‘defect’ to more subtle forms of organizational 
adaptations (Joaquin, 2008, p. 5; Oliver, 1991). Adaptation can be internal and passive, 
implementing decisions that have been taken in the coordination arena (e.g. just complying 
with), or more active, focusing on modifying or changing the environment (e.g. influencing the 
decision-making process). In other words, adaptation is a continuum from compliance 
adaptation to proactive adaptation (Cameron, 1984, p. 124; Joaquin, 2008, p. 5). 
Furthermore, adaptation underlines the notion of evolution in both the environmental and 
organizational sphere, while connecting both (Joaquin, 2008, p. 17).  
The efforts, arrangements, and processes in the coordination arena can affect 
organizational adaptation, but this seems to be only one kind of environmental demand on 
government organizations. Organizations may experience some pressures from this 
arrangement and subsequently adapt their documents, goals and structures. At the same 
time, there are other influencing factors—like capacity, other priorities, and tensions—that 
can both hinder or affect organizational adaptation. For instance, 6 et al. (1999, p. 27) stress 
a few other pressures that organizations face: other cross-cutting policy objectives, 
pressures to achieve government manifestos, and short term pressure on ‘popular demands’ 
with quick wins for political actors. Some scholars claim that managers focus only on those 
objectives for which they are accountable (i.e. objectives set by their portfolio minister), 
neglecting all objectives related to collaboration and cross-cutting policies. Adaptation to 
cross-cutting policy objectives remains, because of these conflicting demands, challenging 
for organizations and, therefore, particularly interesting to study.  
Scholars who study organizational adaptation typically focus on organizational 
characteristics, which can explain the type of adaptation, such as its history, leadership, 
culture, and power (Hernes, 2005, p. 8). Though this thesis focuses on organizational 
characteristics, it specifically focuses on the influence of size, autonomy, and the policy task 
of the organization on structural adaptation.  
 HOW TO STUDY ADAPTATION? 
Structural adaptation is, according to Christensen et al. (2007), based on the logic of 
consequence. When an organization adapts in terms of structure, it rationally aligns its 
objectives, structures, and actions to the cross-cutting policy objectives. Structural 
organizational adaptation is operationalized as the extent to which the organization aligns its 
goals, monitors the cross-cutting policy objectives, allocates resources, and if it appoints 
tasks and responsibilities to specific staff members. In other words, if the organization is 
integrating the cross-cutting policy objectives in its organizational goals, structures, and 
actions (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
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1. Aligning goals; translating the goal to organizational-specific tasks makes the goal 
visible, ‘monitorable’, and an explicit objective for members. 
2. Monitoring goals; another part of structural adaptation is the extent of monitoring. 
Monitoring, first of all, ensures that the objectives are attended to, yet it also 
maintains pressure for actions—for instance, during management committee 
discussions (6 et al., 1999; Boyle, 1999). Monitoring tasks and objectives also places 
emphasis on goal formulation and achievement. Indeed, monitoring and evaluation 
systems allow employees to comprehend goals and focus on objectives (Özerol et 
al., 2012). 
3. Allocating financial resources; allocating financial arrangements to the cross-cutting 
policy issue objective can serve as an influential form of task allocation (Bouckaert et 
al., 2010). Doing so emphasizes that the allocated budget must be spent on the 
cross-cutting issue. Furthermore, it incentivizes staff and management to monitor the 
budget and, therefore, the cross-cutting actions (Boyle, 1999).  
4. Appointment of a responsible staff member; appointing someone to coordinate the 
progress of the cross-cutting objective ensures organizational attention to the 
objective itself. This appointed person needs a specific skills set. Working across 
boundaries requires skills such as handling multiple points of accountability in 
different structures and value systems, being accountable for things beyond your 
control, and understanding different jargons (6 et al., 1999).  
 
Börzel and Risse (2003) describe three levels of adaptation. They apply this classification 
to domestic change of nation states to EU policies, but the operationalization also applies to 
structural adaptation to policy issues. First, absorption is the incorporation of policies or ideas 
into internal documents and structures, without substantially modifying existing processes, 
policies, and structures. Secondly, accommodation is adapting existing processes, policies 
and institutions without changing their essential features and the underlying collective 
understandings attached to them. Börzel and Risse (2003) posit that one way of doing this is 
“‘patching up’ new policies and institutions onto existing ones without changing the latter” 
(Héritier, 2001, cited in: Börzel & Risse, 2003). Finally, there is transformation: organizations 
replace existing policies, processes, and structures with new, substantially different ones, or 
alter existing ones so that their essential features and/or the underlying collective 
understandings fundamentally change.  
Apart from structural adaptation, there are cultural and mythical adaptation. These forms 
of adaptation offer insight, but do not represent the main focus of this thesis.  
Cultural adaptation occurs as a cross-cutting objective is institutionalized (becomes a part 
of the organization) (A. Jordan & Schout, 2006; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Salamon, 2002). This 
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concept stems from a cultural perspective on organizations (Christensen, Lægreid, et al., 
2007), and builds on the logic of appropriateness. In the case of adaptation towards cross-
cutting policy objectives and new demands, this logic implies that organizations seek to 
adopt only the rules and demands that fit their structure (Sager, 2009). Adapting only in 
structure to the cross-cutting objectives is not enough for organizations to internalize them 
(Christensen & Lægreid, 2007). As Christensen and Lægreid (2007) suggest, organizations 
need another attitude for cross-cutting initiatives to work, which requires time as well as 
leadership and a social contract that embodies a cross-cutting attitude. One of the aspects 
that Ling (2002) stresses with respect to attitude, which this study will take into account, is 
the commitment and attention to these issues throughout policy preparation and 
implementation. 
Mythical adaptation suggests that public organizations always feel the need to legitimize 
themselves and look for efficiency. As Christensen and his colleagues explain: 
 
“Myths can spread quickly, through imitation, and they can be adopted by public 
organizations without producing instrumental effects, that is, they may sometimes function as 
‘window dressing’. Leaders of public organizations can, for instance, talk about reforms in a 
way that makes people believe they are putting reforms into practice while in reality the 
leaders do little to make this happen”. (Christensen, Lægreid, et al., 2007, p. 57) 
 
Why would organizations do that? Christensen et al. (2007) argue that focusing solely on 
structure can possibly reveal merely an organizational ‘myth’ and effective decoupling-
‘tactics’ (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), but no real adaptation. The concept of decoupling comes 
from Meyer and Rowan (1977), who demonstrate how public organizations appear 
simultaneously efficient and legitimate by effectively decoupling their structures. These 
organizations maintain a façade, a ‘false belief’ (Pettigrew, 1979, p. 575), and show the 
image of the good organization: “Inside the organizations, however, the actual state of the 
organization tended to be different and more oriented towards the tasks at hand” (Hernes, 
2005, p. 7).  
 HOW DO AGENTS AND STEWARDS ADAPT?1 
Agency and stewardship theories, which explain types of relationships between 
organizations and their principals, provide competing hypotheses about how external 
pressures motivate organizations and force them to react. As this chapter states in its 
                                               
1 The hypotheses in the current and next paragraph are based on a conference paper, presented at the EGPA conference 
2014 (see: Molenveld, Verhoest, & Wynen, 2014) 
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opening paragraphs, according to rational choice theory actors have no incentive to support 
cross-cutting policy objectives. If they calculate that the costs of cooperation are high, and 
that their participation has no significant effect on the organization's power and resources (or 
that they could even lose these), they will conclude that there is nothing to gain from 
collaboration. Again and again, however, studies show that people do join collaborations and 
become active in them, which suggests that the simple rational action model misses 
something. Olson (1971) has suggested that collective action is sustained through what he 
calls 'selective incentives'. Principal agent models, meanwhile, propose an intentional role of 
actors in enabling coordination through the design and implementation of positive and 
negative incentives. It is expected that these incentives can steer behavior in a specific 
direction to align to certain predefined goals (J. Scott, 2000).  
2.5.3.1. The agency perspective 
The agency perspective on organizations (based on the principal-agent model) argues 
that organizations are utility-maximizing groups that prioritize the tasks of primordial 
importance to them, for which they are accountable, and benefits them the most. This 
behavior leads to agents selling minimal efforts at a maximum price and shirking 
responsibilities (Schillemans, 2013). Seen from this perspective, public organizations are 
motivated by extrinsic rewards and want to secure and enhance their own organizational 
legitimacy and survival. Any challenge to these ultimate extrinsic rewards creates strong 
resistance (W. R. Scott, 1992).  
Public sector organizations, within their statutorily defined objectives, need to balance 
objectives with the limited resources at their disposal (6 et al., 1999, pp. 27–28). When 
confronted with conflicting demands, e.g. cross-cutting policies and their routine tasks, 
individual organizations (be it departments or agencies) need to make choices how to 
prioritize these demands (6 et al., 1999). Integrating cross-cutting objectives into 
organizational activities and standard operating procedures, in most cases, implies 
realignment of existing activities, change of procedures, new activities, or re-orientation of 
focus, as well as interaction with other actors (ministers, departments, and agencies). Such 
an integration demands resources and efforts, not only to plan, monitor, and evaluate these 
objectives, but also because of the implied changes to primary processes in the organization. 
Individual organizations perceive cross-cutting objectives therefore as labor-intensive, and 
they must re-steer their organizations towards the achievement of those goals. This is very 
costly, and it does not allow the organization to focus on the alignment of vertically-defined 
sectorial organizational goals (Christensen, Fimreite, & Lægreid, 2007).  
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Furthermore, cross-cutting problems and their solutions are, by definition, complex, while 
the risk of failure is higher than those for problems and solutions confined to a single sector 
or organization (6 et al., 1999). Senior managers of public sector organizations remain less 
willing to invest significant resources and time in activities with a high chance of failure (6, 
Leat, Setzler, & Stoker, 2002) when they can safeguard their positions by investing in simpler 
single-sector policies that align with the primary purpose of their organizations. When cross-
cutting policies are highly salient, incentives for individual organizations to prioritize these 
policies are low. 6 et al. refer to such a situation in which "the project has too high a political 
profile to be allowed to fail. The effect of this message is that managers become unwilling to 
undertake risky initiatives" (1999, pp. 26). Moreover, when cross-cutting objectives are 
mostly long-term oriented (Lægreid, Randma-Liiv, Rykkja, & Sarapuu, 2013), organizations 
will contribute less value to them, because they do not expect to benefit in the immediate 
future (Kollock et al., 1992). Therefore, according to this perspective, it is unlikely that 
organizations will voluntarily contribute to cross-cutting objectives. Individual organizations 
mainly perceive cross-cutting objectives as claims for scarce organizational resources and 
efforts which compete with the vertically-defined sectorial organizational goals. 
In the agency perspective, cross-cutting objectives are competing claims for 
organizational resources, and their achievement implies problems of overcoming low 
organizational motivation, urging for external control and incentives (Davis et al., 1997). 
Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest (2010) argue that a low interest in alignment is one of the 
most prevalent failure factors for coordination. Organizations’ fear that coordination will 
negatively influence the effectiveness of policies and services is one of the main factors for 
failure of coordination (Rogers & Whetten, 1982). Hence, the coordination of these objectives 
becomes a problem for the involved (political) principals. Coordination of cross-cutting 
objectives is, in this perspective, mainly achieved via top-down steering and incentives that 
impose collaboration on organizations. Tightly coupled coordination arrangements which 
entail control, strong institutionalization, and hard accountability— fit the agency perspective 
(Schillemans, 2013). The perspective assumes that the administrative or political principal, or 
lead organization, exercises this because it fears information asymmetry and goal 
incongruence.  
 
The hypothesis on the basis of the agency perspective is that:  
- H4a. Organizations under tightly coupled coordination arrangements adapt 
themselves highly 
 
The next section will introduce an alternative, more optimistic perspective on 
organizational adaptation to cross-cutting objectives. 
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2.5.3.2. Stewardship perspective 
The alternative perspective is more optimistic about the willingness of single 
organizations to invest in coordination and cross-cutting objectives. The stewardship model 
goes beyond the narrow economic-rational model of man (Davis et al., 1997) and 
underscores collective behavior and goal convergence. In this perspective, the staff and 
senior management of public sector organizations are believed to act in the best interest of 
their principals (Davis et al., 1997; Rogers & Whetten, 1982) and focus on goal alignment, 
absent of any tangible rewards (Schillemans, 2013; Van Slyke, 2007). The stewards are 
motivated intrinsically, by achievement and affiliation (Davis et al., 1997). As public servants 
are genuinely motivated by public service and stakeholder interest, their political and 
administrative principals can trust them to act accordingly to their objectives (Davis et al., 
1997; Schillemans, 2013; Van Slyke, 2007). Moreover, by focusing primarily on the interests 
of society and users, organizations and their managers are more attuned to problems arising 
from ill-coordinated policies, like overlap, lacunae, and non-integrated service delivery, and 
the collective costs they carry. 
 Organizations do not need strong controls from their principals to collaborate and adapt 
to cross-cutting objectives because of their inherent motivation to contribute to and mutual 
trust in such initiatives (Davis et al., 1997). In fact, according to stewardship theory, intensive, 
detailed, and ‘hard’ controls from principals that ‘force’ their ‘stewards’ to pursue certain 
objectives will have counterproductive effects, as it signals to the ‘steward’ that the principal 
does not trust him, and he will be inclined to reciprocate this behavior with distrust and loss 
of intrinsic motivation (Argyris, 1964; Davis et al., 1997). As ‘stewards’ mainly respond to 
reputational incentives, too much emphasis on external incentives, like those related to 
performance, will not yield the expected effects. Rather, they will push the ‘steward’ towards 
self-interest. The room that organizations have to maneuver and to align themselves with the 
collective goal under a model of loose coupling implies trust, which fits the stewardship 
perspective. 
 
The hypothesis on the basis of the stewardship perspective is that:  
- H4b. Organizations under loosely coupled coordination arrangements adapt 
themselves highly 
 
In this optimistic perspective, the orientation, as well as the potential, of public sector 
organizations to internally adapt to cross-cutting objectives is even stronger under specific 
structural, task-related, and cultural conditions, especially when close to users, their services, 
and society, and when granted the autonomy and flexibility to direct resources and efforts of 
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their organization towards cross-cutting objectives. The next section will develop alternative 
hypotheses about the influence of the organizational characteristics on the basis of these two 
competing perspectives. 
 INFLUENCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS  
On the basis of the coordination literature, we choose three organizational characteristics 
that cogently explain organizational adaptation to cross-cutting policies: autonomy, size, and 
policy task. We expect that these organizational characteristics can explain what type of 
organizations adapt more strongly to new cross-cutting policy objectives. 
2.5.4.1. Autonomy 
An important structural factor that explains variance in organizational adaptation to cross-
cutting objectives is the autonomy, in terms of formal-legal distance from the center of 
government and competent ministers, of the organization. Basically, we can distinguish 
between departments and (semi)autonomous agencies of different types: departmental 
agencies, public law agencies with or without a governing board, and private law agencies 
(Van Thiel, 2012).  
Departments and agencies differ in terms of variety of purposes and extent of autonomy. 
Departments are usually multipurpose entities with broadly defined scopes and are 
composed of subunits, which focus on different objectives and policy fields. Departments are 
under the full authority of their ministers and close to central government; principals can steer 
them to pursue defined objectives, which ministers can quite easily impose on departments 
as additional tasks. The relationship between the principal and department is hierarchical, 
and the power is unequal between the players (Schillemans, 2013). Many departments 
combine policy formulation and evaluation with elements of policy implementation. A diversity 
of functions and purposes increases the openness for coordination (Rogers & Whetten, 
1982). Coordination and collaboration with other organizations implies the ability to move 
quickly and seize unexpected opportunities and, hence, requires involved organizations to 
shift resources across units of the organization and across activities or even share resources 
between organizations (Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012). This is exactly what 
departments can do. As departments are more multifunctional and comprised of different 
units, which focus on different objectives, there exists more possibility to shift resources from 
one objective to another and from one unit to another, if desired by executive politicians.  
Compared to departments, (semi-)autonomous agencies are more focused and narrow 
(single-purpose) in their objectives (Van Thiel, 2012). This is even more the case for 
agencies with their own legal identities, vested in either public or private law. Their narrow 
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objectives revolve around enacting statutes that grant these agencies the legal basis for their 
existence, making it harder to assume extra objectives or new tasks not aligned directly with 
their statutory objectives. Moreover, these agencies are harder to control and steer, as their 
enacting statute restricts the modes of governmental intervention to those specifically 
mentioned in the statutes. Such legal status gives them formal autonomy, which shields them 
from ministerial interference and complicates steering and control (Pollitt, Talbot, Caulfield, & 
Smullen, 2004; Van Thiel, 2012). This is the case for coordination of vertical objectives but 
even more so for coordination of cross-cutting objectives. Formal autonomy grants the 
organization more leeway to define its own preferences and enact them without interference 
from above.  
In sum, argued from the agency model, our basis argument is that organizations formally-
legally closer to government will more easily engage themselves in cross-cutting objectives, 
because of the vertical accountability relationship. Independent agencies, which are formally-
legally distant and have equal power in relation to their principals, are likely to develop 
agency behavior (Davis et al., 1997, p. 36). 
The stewardship model underscores the importance of autonomy and discretion for 
collective goals to blossom. Stewards need room to maneuver, and control would be 
counterproductive (Davis et al., 1997). Even if the stewards’ goals and that of the principal 
are not aligned “the steward places higher value on cooperation than affection” (Davis et al., 
1997, p. 24). If, following from the stewardship perspective, autonomy is important for 
collective goals, we expect that formally-legally distant agencies adapt themselves more 
strongly to cross-cutting policy objectives.  
 
The hypotheses for the influence of formal-legal distance and autonomy on the basis of 
these perspectives:  
- Agency perspective: organizations which are formally-legally close from government, 
and which have relatively low levels of managerial autonomy, will make greater 
efforts, in terms of organizational adaptation, to achieve cross-cutting objectives.  
- Stewardship perspective: organizations which are formally-legally further from central 
government, and which have relatively high levels of managerial autonomy, will make 
greater efforts, in terms of organizational adaptation, to achieve cross-cutting 
objectives. 
2.5.4.2. Size 
Argued from the agency model, and according to Pollitt et al (2004) and other 
researchers, the size of the organization (expressed in full time employees, and thus budget) 
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indicates importance in the eyes of the politicians. Larger organizations also pose greater 
risks to politicians, and they increase the amount of information asymmetries. Mangers in 
large organizations are assumed to have more “discretionary” power (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976, p. 330), which constrains the influence a minister has on the organization (Lægreid & 
Verhoest, 2010). The larger the organization, the lower the relative control capacity of the 
parent ministry or minister (Binderkrantz & Christensen, 2009, pp. 270–272). According to 
Olson (1971, p. 48), there are a few reasons why large organizations behave like agents. 
First, the larger the group, the smaller the fraction it will gain from achieving a collective 
good. Second, a large organization is less flexible and will have to bear more costs to align 
itself. Therefore, the hypothesis is that larger organizations will do less efforts in terms of 
organizational adaptation.  
Stewards are in favor of full participation in the development of goals and achievement of 
envisioned outcome (Schillemans, 2013). Organizations with a smaller size are more likely to 
behave as stewards. Their “enormous energy and commitment” are more obvious, because 
they are for their existence and legitimacy dependent on successful collaborations (Lowndes 
& Skelcher, 1998, p. 327). However, the ‘costs’ that they experience during the collaboration-
process can be relatively high, compared to larger agencies (Provan & Milward, 2001, p. 
420). As stewards are in favor of collective goals, they will tend to prioritize cross-cutting 
policy objectives. However, they need room for implementation and alignment with general 
targets. Even if the goal does not fit to the organizational goal, stewards try to align with 
congruent interests. A smaller size means more room to maneuver and flexibility to align with 
the collective goal.  
The hypotheses on the basis of these perspectives:  
- Agency perspective: Organizations which are larger in size will make less effort, in 
terms of organizational adaptation, to achieve cross-cutting objectives.  
- Stewardship perspective: Organizations which are smaller in size will make more 
effort, in terms of organizational adaptation, to achieve cross-cutting objectives. 
2.5.4.3. Primary organizational task 
The task portfolio of an organization defines its technical environment, which, functionally 
and institutionally, determines behavior and role definition of individuals in organizations 
(Christensen & Lægreid, 2007). Basically, in terms of tasks of public sector organizations, we 
can distinguish between policy development (coordination and evaluation) and policy 
implementation (general public service delivery, regulation, and exercising other kinds of 
public authority).  
52  Chapter 2 
One may argue that coordination at the level of ‘text’, vision, i.e. policy development, is 
easier for the involved organization, compared to coordination of ‘actions’, i.e. policy 
implementation and service delivery. For organizations involved in policy development, 
coordinating policy formulation stages mainly means conversing with other actors in order to 
add their preferences to policy documents. Policy implementing agencies need to change 
procedures when coordinating their actions and coordination regarding policy implementation 
(like delivering seamless services, fully integrated with the services of other organizations). 
This affects their way of working, is more costly, in terms of resources and efforts, and has 
more impact on other organizational priorities. Agencies with policy implementation tasks will 
know more about the effects of policies and service delivery on users and society, as they 
remain in closer contact with them (Bekkers et al., 2013). Hence, in case ill-coordinated 
policies cause lacunae, overlaps, or contradicting signals to society, or when non-integrated 
service delivery causes costs, frictions, and frustrations within society, policy implementing 
agencies will most likely be better informed about these problems and their causes 
compared to organizations mainly involved in policy development. 
Following the agency perspective, we expect that organizations with policy development 
tasks will make greater efforts to integrate cross-cutting policy objectives. Policy 
development often happens in departments where direct forms of monitoring and intervention 
are possible to overcome the worries of the principal (Schillemans, 2013). As principals worry 
about the (ab)use of the discretionary space, they can intervene with much easier with the 
processes of a policy development organization, compared to a policy implementing 
organization.  
The stewardship perspective indicates the opposite, however, as organizations with 
policy implementation and service delivery will make greater efforts in terms of organizational 
adaptation to achieve cross-cutting objectives. Predicting outcomes of policy implementation 
is often problematic (Schillemans, 2013), but, because stewards, like policy implementing 
agencies, are focused on societal outcomes and therefore ‘the collective’, we expect that 
they will make greater efforts.  
 
The hypotheses on the basis of these perspectives:  
- Agency perspective; organizations tasked mainly with policy development will make 
greater efforts, in terms of organizational adaptation, to achieve cross-cutting 
objectives. 
- Stewardship perspective; organizations tasked mainly with policy implementation and 
service delivery will make greater efforts, in terms of organizational adaptation, to 
achieve cross-cutting objectives 
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2.5.4.4. Combination of organizational characteristics 
Abovementioned characteristics will never appear as a single condition. Organizations 
are sets of different characteristics. The hypotheses guiding RQ 4 are therefore 
configurations (which also fits FsQCA – explained in chapter 3 – methodology).  
The combined hypotheses on the basis of these perspectives:  
- H5a. Agency perspective: if organizations are close to the center of government (i.e. 
have low autonomy), of a large size and have a policy development task this will lead 
to high adaptation.  
- H5b. Stewardship perspective; if organizations are further away from the center of 
government, of a smaller size, and have a policy implementation task this will lead to 
high adaptation.  
 
Research question five (RQ 5) asks: How does the coordination arrangement (tightly or 
loosely coupled) interact with the organizational characteristics to explain organizational 
adaptation to cross-cutting policy objectives? The hypothesis is that the coordination 
arrangement in interaction with the structure of organizations will lead to either higher or 
lower organizational adaptation. The combined hypotheses on the basis of these 
perspectives:  
- H6a. Agency perspective: Being under tightly coupled coordination arrangements in 
combination with low autonomy, a large size and policy development as main task 
lead to high adaptation. 
- H6b. Stewardship perspective: Being under loosely coupled coordination 
arrangements in combination with high autonomy, a small size and policy 
implementation as main task lead to high adaptation.  
2.6. HYPOTHESES TO STUDY ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION  
As explained in detail, this thesis aims to combine the concepts coordination and 
organizational adaptation. The expectation is, that by the end of this thesis, we can say 
whether 1) the organizational adaptation process can be better explained either with the 
agency or the stewardship perspective on organizations, or 2) that both perspectives are 
complementary. Moreover, another expectation is that we can say something about how the 
coordination arrangement interacts with the organizational characteristics to explain extent of 
organizational adaptation. Table 11 summarizes the three competing hypotheses to study 
organizational adaptation, based on the agency – and stewardship perspective.  
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TABLE 11: HYPOTHESES ON THE BASIS OF AGENCY- AND STEWARDSHIP PERSPECTIVE 
 
Research 
question  
Concept Agency perspective Stewardship perspective 
RQ 3 
Coordination 
arrangement  
H4a: Organizations 
under tightly coupled 
coordination 
arrangements adapt 
themselves highly 
H4b: Organizations under 
loosely coupled 
coordination arrangements 
adapt themselves highly 
RQ 4 
Organizational 
characteristics 
H5a: low autonomy, a 
large size and policy 
development as main 
task lead to high 
adaptation 
H5b: high autonomy, a 
small size and policy 
implementation as main 
task lead to high 
adaptation  
RQ 5 
Interaction of 
organizational 
characteristics and 
coordination 
arrangement 
H6a: Being under tightly 
coupled coordination 
arrangements in 
combination with low 
autonomy, a large size 
and policy development 
as main task lead to 
high adaptation  
H6b: Being under loosely 
coupled coordination 
arrangements in 
combination with high 
autonomy, a small size 
and policy implementation 
as main task lead to high 
adaptation 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter reviews the methodological design of the thesis. The research puzzle which 
this dissertation tries to answer is: what explains organizational adaptation to cross-cutting 
policy objectives? Coordination and organizational adaptation (or implementation) have been 
mainly studied using thick descriptions on the basis of single case studies, which often came 
to pessimistic conclusions about the effectiveness of policy (Alexander, 1995; Sabatier, 
1986). According to Alexander (1993), these studies were conducted in a rather ‘top-down 
school’ manner. The later research generation, however, adopted a more comparative 
approach, and determined characteristics that can explain variation in adaptation success 
(Sabatier, 1986, p. 21). Studies linking the characteristics of organizations and coordination 
arrangements from a comparative perspective remain necessary for more insight into the 
process between coordination and subsequent adaptation.  
This thesis will address which factors explain the extent to which organizations adapt to 
cross-cutting policy objectives. The design of the thesis took its particular form through three 
different elements: the research puzzle, the theoretical framework, and previous studies 
about coordination.  
 
The current chapter is divided into four parts:  
1. The research questions. 
2. Part 1: explains which policy issue characteristics ground the selection of cross-
cutting policy objectives, and how coordination arrangements were studied. 
3. Part 2: explains how organizational adaptation was studied, and which organizations 
were selected for this process.  
4. The last section of this chapter addresses the rigorousness of the methodological 
design, as well as the challenges and concerns encountered during this study.  
3.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The main research question of this thesis is:  
What explains organizational adaptation to cross-cutting policy objectives? 
   
To answer this question, the thesis will study two parts: the coordination arrangement 
deployed for specific cross-cutting policy objectives and the organizational adaptation to 
them.  
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In part 1, the coordination arrangement deployed in the specific cross-cutting policy 
objective is studied, and it expects that policy-specific characteristics explain the type of 
coordination deployed (either loosely or tightly coupled). To study the first part, the thesis 
presents the following research questions:  
- RQ 1: How does the Flemish government organize the coordination of specific cross-
cutting policies? 
- RQ 2: What policy issue characteristics explain the type of coordination arrangement 
deployed in cross-cutting policies?  
 
Part 2 of this thesis studies organizational adaptation to cross-cutting policy objectives. 
On the basis of the literature, hypotheses were formulated about which perspective and 
which organizational characteristics can explain this process. To study the second part, the 
thesis presents the following research questions:  
- RQ 3: To what extent does the degree of coupling of the coordination arrangement 
(tightly or loosely coupled) explain the extent to which organizations adapt to cross-
cutting policy objectives?  
- RQ 4: Which organizational characteristics explain the extent to which organizations 
adapt to cross-cutting policy objectives?  
- RQ 5: How does the coordination arrangement (tightly or loosely coupled) interact 
with the organizational characteristics to explain organizational adaptation to cross-
cutting policy objectives? 
 
Figure 4 provides an overview of all the research questions and layers.  
 
FIGURE 4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND –QUESTIONS 
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3.2. PART 1: COORDINATION ARRANGEMENT 
In this thesis, the collection of instruments and mechanisms deployed to steer a cross-
cutting policy objective or program is called a coordination arrangement. Based on its 
characteristics, an assessment can be made about whether the arrangement is either tightly 
or loosely coupled. Following the research design, the first research question attempts to 
highlight the actors, instruments, and mechanisms deployed to coordinate the three cross-
cutting policies under study. Subsequently, we determine why the coordination arrangement 
gets its particular form.  
Authors (Alexander, 1995; Peters, 1998; Turnpenny et al., 2009) suggest that the 
'character' of the policy issue provides an indication for the appropriate means to coordinate 
a policy issue. As addressed in the theoretical chapter, the expectancy is that policy issue 
characteristics—political urgency, interdependencies, and focus—determine the form of the 
arrangement. These hypotheses were built on previous research about policy coordination. 
Such an approach is called a y-centered research design (Haverland & Blatter, 2012). Y-
centered research (see Figure 5) starts with a few theory-based assumptions about the 
influence of a specific configuration of independent variables (in this case, the policy issue 
characteristics) on the dependent variable of the coordination arrangement. The assumption 
in this kind of research design is that a “plurality of factors work together to produce the 
outcome of interest” (Haverland & Blatter, 2012). To reach valid conclusions in Y-centered 
research, the cases must have strong differences with respect to these selected 
characteristics, but remain as similar as possible in other respects. Lijphart (1971, p. 159) 
calls this a most-similar-different-outcome (MSDO) systems design: “focusing the analysis on 
comparable cases (i.e., cases that are similar in a large number of important characteristics, 
but dissimilar with regard to the variables between which a relationship is hypothesized)”. 
The following paragraphs explain the chosen cases and how they differ. 
 
FIGURE 5: PART 1: Y CENTERED RESEARCH – CHARACTERISTICS OF COORDINATION 
ARRANGEMENTS 
    
  
Policy issue  
Characteristics 
  
· Political urgency 
· Interdependencies  
· Focus 
 
 
Coordination 
arrangement 
 
Tightly or loosely 
coupled 
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 PART 1: POLICY ISSUE CASE SELECTION 
The selection of cross-cutting policy objectives was based on issue characteristics found, 
in the coordination literature, influential on the design of the coordination arrangements: (1.) 
political urgency, (2.) interdependence, and (3.) focus. The hypotheses in the theoretical 
framework clearly state the expected influence of these policy issue characteristics on the 
coordination arrangements. Table 12 shows which cross-cutting policies were chosen to 
study the hypotheses. Three different cases were selected: two opposite cases and a mixed 
case, in terms of the policy issue characteristics. On one hand, these policy issues do differ 
strongly on the abovementioned factors. On the other hand, however, these cases are 
similar: first and foremost, all involve many actors and consultation processes (e.g. 
deliberations with sectors, unions, experts etc.). Secondly, they belong, in terms of 
competencies, fully to the Flemish government. Thirdly, they began at least 10 years ago. 
Fourthly, these issues received policy (coordination) attention during the government period 
under the remit of Minister-President Kris Peeters. Underneath, the cases are described 
shortly, to clarify the case selection. Chapter four studies the cases in detail.  
 
TABLE 12: CROSS-CUTTING POLICY OBJECTIVE SELECTION AND HYPOTHESES  
 Austerity 
measures 
Administrative 
simplification 
Integrated Youth 
Care 
Political urgency H1a. High Moderate H1b. Low 
Interdependence H2a. Pooled Mixed H2b. Reciprocal 
Focus H3a. Internal  Mixed H3b. External 
Hypotheses Tightly coupled Mixed Loosely coupled 
3.2.1.1. Austerity measures 
Austerity measures are politically urgent, must be reached by each organizations 
individually (pooled interdependent), and focused on internal operations (O’Toole Jr. & 
Montjoy, 1984). After a number of minor, initial savings, the Flemish government planned, in 
the autumn of 2011, to save 60 million euros on staff-related budget and 6% on staff 
members in three years. The staff-related budgets were skimmed from the annual 
organizational budgets in order to achieve this objective. The effort required of the 
organizations, in this timeframe, makes the time-horizon to achieve the goals of this policy 
issue short. Moreover, because politicians monitor, coordinate, and evaluate the progress 
closely (every three months), this policy issue is also politically urgent. The organizations are 
pooled interdependent, and the goal must be reached by each organization individually—i.e., 
across-the-board cuts. The focus of the austerity measures is internal, on staff-related 
budgets, and staff members within the Flemish government. While the ‘core’ austerity 
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measures began in 2011, the first austerity initiatives were already launched a few years 
before the inauguration of the government in 2009.  
3.2.1.2. Administrative simplification 
The Flemish government has two related but separate goals to enact administrative 
simplification:  
1. ex-ante quality of new regulation, and  
2. ex-post administrative simplification of existing regulation.  
These concepts are interrelated: the better the ex-ante control of quality, the less 
administrative simplification needed afterwards. On one hand, the ex-ante deregulation goal 
is partially imposed, through the use the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA). The ex-post 
goal, on the other hand, is fully voluntary. The administrative simplification objectives are 
moderate to low with respect to political urgency, and use inter-organizational networks 
(reciprocal interdependent, O’Toole et al., 1984) as well as individual input (pooled 
interdependent, O’Toole et al., 1984) to arrive at policy coherence. Although less 
bureaucracy affects citizens and companies, the policy issue remains, mainly, focused on 
internal operations. The ‘program’ began in September 2001 with the launch of the 
‘Knowledge Centre for Regulatory Management’.  
3.2.1.3. Integrated Youth Care  
Integrated Youth Care, a program to coordinate seamless services (external focus) in the 
youth health care was initiated because many actors reported gaps in the system, leaving 
youth who urgently needed an integrated approach ‘slip through the health care net’. The 
program, which aims to create standardized and proper care chains, pushes actors to 
collaborate on both the administrative and operational, service-delivery levels. The ‘policy 
lines’, envisioned to separate different ‘types of problems’, so that each ‘type of client’ is 
channeled to the right service delivery chain, makes the organizations reciprocal 
interdependent. Although the administration felt the urgency, there was low political attention 
for the issue up to 2014—partially explained by frequent ministerial turnover. The earliest 
developments can be traced back to the parliamentary motion youth welfare (“motie 
bijzondere jeugdzorg”) in 1998. That motion was the impetus for the new government, in 
1998, to launch a working group, a committee, where basically all sectors, both 
administrations and political representatives, were present. In 2004, the first decree was 
approved by the government.  
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 PART 1: DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
The data collection and analysis are based on the premise that how the coordination 
arrangement was de jure framed and designed (Sorensen, 2006) could deviate from the de 
facto coordination processes. Besides the de jure description of the instruments, based on 
official decrees and reports, interviews with key respondents, political and administrative 
champions2 clarify the de facto deployment of the coordination arrangement. 
3.2.2.1. Data collection 
Various official (e.g. the decree, reports) and informal documents (e.g. position papers, 
notes) were collected and analyzed to map the coordination actors, instruments, and 
arrangements. All ‘coordination-actions’ in the period from 2009 to early 2014 were taken into 
account. Moreover, interviews were conducted to validate the information stemming from the 
official documents. In Annex 4, an overview of all the interviews is provided. The political 
champion was often the representative of the ministerial cabinet3 of the competent minister. 
The external expert was often someone from an advisory board or a representative of an 
umbrella association.  
3.2.2.2. Data analysis 
The analysis of the coordination arrangements uses the Institutional Analysis and 
Development Framework (Ostrom, 2005, see chapter two) to determine the coordination 
mode or hybrid form. This is based on the eight elements mentioned in theoretical framework 
(see also: Annex 1). With this framework the actors and coordination instruments will be 
classified and assessed to analyze whether the arrangement is loosely or tightly coupled. If 
the arrangement is fully tightly coupled all the elements receive a score of one, like in the 
upper radar-graph in Graph 1. The second radar-graph shows a loosely coupled 
arrangement, in which all the elements of the IAD-framework received a score of four.  
 
                                               
2 ‘Champion’ refers to a visible, powerful, and prestigious civil servant who organizes or boosts the translation and the 
dynamics (Agranoff, 2006). 
3 A ministerial cabinet comprises staff or personal advisors hired when a minister takes office. They are not part of the 
administrative hierarchy. They assist the minister in identifying policy problems, outlining policy, and in everyday decision-
making. They are spoils in that they come and go with their minister. 
 Methodology  61 
GRAPH 1: IDEAL TYPE TIGHTLY COUPLED AND LOOSELY COUPLED ARRANGEMENTS 
Tightly coupled arrangements  
 
Loosely coupled arrangements 
 
3.3. PART 2: ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION 
After mapping the coordination arrangement in every policy issue, organizational 
adaptation to the cross-cutting policy objectives is studied. Organizational adaptation is the 
process in which organizations cope and weigh environmental demands and the adaptation 
required to comply with them (Gumport & Sporn, 1999, p. 18). Here, the focus lays on the 
adaptation of cross-cutting policy objectives to organizational-specific structures (i.e. goals, 
monitoring systems, financial resources, appointment of responsible staff members). 
Following the research design, the second part of the thesis is guided by three questions:  
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Participant
constellation
Political positions
Administrative
positions
Room for action
Information
Power distribution
Accountability
Intensity
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
Participant
constellation
Political positions
Administrative
positions
Room for action
Information
Power
distribution
Accountability
Intensity
62  Chapter 3 
- RQ 3: To what extent does the degree of coupling of the coordination arrangement 
(tightly or loosely coupled) explain the extent to which organizations adapt to cross-
cutting policy objectives?  
- RQ 4: Which organizational characteristics explain the extent to which organizations 
adapt to cross-cutting policy objectives?  
- RQ 5: How does the coordination arrangement (tightly or loosely coupled) interact 
with the organizational characteristics to explain organizational adaptation to cross-
cutting policy objectives? 
 
As addressed in the theoretical chapter, the agency and stewardship perspectives 
present competing perspectives on organizational adaptation. Also discussed in the 
theoretical chapter is the expectancy that organizational characteristics—size, autonomy, 
and policy task—determine to what extent organizations adapt to a cross-cutting policy 
objective. Like the study of the coordination arrangements, this part uses a y-centered design 
(see Figure 6), which compares cases via meaningful systemic differences. Therefore, 
similar organizations—but ones that differ on the independent aspects under study—are 
selected to study organizational adaptation.  
 
FIGURE 6: PART 2: Y CENTERED RESEARCH – CHARACTERISTICS OF ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 
 PART 2: ORGANIZATION CASE-SELECTION 
The empirical chapters on organizational adaptation will describe ten organizations, 
involved in the three cross-cutting policies. These ten organizations are specifically chosen 
because they represent ‘a specific configuration’ of organizational characteristics (see Table 
13). Based on the theoretical framework, this thesis proposes that autonomy, size, and policy 
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task explain organizational adaptation. To reach valid conclusions, it chooses a MSDO 
design.  
By selecting only organizations of two ministries, the diversity remains slightly limited. 
The organizations were specifically selected from the ministries of Social protection and 
Health and Environmental Protection4. In terms of staff, these ministries are the second and 
third largest (of thirteen ministries in total), so they are comparable in size. In terms of 
budget, these sectors are large, and, therefore, often politically salient. The ministers have 
many organizations and sectors under their remit. In terms of ministerial steering, the 
Environmental Protection ministry had two ministers during 2009-2014, Joke Schauvliege for 
Environment and Nature, and Freya Van den Bossche for Energy. The Social protection and 
Health ministry had only one, Jo van Deurzen. These ministries were also chosen because 
they include all the different types of organizations, necessary for the case-selection. The 
same agencies and departments were selected to assess the organizational adaptation to all 
three policy issues. By working this way, the organizational differences across the three 
cross-cutting policy cases remain the same. This has a major advantage: factors are 
constant and, therefore, the mechanisms that operate among the organizational 
characteristics, coordination arrangement, and organizational adaptation can be studied 
more clearly.  
The organizations do differ, however, in their organizational characteristics of autonomy, 
size, and policy task (see for an overview Table 13). The organizations were selected as 
follows: 
 
Autonomy  
The organization selection, in terms of autonomy, is based on the legal structural type of 
the organization (Van Thiel, 2012). Three different types of organizations have been 
included, and ranked below in order of increasing level of formal autonomy:  
1. Departments (two included): Units operating under direct supervision of ministers and 
do not have their own legal identities.  
2. Departmental agencies (four included): Units without legal identities but with 
extended forms of managerial autonomy.  
3. Semi-autonomous agencies:  
o public law agencies under direct ministerial authority (three included) with 
legal identities. 
o public law agencies with governing boards (one included). 
 
                                               
4 Classification of the OECD: http://www.oecd.org/gov/48250728.pdf  
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Size  
In terms of size, both large (>350 full time employees) and small organizations (<350 full 
time employees), in terms of staff were selected. The selection was based on the average 
size, 350 full time employees, of a Flemish government organization. Following this 
classification, five organizations are considered large and five small.  
 
Policy task  
Both organizations with a policy development task (two included), as well organizations 
with a policy implementation task (eight included) were selected. 
 
TABLE 13: ORGANIZATION SELECTION 
Organization Size Autonomy Policy task 
1 Large 
Low 
Implementation 
2 Small Implementation 
3 Large Development 
4 Large 
High 
Implementation 
5 Small Implementation 
6 Small 
Low 
Development 
7 Small Implementation 
8 Small 
High 
Implementation 
9 Large Implementation 
10 Large Low Implementation 
 
 PART 2: DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
Like Part 1, the data collection and analysis of organizational adaptation assume that 
how organizations de jure frame and design the organizational adaptation (Sorensen, 2006) 
could be different from the de facto management and participation. In the ten organizations 
(see Table 14) under study, both the de jure (documents) as well as the de facto situation 
(interviews) are studied in detail.  
3.3.2.1. Document collection and analysis 
In order to better understand de jure organizational adaptation, a content analysis of 
different organizational documents was conducted.  
 
Data collection 
Data collection occurred with the multi-annual performance agreement (policy plans with 
a five year term), the business plans (yearly translation of the agreement) and lastly, the 
annual reports.  
We collected from each organization: 
1. the multi-annual performance agreements from 2007-2010 and 2011-2015 
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2. the annual business plans from 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 
3. the annual reports from 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 
 
For more explanation about these instruments, see Annex 2. These documents help 
guarantee sound planning, negotiation, follow up, and evaluation at the level of the single 
agency. Each organization can have, in total, ten documents, but some do not use certain 
documents, especially not until 2010 (see for an overview Table 14). To summarize, the 
collection amounted to 86 documents. Nvivo 10 was used to conduct word queries (see 
Annex 3). We ended up with many references to the cross-cutting policy objectives, which 
were then scanned for their contextual content to determine if they really concerned the 
policy issue under study. After this selection, we ended up with 136 references to the 
austerity measures, 238 to administrative simplification, and 210 to Integrated Youth Care5.  
 
TABLE 14: DOCUMENTS PER ORGANIZATION 
Organization Size Autonomy Policy task # of documents 
1 Large 
Low 
Implementation 10 
2 Small Implementation 10 
3 Large Development 6 
4 Large 
High 
Implementation 10 
5 Small Implementation 10 
6 Small 
Low 
Development 7 
7 Small Implementation 6 
8 Small 
High 
Implementation 8 
9 Large Implementation 10 
10 Large Low Implementation 9 
 
Data analysis 
The documents were studied to assess to which extent organizations address the policy 
issue in terms of structural organizational adaptation:  
1. Aligning goals: The quality of the formulated goals, measured by the extent to which 
they are SMART  
 Specific – the goal explains and targets an explicit area. 
 Measurable – the goal quantifies an indicator or norm to which the 
organization can be held accountable. 
 Achievable – the goal is well defined and clear enough to be achieved.  
 Realistic – the goal states what results can realistically be achieved given 
available resources. 
                                               
5 An overview (in Dutch) can be obtained from the researcher, mail to: astrid.molenveld@uantwerpen.be  
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 Timely – the goal specifies when and with which paths the result(s) can be 
achieved. 
2. Monitoring  
 Is there a monitoring tool?  
3. Allocating financial resources 
 Are the goals translated into budget plans? 
4. Appointment of a responsible person 
 Is there a ‘champion’ (or ‘champions’) appointed?  
 
An organization can reach a score between zero and one (a mean was taken across the 
documents) per element of structural adaptation, on the basis of the extent to which an 
organization mentions it. In total, the score for de jure adaptation of the cross-cutting policy 
objectives to organizational structures can reach a score of four, if the organization 
mentioned all the elements of structural adaptation fully.  
The de facto adaptation to cross-cutting policy objectives, however, can deviate 
significantly. The documents do not reveal much about the perspectives of the involved 
organizations, or how they adapt to the cross-cutting policies (on not) in their organizational 
planning and reporting documents, and to what extent the coordination arrangement 
deployed affects this. Still, as these documents remain the basis for the evaluation of staff by 
the senior management, and organizations by the responsible minister, we argue that they 
will match, to a large extent, the actual ex-ante planning. Studies of organizational 
documents to assess activity or references to specific goals have been done in a similar way 
by other authors as well (mentioned in Christensen, Lægreid, Roness, & Røvik, 2007, p. 82).  
3.3.2.2. Q-methodology (interviews) 
In order to validate and deepen the understanding of the organizational adaptation 
process, interviews were conducted, mainly to develop insight with regards to ‘linking pins’ 
(Schout & Jordan, 2008). Q-methodology studies individual points-of-view. This method, 
developed by William Stephenson (1902-1989), has been applied in both clinical settings for 
assessing individuals, as well as in research settings to examine how people think about a 
certain issue (Van Exel & De Graaf, 2005). Q-methodology is not particularly widespread in 
Public Administration and Management, but there have been a few applications (e.g. Brewer, 
Selden, & Facer II, 2000; Dryzek & Berejikian, 1993; Exel, Graaf, & Brouwer, 2007; Jeffares 
& Skelcher, 2011; Sullivan & Williams, 2012; van Eijk & Steen, 2013; Willis & Jeffares, 2012). 
Many of the applications are geared towards larger groups of respondents, but, in its first use 
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Q-methodology, was applied to study viewpoints of a single individual (Brown, 1993; 
Stenner, Watts, & Worrell, 2007). This study focuses on a larger group. 
 
Data collection 
Q-methodology works with a small non-representative sample and, therefore, 
conclusions are limited to those who participated. Although respondents should not be 
chosen to the extent in which they are representative for the whole population, the 
respondents are consciously selected. From each of the ten case organizations one ‘linking 
pin’, responsible for a policy issue under study, was chosen. These are the representatives 
of the organization, the ones who have to ‘adapt’ and implement the cross-cutting policy 
objectives within the organization. The ‘linking pins’ (Schout & Jordan, 2008) are the first to 
confront the new cross-cutting demands and, therefore, are of particular relevance to the 
policy issue (McKeown & Thomas, 1988).  
Twenty-nine interviews were conducted, each featuring one linking pin from an 
organization. The response rate was 100% (see Table 15, the numbers refer to individual 
respondents)6. Many Q-sort studies have around 30-50 respondents, and this is considered 
adequate. The policy area Environmental Protection is not active in Integrated Youth Care. 
For Integrated Youth Care, we picked two respondents per organization from the five 
organizations involved. One organization had only one organizational linking pin appointed 
for Integrated Youth Care. 
  
TABLE 15: RESPONDENT-SELECTION  
 
Data analysis 
Q-methodology, in comparison to other (statistical) methods, attempts to find patterns 
across respondents, which, in turn, are used to find patterns across items (Dryzek & 
Berejikian, 1993, p. 50). Respondents are asked to rank statements in relation to other 
statements into a quasi-normal distribution (see for example Annex 6) based on preference. 
As a researcher, you develop a comprehensive view of a respondent’s perception (Brewer et 
                                               
6 The numbers do not refer to the numbers given to the respondents in Annex 4: Interviews, because anonymity was 
granted to the interviewees 
 
Org 1 Org 2 Org 3 Org 4 Org 5 Org 6 Org 7 Org 8 Org 9 Org 10 Total 
Austerity 
measures 
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 10 
Administrative 
simplification 
#11 #12 #13 #14 #15 #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 10 
Integrated Youth 
care 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
#21 & 
#22 
#23 
#24 & 
#25 
#26 & 
#27 
#28 & 
#29 
9 
Total 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 29 
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al., 2000). Factor analyses are used to identify clusters of respondents who have sorted the 
statements in a similar way. Furthermore, q-methodology gives the researcher an overview 
of the different discourses on the topic studied. Q-methodology makes use of two sets of 
samples: a q-sample and a p-sample. The q of the q-sample refers to question. The p of p-
sample refers to person.  
Q-methodology first defines questions. ‘Representative’ in q-methodology relates to the 
representativeness of the q-sample for the whole debate on a topic and not to the 
respondents-sample. As it is important that statements represent existing opinions and 
arguments from relevant actors (Van Exel & De Graaf, 2005, p. 4), the interviews about the 
coordination arrangement with the champions of the three cross-cutting policy objectives 
were used. Six extra interviews were done to retrieve more statements about how 
organizations adapt the cross-cutting objectives into their own objectives and to better 
understand the organizational adaptation ‘debate’. These six respondents had nothing to do 
with the three cross-cutting policy objectives under study; they were selected to ensure that 
the ‘debate’ is representative for other policy issues as well. For an overview of all the 
conducted interviews, see Annex 4.  
The interviews were transcribed and coded, and 615 quotes were selected. Out of the 
total of 615 selected statements, a subset of twenty-four statements was compiled for the q-
sort about organizational adaptation. Although this selection is of utmost importance, it is 
also fairly based on the impression of the researcher (Van Exel & De Graaf, 2005). To 
ensure the selection was done systematically, ‘a discourse analysis matrix’ was used (based 
on Dryzek & Berejikian, 1993) (see Annex 5). The matrix consists of substance elements 
(rows) and types of arguments (columns).  
To come up with the q-sample (see Annex 5), statements were placed within each cell. 
Some statements were re-framed and re-written for clarity of meaning. The elements of 
Christensen and his colleagues (2007)—structure, culture, and myth—were used as 
substance elements. The second dimension (columns), based on argument types, includes 
designative, evaluative, and advocative arguments (based on Dryzek & Berejikian, 1993; van 
Eijk & Steen, 2014).  
- Designative arguments; are about facts and quotations in which people state that 
something is likely, accurate, or true.  
- Evaluative arguments; concern the worth of something that does or can exist. Under 
this argument, quotations with value judgments are clustered.  
- Advocative arguments; concern whether or not something should exist. These 
arguments involve statements which advocate for a certain action and can be 
controversial.  
 Methodology  69 
The active, ‘on-the-spot’ involvement of respondents, who must sort through the 
statements, makes the data highly reliable. During the interview, the researcher can explicate 
the statements and method, and the respondent can explain her or his contemplations. The 
interview protocol can be found in Annex 7 (based on Van Exel & De Graaf, 2005). The 
analysis of the q-sorts starts by correlating all types of participants, resulting in a 29 × 29 
matrix, reflecting the correlations among viewpoints of the respondents in the p-set. Using 
the PQ Method 2.35, the correlation matrix was factor analyzed7 with a Centroid factor 
analysis, an exploratory factor analysis—used to uncover the underlying structure of large 
sets of variables—and applied a varimax rotation. This maximizes “the purity of saturation”—
i.e., examining as many sorts under the number of factors extracted—and ensures that each 
sort has the highest degree of association with only one factor (McKeown & Thomas, 1988, 
p. 52). We used the option of Horst 5.5 with iterative solutions for communalities instead of 
Brown’s (1980) method, due to the latter’s irregularities (Schmolck, 2015).  
3.3.2.3. Qualitative comparative analysis to unravel patterns 
The data on organizational adaptation, based on the analysis of the documents (de jure) 
and the information following from the q-sort interview (de facto) are combined in chapter 
five. This leads to four types, or levels, of adaptation:  
- Low de jure x low de facto – Little plans x little action 
- High de jure x low de facto – Huge plans x little action 
- Low de jure x high de facto – Little plans x huge action 
- High de jure x high de facto – Huge plans x huge action 
 
A fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (FsQCA) is used to assess whether different 
organizational characteristics (and the coordination arrangement) can explain the extent of 
organizational adaptation. This method and approach allows for small n samples, and it is a 
method that analyzes combinations of conditions. This fits the research design of this thesis 
well. A particular condition may have a different result, depending on the combination of 
conditions surrounding it. In other words, FsQCA does not assume the uniformity of causal 
effects, as in statistics. Also contrary to statistics, this method is not oriented towards the 
formulation of a single causal model that fits the data best (Rihoux & Lobe, 2009). It permits 
the existence of several combinations or conditions, which can equally account for the 
outcome. Moreover, FsQCA assumes asymmetric causality: if the presence of a particular 
(combination of) condition(s) is relevant for high adaptation, then its absence is not 
                                               
7 http://schmolck.userweb.mwn.de/qmethod/downpqwin.htm (Schmolck, 2015) 
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necessarily relevant for low adaptation. Thus, the results of the analysis are ‘configurations’ 
(Longest & Vaisey, 2008) that explain high and low adaptation. In this context, ‘configuration’, 
also called a ‘path’, refers to a combination of conditions that lead to high or low adaptation. 
For example:  
High autonomy * (and) being a large organization (size) -> (leads to) high adaptation.  
 
The calibration process remains a key precursor to retrieve these configurations. This 
involves the researcher assigning cases to ‘categories’ based on whether or not it belongs to 
a particular set. A set is a ‘bunch of things’, for example organizations with high autonomy. A 
department is ‘fully out of the set of organizations with high autonomy’ and, therefore, 
receives a 0 on the condition ‘high autonomy’. Most important in this process is the anchor 
point of 0,5. Cases with scores below the anchor point become cases without the particular 
condition, and those with a score above become cases with it. By systematically comparing 
the combinations of conditions, the researcher searches for certain patterns and redundant 
conditions. To unravel those patterns, FsQCA relies on Boolean mathematics.  
FsQCA expresses causal relations in terms of necessity and sufficiency. A condition is 
necessary whenever it and the outcome are both present: X  Y. In other words, if we see a 
certain outcome, the condition is in the path (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). A sufficient 
configuration can be schematically explained as X  Y, meaning that a certain condition or a 
combination of conditions leads to a certain outcome (i.e. high or low adaptation).  
Two parameters are used to analyze the sufficient configurations: coverage and 
consistency. The higher a coverage score, the higher the percentage of cases that exhibit a 
given configuration and the outcome. The higher a consistency score, the higher the 
proportion of cases consistent with a certain outcome. The consistency cut-off was set at 
0.80 for the analysis of sufficient conditions and at 0.90 for necessary conditions. 
Consistency values of 0.7 and higher are well suited for the analysis of sufficient conditions. 
This is in line with medium-sized N (30-60) QCA-applications (Schneider & Wagemann, 
2010, 2012). FsQCA and its specifics will be further explained, step-by-step, in chapter 5. 
3.4. METHODOLOGICAL CHOICES AND CONCERNS  
Safeguarding the reliability of this research can be done by describing the research 
methods and procedures thoroughly while accounting for the challenges in methods and 
design (Haverland & Blatter, 2012; King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). During any study, and 
due to practical and methodological challenges, numerous events and decisions change the 
intended design. The following paragraphs describe these challenges and explain their 
solutions.  
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The abovementioned paragraphs showed that the data analysis is based on both 
qualitative and quantitative analysis: a mixed-method approach. Triangulation of methods 
prevents a common methods bias. Triangulation rests on the premise that, by combining 
methodologies to study the same phenomenon, the weaknesses of each single method will 
be compensated by the strengths of other methods (Jick, 1979). The data collection and the 
analysis is based on the premise that empirical material can demonstrate significant 
difference between: 1.) How something was envisioned, which we call the de jure situation, 
and 2.) how something works de facto, in practice. This is why I study both documents, as 
well as interviews, which provide the perspectives of respondents. These two data sources 
are combined in chapter five. This triangulation of the data from these approaches creates a 
rich insight into the coordination arrangement and the adaptation process.  
Considering my own background and presumptions, I am most acquainted with the 
positivist approach to scientific studies. Therefore, I have assumptions about objectivity and 
‘retractable facts’ and am more inclined to ‘test’ certain theories. These theories are often 
middle range theories that are not encompassing but rather limited in scope (Merton, 1957). 
Middle range theories are often highly iterative: supported by empirics and, vice versa, 
constructed with observed data and afterwards tested by empirics. Take the q-sort study for 
example. This study began with interviews on the topic; then, statements were extracted and 
tested among a new sample of respondents. This might limit external validity, because it 
starts with theorizing clearly defined elements of a certain study object. External validity is, 
on the other hand, strengthened by the selection of policy issues and organizations, allowing 
for theoretical generalization (Yin, 2014). This selection assures the internal validity of 
results, but also strengthens the representativeness of the results for other cases related to 
cross-cutting policy initiatives. I tried to remain as open as possible to elements that did not 
fit the research framework. For instance, the semi-structured interviews introduced new 
factors that can possibly influence the coordination arrangement and organizations 
(descriptive inference). Furthermore, the broad selection of respondents and cases may 
provide deeper insight than previously thought.  
 A study on a small scale ensures internal validity, because it is directed, specific, and 
systematic. The response of a 100% in both interview rounds (coordination arrangement and 
organizational adaptation) strengthens this validity. Because I granted anonymity, and coded 
rather than named organizations, many interviews were conducted and many documents 
shared. Internal validity, in this context, also refers to how well run the study was. All the 
documents and interviews were transcribed and coded; all other empirical data is retractable, 
and replication of this research is possible. Giving this account and using explicit, codified, 
and public methods is a best practice in scientific research and ensures reliability, both in 
terms of data generations and further testing of the conclusions under different 
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circumstances (King et al., 1994). Responsible champions vetted and approved the factual 
data in the description of the coordination arrangements. The interview material and 
perception data were presented at many public fora, where the results were discussed with 
civil servants of the Flemish government. Furthermore, many parts of the thesis have been 
presented on different occasions: research visits, conferences, workshops, etc.  
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4. COORDINATION ARRANGEMENTS 
This chapter describes the coordination arrangements for cross-cutting policy objectives. 
Three cross-cutting policy objectives were selected for their characteristics: (1.) the austerity 
measures, (2.) administrative simplification, and (3.) Integrated Youth Care (see Table 16). 
The chapter aims to answer the first research question (RQ 1): How does the Flemish 
government organize the coordination of specific cross-cutting policies? Every cross-cutting 
policy objective will receive a short introduction. Subsequently, the coordination arrangement 
will be analyzed using Elinor Ostrom’s IAD framework (2005, 2010 – see chapter 2 and 
Table 16). Scaling the elements on a 4-point ‘scale’ from (1), tightly, to (4), loosely coupled, 
helps us assess the type of coordination. 
 
TABLE 16: ELEMENTS OF THE IAD FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The theoretical section concluded with specific hypotheses about which coordination 
arrangements we expect to find in the cross-cutting policy objectives, based on their policy 
issue characteristics. Table 17 provides an overview of the hypotheses and the cases. In the 
austerity measures, a tightly coupled coordination arrangement is expected, while, in 
Integrated Youth Care, a loosely coupled one. The administrative simplification objective 
features mixed policy issue characteristics; therefore, a hybrid coordination arrangement is 
expected. Comparing the empirical assessments of types of coordination used, with these 
hypotheses, is the aim of the last paragraph of each subsection. These attempt to answer 
the second research question (RQ 2): What policy issue characteristics explain the type of 
coordination arrangement deployed in cross-cutting policies? 
 
  
Participant constellation 
Political positions 
Administrative positions 
Room for action 
Information 
Power distribution 
Accountability 
Intensity 
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TABLE 17: CROSS-CUTTING POLICY OBJECTIVE SELECTION AND HYPOTHESES 
 Austerity 
measures 
Administrative 
Simplification 
Integrated Youth 
Care 
Political urgency High Moderate Low 
Interdependence Pooled Mixed Reciprocal 
Focus Internal Mixed External 
Expectation Tightly coupled Hybrid Loosely coupled 
4.1. AUSTERITY MEASURES8 
The Flemish government works to address the major challenge of a more efficient and 
better service delivery, without increase of staff, as formulated in its coalition agreement of 
2009-2014. In fact, the government wants to spend its budget on core tasks. During this 
period, it gradually introduced austerity measures, especially after 2011, (1) to reduce its 
workforce by 6,5% and (2) to realize a budget cut of 60 million euros on staff-related budgets 
in the budget years 2012-2014. The Flemish government is not the only government which is 
thoroughly reviewing its expenses; many European governments look for measures to bring 
public finances into balance. The Flemish government wants to shrink mostly through natural 
attrition—e.g. not renewing contracts, not replacing staff who will retire, etc.—and across-the-
board-cuts. This places Flanders, in comparison with other European countries, within the 
group of countries with moderate savings targets (Kickert et al., 2013; Molenveld, Boon, & 
Verhoest, 2014). The coordination arrangement will be described in the following sections. 
 DESCRIPTION OF THE CROSS-CUTTING POLICY OBJECTIVE 
Immediately after taking office in 2009, the Flemish government announced that the 
administrative apparatus would be cut by 5% of its operational costs, while there would be a 
2,5% on staff-related budgets, by the end of 2014. In early 2011, this amount was further 
increased with an extra 1,5% cut. Moreover, organizations did not receive budgets to 
compensate ‘seniority’ (and rising labor costs) in their staffs, as happened previously. 
Additionally, a 10% cut in the budget allocated for communication and consultants was 
added to the measures. Shortly afterwards (spring 2011), the Flemish government 
announced that colleagues leaving in the coming years would be only partially replaced. April 
2011 marked the beginning of the more severe reduction in staff, which had to be reduced by 
5%, and budget. This affected heads instead of full-time equivalents (FTE), implying that it 
does not matter if a staff member works full or part time. Furthermore, a saving of 50 million 
euros on staff-related budget over the period 2012-2014 was imposed. At the time of the 
government budget planning in February 2012, the 5% cut became the 6% norm (i.e. 1700 
                                               
8 Another version of this text has also been part of papers (see e.g. Molenveld et al., 2014; Molenveld & Verhoest, 2013) 
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fewer staff members in total). Also, the savings on staff-related budgets increased. By 2014, 
a decrease of 60 million euros had to be reached, instead of the earlier target of 50 million. 
Supplementary savings were announced by the Flemish government in November 2012. A 
surplus of 11,7 million was added to the existing 60 million euros cut from staff-related 
budgets. An extra staff reduction of up to 6,5% was introduced in 2013 after the government 
realized that the staff reduction had been already achieved one year before the deadline 
(June 2014). At the moment of writing (October 2015), the Flemish government has reduced 
its workforce by 7,5% or 2160 employees, 285 more than anticipated.  
The Flemish parliament decided that they did not want to save in subsidized sectors, 
where the government gives major policy impulses, such as sheltered and social workshops, 
services and benefits for people with disabilities, child and youth care, and homecare and 
housing subsidies. From the case organizations in this thesis, organization ten is excluded 
from the austerity measures (see Table 18) and another (organization nine) is partially 
excluded.  
 
TABLE 18: THE STAFF REDUCTION HAS DIFFERENT IMPACT ON DIFFERENT ORGANIZATIONS 
Goal 
Organization 1 6 % 
Organization 2 7 % 
Organization 3 7 % 
Organization 4 6 % 
Organization 5 6 % 
Organization 6 6 % 
Organization 7 6 % 
Organization 8 6 % 
Organization 9 2 % 
Organization 10 0 % 
 
See the timeline below for an overview of the most important events.  
- 2010: new government and introduction of the following measures: 
o 2,5% cut on staff budgets and 5% on operating costs  
o 20% cut on budget for communication and consultants 
- 2011:  
o Extra cut of 1,5% on staff budget 
o Extra 10% cut on budget for communication and consultants 
- 2011:  
o April: 5% staff reduction. 
o April: 50 million euro reduction of staff budget 
- 2012:  
o February: increase staff reduction to 6%, 1700 heads in total 
o February: 60 million euro reduction of staff budget  
- 2013:  
o September: increase to 6,5% staff reduction 
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o November: 100 million euros (after September declaration); extra budget cut 
of 11,7 million euros 
- 2014 
o 31 March: deadline for the savings on ‘heads’ and personnel related budgets  
 
 INSTRUMENTS OF THE COORDINATION ARRANGEMENT 
The following paragraphs will describe the political and administrative champions, and 
structural and management instruments.  
4.1.2.1. Political and administrative champions 
Geert Bourgeois, the Vice-Minister-President of the Flemish government (at that time) is 
responsible for coordinating the austerity goals. He has the authoritative power to sanction 
organizations that do not reach their goals with, for example, a recruitment stop. The 
administrative champions of this dossier are from the Department of Public Governance (in 
Dutch: Bestuurszaken), under remit of Geert Bourgeois. The CAG (see Annex 2: Instruments 
of the Flemish Government) has a major role and is appointed as champion of the whole 
austerity project. The CAG is a horizontal forum which unites the CEOs of departments or 
agencies, who discuss managerial topics which go beyond the organizational level. It has 
thirteen members in total, one representative of each ministry. It is a major ‘channeling 
forum’ for information-delivery to ministers and to Flemish government organizations, and is 
tasked with developing a method to realize the austerity goals. 
4.1.2.2. Structural Instruments 
Geert Bourgeois had appointed the CAG to figure out a method to reduce the staff by 6% 
and achieve the 60 million euro budget cut. An ad-hoc working group, encompassing ten 
CEOs of departments and agencies, is established to do this. This group must design a 
method, without intervention from political actors. Eventually, this working group split Flemish 
governmental organizations into two groups: (1) organizations who previously had realized 
savings, and (2) those who still had to do so. Subsequently, the abovementioned groups 
divided the austerity measures among themselves. After these groups came to an 
agreement, the plan was written and then accepted by the CAG and the Flemish parliament. 
In the implementation phase, organizations can ‘re-allocate’ the reduction of the number of 
staff intra-ministry, but not inter-ministry. As the CAG decided, the CEOs can decide 
autonomously where to replace staff. Concerning the staff-budget reduction, the CAG 
decided on a ‘growth path’ which saves up every year one third of the 60 million euros in 
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total. That is, in three consecutive fiscal years (2012-2014), 20 million was cut. A consensus 
within CAG about how much each ministry would contribute drove this decision.  
4.1.2.3. Management instruments 
The Department of Public Governance manages the measurement of the staff reduction, 
and the CAG delivers and validates figures and subsequently reports to the core ministers in 
a trimestral meeting between these ministers and the CAG (in Dutch: kern-CAG). The staff 
reduction figures are also reported half-yearly to the core-ministers and the whole Flemish 
government. In their performance agreements for the period 2011-2015, organizations were 
asked to record the number of employees, expressed as full-time equivalents (FTE). 
Furthermore, they had to clarify how to keep this amount equal or, preferably, lower in the 
coming years. The 6% and 60 million euro staff and budget reductions were, at that time, not 
yet enacted. Individual organizations were tasked with monitoring the results at least twice a 
year to determine if the targets were achieved. Figure 7 provides a schematic overview of all 
the agencies, departments, champions, and instruments involved in the austerity measures. 
This figure is solely intended to provide insight into the coordination structure and its 
instruments. It will not be further used in the analysis. The legend below the figure explains, 
number by number, which instruments and actors are shown in the figure. 
 
FIGURE 7: OVERVIEW OF THE COORDINATION ARRANGEMENT DEPLOYED IN THE AUSTERITY 
MEASURES 
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Number Figure Explanation 
(1) * Responsible minister – Vice-Minister-President – Department for 
Public Governance 
(2)  Monitoring of the austerity measures 
(3) * Two champions of the Public Governance Department  
(4) 
 
CAG 
(5) 
 
Ad-hoc working group of the CAG to come up with a method for 
the core austerity measures 
(6)  Trimestral meeting between the competent ministers and the CAG 
(7)  strategic and management agreements and business plans of the 
agencies and ministries/departments 
 
 ANALYSIS OF THE COORDINATION ARRANGEMENT 
The following paragraphs will analyze thoroughly the coordination arrangement using the 
IAD framework. This framework examines the different aspects of the coordination 
arrangement: the participant constellation, the political and administrative positions, the room 
for action, the information available to the participant, the power distribution, accountability 
arrangements, and collaboration intensity. After this description, the analysis leads to the 
conclusion about whether the arrangement is either tight or loose.  
4.1.3.1. Participant constellation 
In the decision making process, horizontal linkages, which are more open and fluent, 
exist within the ad-hoc working group of the CAG. In this group, the CEOs develop the 
method to achieve the austerity goals. During the implementation phase, which followed 
shortly afterwards, the participant constellation is vertically oriented, with tight, restricted, 
ordered linkages between organizations. The reduction occurs within the organizations. If 
necessary, the policy council and the management committee (see Annex 2) —ministerial 
forums—decide upon ‘shifts’ in staff reduction numbers.  
4.1.3.2. Political positions 
Geert Bourgeois, the lead minister, coordinates the austerity measures. He bases his 
political position on a unilaterally coercive government directive with executive orders. This 
coercive strategy is clearly demonstrated by the authoritarian power that the responsible 
minister has: “the minister said at that time, if we notice in the annual monitoring that an 
organization is not complying, and is also not likely to achieve the goal on 31/6/2014, other 
measures must been taken. End of discussion” (respondent 19). In other words, the political 
position is tightly established in the austerity measures.  
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4.1.3.3. Administrative positions 
The austerity goals are lead organization governed, by specific administrative champions 
per goal. The champions within the Department of Public Governance are responsible for the 
tally, as well as assistance and coaching, but do not have a hierarchical function or decision-
power. There is no fully-fledged, separately-created formal organization. These 
administrative champions, simultaneously, have many roles: initiator, participant, and 
champion. Yet they must combine these with a 'police role’, which often creates role conflicts: 
“the purpose of the department of Public Governance is not to control or audit the 
organizations. Sometimes some people think so, but we are not an audit office” (respondent 
18). This may eventually delegitimize the champion and, sometimes, cause deadlock.  
4.1.3.4. Room for action  
To examine organizations’ room for action, Ostrom (2005) analyzes mission statements. 
These statements can be formulated as rules, norms, strategies, and statements that convey 
their compellingness. The Flemish government’s mission was first a norm—see the quote 
below. Along the way, when the number, amount, and percentage were set, the mission 
became a rule, because the minister introduced a sanction (see: political positions). The 
organizations have to comply, otherwise the political level takes other measures. The initial 
norm was for the staff reduction was: 
 
“The organizations (attributes) engage themselves in relation to the relevant minister 
(deontics) to keep the number of employees, expressed in FTE constant, or preferable lower 
(aim), in comparison to the number of FTE in the organization at the beginning of the Flemish 
coalition agreement 2009-2014 (conditions).  
4.1.3.5. Information  
The austerity measures are coordinated via direct formal information channels. In the 
decision making phase, there are informal information-channels in the CAG workgroup. 
During this period, there are many possibilities to discuss and update the reduction method. 
In the implementation phase, the information is formal. Every organization receives 
standardized information: i.e., reach 6% staff reduction by means of natural attrition. Every 
organization has the same goals, though there exists a difference in severity (see Table 18). 
Champions maintain formal relationships with the political level in the policy implementation 
phase. The feedback loop between the CAG and the ‘core ministers’ occurs every three 
months. The champions and the CAG, update the whole Flemish government, every six 
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months about the reduction goals. The ‘tally’ is made public to the organizations every half 
year via formal communication.  
4.1.3.6. Power distribution 
Power is highly distributed in the CAG; there is, in other words, democratic decision-
making. In the ad-hoc working group no one succeeds another and there are no hierarchical 
functions installed. The functioning of the working group was according to respondent 11, 18 
& 19 a “very chaotic process, with alternatives being thrown on the table, no vision, except 
the method about who to cut with how many percent. Actually, that's not a vision”. According 
to respondent 19, most CEOs in the working group had already reduced staff numbers and 
budget a lot and hence said: “I can hardly save, I've no room left”. So, conflicts arose, 
between the ones who had already saved substantially and others yet to realize the savings. 
Subsequently, across-the-board cuts became the highest achievable goal. Apparently, in a 
sensitive dossier like this, organizations protect themselves strongly. As respondent 19 
reported: “you can protect your organization in a serious way, but this was not the case. The 
conflict escalated”. The democratic decision-making and following conflict led to only one 
possible decision: cut everybody proportionally, across-the-board.  
4.1.3.7. Accountability 
Organizations must translate the goals in the performance agreements and personnel 
plans, which must be included in the yearly business plan, a document based on the multi-
annual performance agreement (see Annex 2). The results of actions are supposed to be 
discussed during the yearly evaluation of the top civil servants. Organizations are judged on 
these results (and may even be punished) by the end of 2014. The accountability system is, 
hence, a hard type, based on performance indicators and involving sanctions.  
4.1.3.8. Intensity 
In the core austerity measures, the organizations coordinate for a joint effort. The 
organizations are ‘supplier’ to the government-wide austerity program. What initially could 
have been targeted cuts became a decision to cut the budgets and staff numbers in all 
organizations proportionally. According to respondent 16, there was not enough political 
courage to opt for targeted cuts:  
 
“ultimately, there was not enough courage to go for it on the political level. There were 
such discussions with the ministers, but then it was decided to leave the design and decision 
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to the CAG. What did we notice: also the CAG cuts proportionately and you cannot even 
really blame them. I had personally preferred that the government would have taken a more 
concrete decision”.  
 
Originally, some CEOs rejected these across-the board cuts and actually preferred 
targeted ones:  
 
“there should have been more greater harmonization. Now, we are left with this statistical 
monitoring, but what else could you do with this task which should now be realized? 
Everybody is going to try to achieve it in a pragmatic manner, but obviously, it should have 
been about what should be our core tasks, functions, processes etc.” (respondent 18).  
 INTERIM CONCLUSIONS  
From the preceding discussion, we conclude that the austerity measures are coordinated 
with a tight coordination arrangement. In the legend of Graph 2 all elements of the 
coordination arrangement are scored9 (See Annex 1). They are also displayed in the graph, 
which demonstrates that the coordination arrangement is tight, except for the element power 
distribution (more explanation below). The analysis shows that tight coupling and authority 
are, in this dossier, the primal causal mechanisms that ‘force’ organizations to comply and 
achieve the envisioned objectives (Chisholm, 1989).  
  
                                               
9 Every element of the coordination arrangement is scored on the basis of the IAD framework of Ostrom (2005). See for 
more explanation paragraph 3.2.2.2, on page 65 and Annex 1. The scale ranges from 1 – tightly coupled coordination 
arrangement to 4 – loosely coupled arrangement. 
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GRAPH 2: THE COORDINATION ARRANGEMENT DEPLOYED IN THE AUSTERITY MEASURES 
 
ELEMENT IAD 
FRAMEWORK 
ANALYSIS 
(1) Participant 
constellation 
Strict ordered linkages 1 (very tight) 
(2) Political positions Unilateral coercive regulation 1 (very tight) 
(3) Administrative 
positions 
Lead organization 2 (tight) 
(4) Room for action Rule 1 (very tight) 
(5) Information Direct formal information, standardized  1 (very tight) 
(6) Power distribution Multiple participants, democratic decision-
making 
3 (loose) 
(7) Accountability Performance-based accountability 1 (very tight) 
(8) Intensity Coordination of independent action 2 (tight) 
 
Most political and administrative actors assume that the possible interdependencies —
that could have arisen when targeted cuts were chosen—would create many insecurities and 
conflicts. According to the interviewees, there was not enough courage (a.o. respondent 16) 
at the political level to select targeted cuts. When the administration made the decision itself, 
and when the organizations relied on democratic decision-making, conflicts arose and, 
subsequently, across-the-board cuts were chosen. Compared to other elements, this 
democratic decision-making is a very ‘loose aspect’. As a result of the ‘across-the-board cuts 
decision’, however, uncertainty was reduced, because all the involved organizations felt that 
they were judged similarly. Hence, the ‘possible interdependencies’ and the subsequent 
uncertainty that could arise were ‘tamed’ through centralization, sanctions, and control in 
different forms—ex-ante—in the decision-making process. This aligns with Chisholm (1992), 
who states that policy makers assume that the best way to deal with interdependence is 
centralization and tight coupling.  
1
1
2
1
1
3
1
2
(1) Participant
constellation
(2) Political positions
(3) Administrative
positions
(4) Room for action
(5) Information
(6) Power
distribution
(7) Accountability
(8) Intensity
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Political urgency seems to bring about tightly coupled coordination arrangements, 
especially through institutionalization, the room for action, and accountability relationships. 
The political urgency and short time horizon led to a situation that required quick decisions; 
this, in turn, tightened the arrangement quickly. The issue’s urgency prompted a strong 
establishment of a political champion with the authority to sanction organizations. 
Furthermore, it led to a strict and ordered participant constellation, performance based 
accountability arrangements, and the appointment of a lead organization. It seems that only 
at a certain point of political urgency steps can be taken to proceed to implementation 
(certainly in a political sensitive dossier that affects the resources of many organizations). 
This conclusion stems from other research too (for instance by Jones & Baumgartner, 2008): 
organizations do not seem to adapt until urgency crosses a significant threshold. By focusing 
internal operations, the political principals could enforce the cuts. According to six of the 
respondents, a focus on core tasks, processes, the citizens, and society might have led to 
the more desired targeted cuts instead of turf wars.  
4.2. ADMINISTRATIVE SIMPLIFICATION  
At the European level, there is an increasing interest in the topic of quality of regulation, 
administrative simplification, and the removal of administrative burdens. Take, for example, 
the European summit held in Brussels in October 2013. Here, the debates revolve around 
the perceived need to embed new innovations, like e-government and digital economy; but 
they also lead to discussions about a ‘healthy way’ to administer and regulate organizations 
and citizens (Europese Raad, 2013, pp. 11–12). In addition to a focus on the quality of 
regulation at the European council, there is also a program, called REFIT, which aims to 
reduce administrative burdens in the EU zone (European Commission, 2012, p. 3). This 
chapter describes the coordination arrangement that the Flemish government uses to 
simplify administrative burdens. In the Flemish government, this cross-cutting policy is split 
up into:  
1. Ex-ante quality of new regulation, and  
2. Ex-post administrative simplification of existing regulation.  
These are interrelated: the better the ex-ante control of the quality, the less administrative 
simplification needed afterwards.  
 DESCRIPTION OF THE CROSS-CUTTING POLICY OBJECTIVE  
The ex-ante goal aims to improve the quality of new regulation. Many European 
governments are implementing processes, structures, and instruments to review, ex-ante, 
the impact of regulation on citizens, companies, and clients. This includes building 
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institutional capacity within government to coordination for administrative simplification, 
enhancing transparency through consultation and communication, reorganizing the 
development of new regulations through impact assessment, composing alternatives to 
regulation, and clarifying administrative procedures and legal quality (Van Humbeeck, 2006). 
The Regulatory Impact Analysis is the main ex-ante instrument, in this respect, in Flanders. 
Internationally, this instrument remains important to improve the quality of new regulation.  
The ex-post goal aims to simplify existing regulations and remove red tape. 
Internationally, this is accomplished, for example, by managing and rationalizing existing 
regulations, dealing with compliance of contradictory regulations, administrative and judicial 
review procedures, strengthening the interface between government-levels etc. (Van 
Humbeeck, 2006). 
 INSTRUMENTS OF THE COORDINATION ARRANGEMENT 
The following paragraphs will describe the political and administrative champions, and 
structural and management instruments. Afterwards, the coordination arrangement, as a 
whole, is analyzed using the elements of the rules and elements of the IAD framework.  
4.2.2.1. Political and administrative champions 
Geert Bourgeois, the Vice-Minister-President of the Flemish government (at the time of 
the Coalition Agreement 2009-2014) is the minister appointed to handle administrative 
simplification. This includes both the ex-ante and the ex-post goals. Following a request of a 
few advisory boards and social partners, the Flemish parliament decided to establish a 
‘Knowledge Center’ for Regulatory Management within the Flemish government in 
September 2001 (Somers, 2004, p. 1): 
 
"... the Knowledge center for Regulatory Management, […] will be a separate 
organization with its own management responsibility and coordinated directly by the Minister-
President of the Flemish government. Its position will be within the Coordination Department, 
Chancery Division. After the reorganization [BBB red.…] the knowledge center will be part of 
the organization “Legal and Regulatory Management" (under remit of the Minister-President, 
red.)." (Vlaamse Regering, 2001, p. 3).  
 
Through the years, both the position and the tasks of the Knowledge center shifted. 
Originally, the knowledge center was part of the Chancellery of the Minister-President. After 
the major BBB reform (Better Governmental Policy reform - in Dutch: Beter Bestuurlijk 
Beleid) the Knowledge Centre became part of the Public Governance Department of the 
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vice-Minister-President. It did not, as was originally proposed, become part of the department 
of the Minister-President. The name changed through the years from Knowledge Center for 
Regulatory Management to the current Regulatory Management Unit.  
Since 2009, there have been a few ‘events’ on the central government level. The ex-post 
goal: ‘administrative simplification of existing regulation’ is, for instance, embedded in the 
former coalition agreement (Vlaamse regering, 2009) and the cross-cutting program Flanders 
in Action (FiA) (Molenveld & Verhoest, 2014). Administrative simplification is a key project in 
the breakthrough n° 5 of Flanders in Action, which stipulated that the ministries must make 
action plans for administrative simplification, with a concrete reduction target by 2012. 
Another initiative is the Flemish Inter-institutional Agreement (IIA). It officially entered into 
force on October 1st 2010 (Vlaamse Overheid, 2010). It represents a commitment by the 
strategic advisory boards, Flemish government, and the Flemish parliament to support and 
apply the regulatory impact analysis (RIA). The IIA is not legally binding; rather, it is, 
primarily, a statement of intent. 
4.2.2.2. Structural instruments 
The monitoring and coordination role for the administrative simplification resides within 
the Department of Public Governance, more specifically in the central Regulatory 
Management Unit, under the competence of the Vice-Minister-President of the Flemish 
government. This unit is responsible for monitoring, reporting, and coordinating 
administrative simplification. The central Regulation Management Unit has a direct 
collaboration with the decentralized ‘Regulatory Quality units’, installed in 2006 by 
governmental approval, in every line ministry. The decentralized units are the first ‘point of 
contact’ for the central unit. They gather information about good regulation and report on the 
progress of administrative simplification within their own ministries (each ministry has a 
Regulatory Quality unit). This unit can contain one staff member or many. Some larger 
ministries have opted for the expansion of the units within single organizations. 
Consequently, those Regulatory Quality units also exist in larger agencies. Through the 
establishment of these units, the Flemish government aimed to improve the horizontal cross-
cutting coordination between the ministries.10  
                                               
10 Information obtained from a.o.: https://www.bestuurszaken.be/cellen-wetskwaliteit 
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4.2.2.3. Management instruments  
There are three major management instruments: the Regulatory Impact assessment 
(RIA), the Compensation Rule for Administrative Burdens, and the Standard Cost Model. Of 
these, the RIA is most important. 
 
Regulatory impact assessment  
The RIA has been mandatory since 2005. All preliminary drafts of decrees and executive 
orders of the government, with a regulatory effect on citizens, businesses, and non-profits 
must include one. The assessment enables organizations wishing to introduce new or 
amended regulation to identify all the related costs and benefits (Dienst Wetsmatiging, 2014, 
p. 10). Through this structured process, all policy alternatives are mapped in one document, 
which highlights the positives and negatives of the newly proposed regulation. In other 
words, the RIA stimulates the administration and the politically competent minister(s) and 
organizations to think and rethink the impact of new regulation on citizens, businesses, and 
non-profit organizations.  
There are several grounds for not completing an RIA in conjunction with new decrees 
and executive orders (Dienst Wetsmatiging, 2014, pp. 18–20); these imply that substantial 
parts of the new regulation will not require this document. The following fall outside of the 
RIA obligation: 
- That should be urgently adopted.  
- Concern "auto-regulation" that governs the operation of the government itself.  
- On dossiers where the Flemish government has no free legal policy space (due to 
higher authorities; federal government, EU) or political policy space (because the 
government already has pre-approved or validated the policy contours—coalition 
agreement, policy programs). 
- Without (significant) impact on society, with a mere formal character. 
- On budget and taxation. 
- About the implementation of policy plans and programs. 
- Arise from international or inter-regional regulations. 
- Ministerial decisions, circulars or mere decisions of the government. 
 
Compensation Rule for Administrative Burdens 
In addition to the RIA, the government also introduced a ‘compensation rule for 
administrative burdens’ (CRAL) in 2005. This compensation rule entails that, when adopting 
new regulations, any increase or decrease in the administrative burdens must be measured. 
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The scope of the compensation rule, and hence the exceptions thereof, coincides with those 
of the RIA.11 
 
Standard Cost Model 
To determine whether the administrative burdens are rising or remaining constant, the 
standard cost model (SCM) is introduced (Regulatory Management Unit, 2014). The SCM 
generates a detailed overview of the cost and burdens per regulatory dossier. The European 
Commission and all EU Member States use this device frequently (Regulatory Management 
Unit, 2010, p.22). The SCM consists of a series of steps. First, determine the scope of the 
involved regulation. Next, identify the relevant actors and target groups. Then, make an 
inventory of the information obligations and administrative procedures asked of the target 
group to comply with the regulation. Finally, before calculating the administrative burdens, 
assess some parameters—e.g. time spent, the hourly rate (staff expenses) of the actors 
involved, and the ‘out-of-pocket’ expenses such as registered mail and transport costs. A first 
baseline measurement (t1 / 0-point) of administrative burdens occurred in 2007.12 Annual 
progress reports monitor the current situation, and a summary of these reports is publicly 
available.13 
To publish the results of the monitoring of the CRAL and the RIA, the Flemish 
government uses a database that contains measurements of the SCM and of the 
administrative burdens. This database, open to all organizations within the government, also 
offers a simulation tool for to assess roughly the impact that a certain regulation might have. 
The regulatory agenda, another tool, publicizes these results as well.14 It is publicly available 
and lists proposed new regulations and modifications to existing regulations. At the start of a 
new legislative period, all ministers state their major strategic choices and ‘regulation plans’. 
The policy papers, drawn up by individual ministers annually, allow the government to update 
the regulatory agenda.  
 
To summarize, the timeline below gives an overview of the most important events.  
- 2001: Decision to establish a Knowledge Center for Regulatory Management 
- 2002: Knowledge Center for Regulatory Management becomes operational  
- 2005:  
o Regulatory Impact assessment is made obligatory  
o The CRAL is made obligatory 
                                               
11 Information obtained from a.o.: https://www.bestuurszaken.be/compensatieregel 
12 Information obtained from a.o.: https://www.bestuurszaken.be/meten-van-administratieve-lasten 
13 Information obtained from a.o.: http://www.bestuurszaken.be/overzicht-actieplannen  
14 Information obtained from a.o.: http://regelgevingsagenda.bestuurszaken.be/ 
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- 2006: Decentral Regulatory Quality Units are installed 
- 2007: First baseline measurement of the administrative burdens in the Flemish 
government 
- 2009: Integration of the ex-post goal in Coalition Agreement and Flanders in Action.  
- 2010: Flemish Inter-Institutional Agreement (IIA) was signed 
 
Figure 8 provides a schematic overview of all the agencies, departments, champions and 
instruments. This figure is solely intended to provide insight into the coordination structure 
and its instruments. It will not be further used in the analysis. The legend below the figure 
explains, number by number, which instruments and actors are shown in the figure. 
 
FIGURE 8: COORDINATION ARRANGEMENT DEPLOYED IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE SIMPLIFICATION 
OBJECTIVES 
 
Number Figure Explanation 
(1) * Responsible minister – Vice-Minister-President – Department of Public 
Governance 
(2) 
 
Regulatory Management Unit 
(3) * Decentral Regulatory Management Units 
(4) 
 
Monitoring of the administrative simplification, by the program office of 
Flanders in Action - Decisive Government, part of the services for the 
General Government Policy 
(5) 
 
Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) and Compensation Rule for 
Administrative Burdens (CRAL) 
(6) 
  
Flemish Inter-institutional Agreement (IIA). 
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 ANALYSIS OF THE COORDINATION ARRANGEMENT 
The following paragraphs analyze the coordination arrangement using elements of the 
IAD framework. The analysis concludes by determining whether the arrangement is either 
tight or loose.  
4.2.1.1. Participant constellation  
There is a strong participant constellation among the Regulatory Management Unit and 
the decentralized quality units in the departments and organizations This is a closed 
constellation with multi-level ordered linkages. There is a champion role for the decentralized 
units within each ministry. De facto, the decentralized regulatory quality units—intended to 
support the Regulatory Management Unit in its central role—do not always do so and do not 
have ministerial authority: “It is not the case that the decentral regulatory quality units have 
the authority to look at processes within their ministry and can say what should be done 
differently” (respondent 11). The units were installed to improve the cross-cutting 
collaboration, but in practice this is not the case.  
Next to this formal participant constellation, there are some bottom-up initiatives by the 
organizations to achieve the ex-post goal. Only if the departments and agencies feel an 
added value and need do they cooperate with the decentralized quality units, and certainly 
not in a systematic manner. There is, according to a few interviewees, willingness to work on 
these issues on the operational level, especially on ex-post simplification based on voluntary 
contributions: “the willingness to work together is certainly there, for instance among many 
department heads and policy advisers. Among people who are in the field, professionals, 
there is a huge willingness to cooperate” (respondent 13). Most respondents share this 
sentiment. 
4.2.1.2. Political positions 
De jure, the ex-ante goal of instituting the RIA and the CRAL was unilaterally imposed. 
The competent minister can enforce their use, but, according to all respondents, he does not 
actively promote the objectives in the government or ministry. One interviewee states: “The 
first conclusion is that it is difficult to identify a political champion or coordinator for these 
objectives” (Respondent 12). The horizontal political ownership, especially, is a problem: “It 
is seen too much as a project of that minister of that specific organization and everyone says: 
do it, but don’t bother us” (respondent 12). The interviewee explains that the political support 
was initially present (while there was also attention at the EU and federal level), but declined 
sharply through the years:  
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“before it was a competence of the Minister-President, which was perhaps better 
because he could play a more authoritarian role. Nowadays, we notice that there is no real 
political leadership around this objective” (respondent 12).  
 
According to the respondents, it is difficult to prioritize the issue if political leaders pay no 
attention to collaborative efforts or heed advice. Meanwhile, the ex-post goal is lead minister 
governed with voluntary contributions by organizations to achieve objectives. 
4.2.1.3. Administrative positions 
De facto, organizations who want to introduce, amend, or simplify regulation govern their 
own actions regarding administrative simplification. This process can be facilitated by the 
Regulation Management Unit, but this unit is not hierarchically overruling or legally 
authorized to force other organizations to comply. Rather, it must persuade, train, and 
facilitate:  
 
“The capacity of the Regulatory Management unit is limited, but also the culture in other 
organizations is also not open to allow people from the horizontal departments in 
(respondent 15).  
 
Although the Central Regulatory Management Unit and the decentralized units in the 
ministries are structurally installed, the coordination structure remains loose. The Central 
Regulatory Management Unit interacts with the decentralized units and individual 
organizations, yet the organizations themselves determine the goals and actions. The 
decentralized units are autonomous, with limited mutual interactions, and have a different 
orientation in every policy domain.  
4.2.1.4. Room for action  
To establish the room for action that organizations have Ostrom (2005) analyzes mission 
statements. These statements can be formulated as rules, norms, strategies and statements. 
As the mission statement below clarifies, the ex-ante goal is formulated as a strategy. The 
mission consists of an aim, attribute, and deontic. The strategy, however, does not elaborate 
on of what must or may be done. In other words, the deontic is not clear. Furthermore, the 
aim is not really clear. For instance, it does not state the outcome of the ex-ante goal of 
reducing the burdens for citizens—in other words, the very focus of the policy: 
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“The aim is to contribute to better information which is taken into consideration during the 
approval process of regulation (aim). The implementation of RIA is a clear responsibility of 
each department (attribute) (…) The person or authority preparing new regulations, is also 
responsible (attribute) for the implementation of the regulatory impact analysis. Finally, the 
Flemish minister who submits the draft regulations (attribute) to the Flemish government 
responsible for the content of the RIA. (…) Regulatory Impact Analysis is best performed by 
the project team which is preparing the new legislation as well. In the drawing-up the RIA it 
will be useful to involve other government departments and the target group (...). A RIA must 
(deontic) be prepared for all regulations that have a regulatory impact on citizens, businesses 
or nonprofit organizations. This includes all preliminary draft decrees and draft decisions, 
unless it relates to one or more of the exceptions” (Somers, 2004, p. 7).  
 
In the ex-post goal there is a norm formulated: 
“The action plans ‘administrative simplification’ with the associated reduction goals of the 
ministries (attributes) have to lead (deontic) by 2012 (condition) to concrete, noticeable 
administrative simplification (-20% aim) compared to the first baseline measurement in 
2009”. “The action plan of the Minster-President of Public Governance has to lead by 2014 to 
cross-ministry and cross-government levels administrative simplification” (Vlaamse Regering 
& CAG, 2011).  
4.2.1.5. Information 
With the ex-ante goal, there exist only a few information channels. The Central 
Regulatory Management Unit publishes formal newsletters, measures the administrative 
burdens, and relies on other formal and informal channels. For instance, the Flemish 
government has a special database, based on the measurements of the SCM to 
communicate the results of the CRAL and the RIA. This database, however, is not ‘alive’:  
 
“there are good instruments, but they are not used or not alive in the organizations. That 
is true in case of the Regulatory Agenda and the RIA, and other instruments as well” 
(Respondent 15).  
 
According to some champions, it remains difficult to access and interact with information: 
“We always try to get that foot-between-the-door and then we hope to get an invitation to join 
in” (respondent 13). Another champion: “when you are not allowed to enter and meet, you 
have to rely on providing training” (respondent 15). So, communication and interaction is 
achieved through formal channels, with the possibility to ‘notice and comment’. Furthermore, 
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the champions train organizations in favor of the instruments or to reduce administrative 
burdens.  
 
With the ex-post goal, the story is similar. The Central Regulatory Management Unit 
provides active support to the organizations of all vertical ministries by disseminating 
information and guidelines on (de)regulation. In addition to the Central Regulatory 
Management Unit’s input, there are ad-hoc bilateral contacts or even more formal platforms 
(for instance, shared management committees) among organizations. These often bottom-up 
initiatives work well in some cases. Yet there is no cross-cutting collaboration at the level of 
the whole government. According to one interviewee, this stems from transparency issues 
and fears of openness:  
 
“In terms of openness and transparency I score the Flemish government: zero [...] what 
counts is: information is power. The leading officials decided in this case [...] who gets 
information and who does not " (respondent 15).  
4.2.1.6. Power distribution 
The power distribution among the participants is pluricentric with different coordinators in 
multiple, fully autonomous organizations. According to one respondent, this inhibits 
horizontal collaboration, which the structure of Flemish Government also aggravates:  
 
“An organization is independent, autonomous. “Responsible”, with a nice word. And that 
means in many heads: we do our own thing, and continue writing regulation. So, when 
introducing new government-wide tasks this is met with much resistance, like: do not 
interfere with our organization” (respondent 14).  
 
The perception is that the situation—in terms of getting rid of red tape—is getting worse: 
“there are lots of “repair decrees” and thus a reduction of quality of regulation as a result. 
There is certainly insufficient political enthusiasm and political leadership to prioritize such 
issues” (respondent 12).  
4.2.1.7. Accountability 
De jure, there exists performance-based accountability with sanctions and rewards and 
the possibility to investigate actual institutional behavior in the ex-ante goal. The instruments 
for ex-ante deregulation are, de jure, obliged and used to assess the impact of the actions of 
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the organizations. Yet these seem, de facto, rather easy to get around. The RIA must be 
attached to new regulation and should pass the advisory boards, the state council (in Dutch: 
Raad van State), and the parliament, as an explanatory memorandum. Apparently, however, 
a share of RIAs are made ex-post to comply with the agreement: “that is the whole problem 
with the RIA, first one writes the new piece of regulation, afterwards one makes a RIA” 
(respondent 15, also confirmed by respondent 12). Although the RIA and CRAL seem 
obligatory, they remain relatively easy to ignore by citing an exception.  
With the ex-post goal, the Department of Public Governance publishes all evaluation 
reports on its website and makes them free for all; sometimes they even undergo peer-
review. Yet many organizations disregard this:  
 
“That is a problem with these evaluations of administrative simplification: there are piles 
of papers and reports, but, if there is no political attention or sanctions and if there is no 
political coordinator, or no negative evaluations when there are serious troubles ...” 
(respondent 12).  
 
“Yeah well, if the cross-cutting task is only such a small piece, compared to all other task 
in the performance agreement, and it’s time to evaluate, then yes, it is only one small goal 
between the 25 targets” (respondent 11).  
 
This suggests an accountability system focused only on peer review and dissemination of 
information that lacks a system for sanctions or inspections.  
4.2.1.8. Intensity 
The ex-ante and ex-post goals are meant to coordinate otherwise independent action. De 
facto, this process is corrupted by the non-use or pro forma use of the instruments. Reports 
from the OECD (2010, p. 25) and SERV (Van Humbeeck, 2006) mention RIA use in the 
Flemish government. According to the former, Flanders does not support civil servants to use 
the instrument. The interviews support this finding, but respondents add that this results, 
partially, from political inattention to the RIA. Relatedly, government members do not properly 
or sufficiently use the regulatory agenda (respondent 15 & SERV, 2014, p. 21). Indeed, 
though published online15, it is often outdated and, therefore, its potential remains unrealized 
according to respondent 15.  
 
                                               
15 http://regelgevingsagenda.bestuurszaken.be/  
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 INTERIM CONCLUSIONS  
 The administrative simplification objectives reveal two different coordination 
arrangements (see Graph 3) both mixed, but different on many aspects. The comparison 
between the content of the documents, de jure, and actual practice is important as it shows 
substantial differences between formal requirements and actual practice. Although 
formulated, de jure, as a tight coordination arrangement, the goals, de facto, developed into 
an easily-ignored, hybrid coordination arrangement. Implementation is lacking; one of the 
respondents even speaks of "a paper policy", which consists of figures and reports without 
much content (respondent 15). Many interviewees emphasize that the Flemish government 
has too many rules and regulations; as one interviewee states: “That's pretty typical to young 
federal countries. People tend to say: wow, we have our own responsibility now, and jump on 
it and write regulation without too much thought” (respondent 12). 
 
GRAPH 3: THE COORDINATION ARRANGEMENT DEPLOYED IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
SIMPLIFICATION OBJECTIVES 
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 Ex-ante Ex-post 
(1) 
Participant 
constellation 
Closed/restricted, ordered 
linkages      
1 (very 
tight) 
Closed/restricted, 
ordered linkages      
1 (very 
tight) 
(2) 
Political 
positions 
Unilateral coercive 
government regulation 
1 (very 
tight) 
Lead minister 
governed, with 
voluntary contribution 
4 (very 
loose) 
(3) 
Administrative 
positions 
Internally participant 
governed       
4 (very 
loose) 
Internally participant 
governed 
4 (very 
loose) 
(4) Room for action Strategy 
3 
(loose) 
Norm 2 (tight) 
(5) Information 
Information from a 
coordination function, with 
possibility to ‘notice and 
comment’ 
3 
(loose) 
Information from a 
coordination function, 
with possibility to 
‘notice and comment’ 
3 (loose) 
(6) 
Power 
distribution 
Pluricentric; coordinators in 
multiple organizations   
3 
(loose) 
Pluricentric; 
coordinators in multiple 
organizations   
3 (loose) 
(7) Accountability 
Performance-based 
accountability 
1 (very 
tight) 
Peer review 
4 (very 
loose) 
(8) Intensity 
Coordination of otherwise 
independent action; joint 
effort/joint planning 
2 (tight) 
Coordination of 
otherwise independent 
action; joint effort/joint 
planning 
2 (tight) 
 
Although there are, de jure, some elements of tight coupling in the ex-ante dossier, the 
lack of political attention and the potential exceptions applicable to the RIA and CRAL 
undoes them. In this case, the declining political urgency loosens the coupling of the 
organizations to the administrative simplification objectives. Though political urgency was 
initially present, all interviewees claim that it declined over the years. For the respondents, 
attention from top officials is essential for its success. Without this attention, the legitimacy 
and value of the instruments is nonexistent. As a respondent explains, the pro forma use of 
the instruments become window dressing for compliance with the Flemish Inter-institutional 
Agreement. The instruments become, though they are not conceived as, an administrative 
burden in and of themselves: “there are many reports produced and there are many good 
intentions, but the actions are not sufficiently coordinated and display too few concrete 
achievements” (Respondent 15). Furthermore, with little political follow-up or attention during 
the evaluation or bilateral meeting between minister and organization, the organization has 
no incentive to prioritize administrative simplification objectives.  
In the ex-ante goal there are some interdependencies, but these neither tighten nor 
loosen the coordination arrangement. Some RIAs are collaborative efforts between the 
organizations and all other stakeholders in a consultation process. De facto, many new 
regulations do not contain RIAs, or they are written afterwards and, therefore, do not include 
extensive consultation. The organizations in this dossier depend on the political process and 
political actors as well. Often the ministerial cabinet initiates new regulation, but, if they are 
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not interested in consulting with stakeholders, the RIA loses its legitimacy. The ex-post goal, 
in some instances, transcends the organizational boundaries; take, for instance, the case of 
bottom-up initiatives. Many initiatives, however, focus on the organizations themselves, and, 
without much cross-cutting collaboration, interdependencies are minimal.  
First, there remains room for action in both goals, but the power is highly distributed in 
different organizations. Moreover, these organizations have little information about each 
other. For instance, because the regulatory agenda is not kept up-to-date, organizations are 
not aware of the upcoming regulatory initiatives of other ministers. Second, the interviews 
highlight that administrative simplification objectives have to cope with fragmentation, 
because of the Flemish government’s structure. The silo-ization in the coordination 
arrangement exacerbates this fragmentation by establishing decentralized regulatory units in 
ministries. These decentralized Quality Units have no forum to meet regularly. Third, the 
regulatory management units have little authority to establish a cross-cutting dynamic. At the 
moment, they have little hierarchical decision-making power to play the coordination-role.  
Moreover, task tensions emerge because the ex-ante and ex-post goal are combined in 
one unit—Cordova-Novion (2011) has made this point also. The central regulatory 
management unit has an expert role and should make a technical judgement about, for 
instance, the quality of the RIA and the administrative burdens in the ex-ante goal. This 
monitoring or expert role conflicts with the trainer and stimulator roles in the ex-post goal. A 
possible solution to counteract fragmentation is the implementation of a central coordination 
body, according to the respondents, like the Regulatory Management Unit, but with sufficient 
expertise and competence.  
As an interviewee stressed, a culture focused on the target group, and a genuine interest 
in what impact regulation and policy decisions have on citizens could bring about cross-
cutting collaboration (Respondent 13). Non-implementation stems from a lack of focus on the 
client, according to three interviewees. Instead of only ‘counting’ administrative burdens, 
there should be more communication about best practices. Furthermore, the use of rewards 
and sanctions could be enhanced.  
4.3. INTEGRATED YOUTH CARE16 
In the nineties, it became clear that specific groups of youngsters were not helped 
satisfactorily, e.g. they were driven from pillar to post, or care was very ad hoc without follow-
up. These youngsters required a more integrated approach due to the complexity of their 
                                               
16 Major parts of the first part of this chapter are published as a book chapter and article: Verhoest, K., Voets, J., & 
Molenveld, A. (2014).  And Voets, J., Verhoest, K., & Molenveld, A. (2015). See also: Van Tomme, Verhoest, Voets, & De 
Peuter (2011). 
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problems (e.g. the client’s trouble was not only a matter of school attendance, but also 
related to family situations, emotional stress, etc.). This paragraph describes the coordination 
practice of Integrated Youth Care (IYC), a cross-sector policy program of the Flemish 
government that aims to achieve a coordinated approach to help multi-problem youngsters 
and their next of kin. IYC is both a goal and policy program; a coordinated approach to help 
troubled young people facing multiple problems (e.g. health issues, multi-problem family, 
school drop-out, mental issues, …) that requires a multi-faceted care strategy. The 
coordination of IYC is an interesting case to analyze because it entails a mixed horizontal 
and vertical coordination strategy in order to align actors from multiple policy sectors – i.e. to 
achieve joined-up government within parts of government. We analyze how the Flemish 
government developed and implemented a coordination arrangement to emphasize 
collaboration.  
 DESCRIPTION OF THE CROSS-CUTTING POLICY OBJECTIVE 
The coordination practice of IYC was initiated because the matter was salient: many 
actors reported gaps in the system, and a number of incidents were also reported in the 
press. A new policy framework and law named ‘Decree Integrated Youth Care’ was approved 
on May 7, 2004 in the Flemish parliament. The goal of IYC is to achieve a coordinated 
approach to help troubled young people and their next of kin. The Decree describes the 
goals, target group, central principles and policy lines, which are essential building blocks to 
achieve the overall coordination aim to provide IYC: 
 
1. The modularization of the ‘supply’ of youth care: in order to get a grip on the 
fragmented and wide range of care, the government wanted to define these care 
activities in the different sectors into more ‘standardized’ packages that could then be 
linked to a more systematic referral system between care organizations and the 
creation of care trajectories. This standardization should create proper care chains, 
achieving co-ordination between aid actors at the operational, service delivery level. 
2. Introduction of the distinction between those actors and services that are directly 
accessible (‘RTJ’) to youngsters (e.g. a center for mental health where they can go 
without referral) and those that require a referral (‘NRTJ’) by another actor, like crisis 
centers to which young people can be referred by a center for mental health. The 
latter is often more far-reaching and/or expensive and therefore a referral should be 
required. This policy line would help to separate different ‘types’ of issues youngsters 
face, so that each ‘type’ would be channeled to the right service delivery chain, and 
ensuring the most costly services (‘NRTJ’) would be used only if necessary.  
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3. The creation of Networks for Direct Accessible Youth Care (‘NRTJ’) at (sub) regional 
level: most of the youth care in Flanders is directly accessible to young people. All 
providers in a certain region would be joined by these networks. The networks have 
goals that can only be achieved if the providers collaborate. Their main task is the 
organization of a qualitative access to youth care, ensuring that a client, regardless of 
‘which door he knocks on’, is directed to those modules most fitting his needs and 
questions. Other tasks include setting up a system of care coordination and creating 
awareness in organizations by distributing information on the access and possibilities 
of integrated youth care. Hence, these networks are regional coordination platforms 
enabling better cooperation of actors involved, aiming for better service delivery. 
4. The creation of Networks for Emergency Care (‘Netwerken crisisjeugdhulp’) at 
(sub)regional level: Although there are long waiting lists for certain types of care (e.g. 
places in residential care), there are emergency or crisis situations in which an 
immediate response is required, like an attempted suicide or domestic violence. 
These networks aim to optimize the access and operations of the Flemish emergency 
care. Regional crisis registration centers have procedures and up-to-date overviews 
of available types of places in institutions. They would provide short term relief. 
5. The creation of an inter-sector portal/gateway to indirectly accessible modules of 
youth care: this portal would allow the primary/directly accessible actors to refer 
youngsters, if necessary, to other actors, using modules to ensure a systematic 
referral basis. The portal should ensure that clients are treated equally, that services 
delivered for a certain issue are comparable and understandable for all actors 
involved, and it should function as a neutral ‘dispatching service’ for clients. 
6. The introduction of guidance in care trajectories: This should ensure that youngsters 
are not only referred to the right actors, but also monitoring to what extent the 
problems are solved or not. 
7. The clarification of the relationship with judicial youth care: judicial or legal youth care 
involves the federal level, featuring care strategies that are linked to legal 
proceedings and legal protection – this type of care does not require consent of 
youngsters, but is forced or mandatory. While the Flemish government holds most 
relevant competences, the federal government also controls part of the aid spectrum. 
By clarifying the relationship between both, overlap or blind spots in the aid of both 
actors should be abolished and efficiency gains can be reached. 
8. The introduction of a system for inter-sector data processing: To provide integrated 
care, the exchange of information between care organizations about the client is vital. 
Information on clients was not shared, and each actor and sector had their own data 
sources and information management systems. Communication between actors was 
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difficult or absent for various reasons (e.g. privacy laws). This system should provide 
the informational backbone for the coordination of IYC: it ensures informed 
interactions and allows for evaluation of the coordination at the strategic and 
operational levels. 
9. The establishment of Platforms to coordinate policy: to achieve this, a permanent 
coordination between policies and actions of the various sectors at different levels is 
required. It is clear that these policy lines are of very different nature and focus: they 
involve substantive issues (e.g. defining modules), process and structural issues (e.g. 
creating networks to deliver care), information issues (e.g. monitoring) and policy 
issues (e.g. coordinating between different policies). Some of these policy lines are 
developed in the Decree in more detail, while other elements had to be further 
defined and operationalized in implementing orders, to be taken by the Flemish 
government (‘uitvoeringsbesluiten’).  
 
After a number of years, new policy lines were added:  
10. Societal necessity: this is a merger of elements from other policy lines, namely the 
relation with legal youth care, and is linked to emergency care. While emergency care 
is mostly dependent on the consent of the clients, there are also urgent situations in 
which clients (young people or their parents) do not ask for care themselves, but 
require immediate help, which if necessary is imposed by a juvenile court.  
11. Regional projects: collaborative initiatives by care workers in regions through an ad 
hoc project (e.g. making a certain joint care tool) may be subsidized by the Flemish 
government as part of IYC. It provides an instrument to experiment with and test 
coordination initiatives. 
 
 INSTRUMENTS OF THE COORDINATION ARRANGEMENT 
The institutional make-up of the health and care sector in Flanders is fragmented and 
featured by six strong (sub-)sectors (see Table 19). However, these sectors are organized at 
different levels (central, regional and local), operate very autonomously within separate 
administrative units, have different types of target groups (e.g. defined by age, type of 
problem, …), have staff from different backgrounds and have their own specific instruments 
and services. 
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TABLE 19: ACTORS INVOLVED IN INTEGRATED YOUTH CARE 
 
At the level of the central 
administration 
At the local level 
(1) 
Children 
and family 
affairs 
 
Child and Family Agency (‘Kind 
en Gezin’ or ‘K&G’); 
Different organizations (e.g. Centres for 
Integrated Family Care — ‘Centrum voor 
Integrale Gezinszorg’ or ‘CIG’; Trust Centres 
for Child Abuse — ‘Vertrouwenscentrum 
Kindermishandeling’ or ‘VK’) 
(2) 
Disabled 
persons 
 
Flemish Agency for the 
Disabled (‘Vlaams Agentschap 
voor Personen met een 
Handicap’ or ‘VAPH’); 
Different organizations (e.g. Day Care 
Centres) 
(3) 
General 
welfare 
work 
 
Department of Welfare, Health 
and Family (‘Departement 
WVG’); 
Centers for General Well-being (‘Centra 
Algemeen Welzijnswerk’ or ‘CAW’) 
(4) Mental 
health 
 
Agency for Care and Health 
(‘Agentschap Zorg and 
Gezondheid’); 
Centers for Mental Care (‘Centra voor 
Geestelijke Gezondheidszorg’ or ‘CGG’) 
(5) Youth 
care 
 
Agency for Well-being of Young 
Persons (‘Agentschap 
Jongerenwelzijn’ or ‘AJ’); 
Different organizations (including closed 
centres for juvenal delinquents) 
(6) 
Student 
counseling 
 
Ministry of Education 
(‘Ministerie van Onderwijs’); 
Centers for Student Counseling (‘Centra voor 
Leerlingenbegeleiding’ or ‘CLB’) 
 
Five sectors are part of one ministry of the Flemish government, being the ‘Ministry of 
Welfare, Health and Family’. The sixth sector is part of the ministry of Education and due to 
its nature applies very different approaches. In each of these sectors, much of the care 
activities are delivered by various non- and social-profit organizations, which are often 
organized at different tiers and protected by powerful umbrella organizations. Moreover, 
these organizations are quite heavily subsidized and regulated by the six involved sectoral 
Flemish administrations, but they still retain considerable autonomy in the way they deliver 
their care activities to youngsters. Care activities and approaches are developed separately 
within the different sectors without much structured concentration. Hence, the challenge of 
IYC is to break through these ‘silos’ and coordinate the strategies and actions of these 
different sectors.  
To achieve non-hierarchical intersectoral and multi-level collaboration, IYC policies and 
actions are developed through network arrangements at different levels. All these structures 
concern youth, but the focus varies depending on the type of issues they face, and the 
consultation between care workers from organizations in the field, their management, and 
policy actors at different levels. IYC wants to achieve its results by deploying a collaborative 
governance model and envisaged a restructuring of the youth care service delivery in four 
 Coordination arrangements  101 
subfields: directly-accessible youth care (RTJ), indirectly accessible youth care (NRTJ), 
emergency and crisis care, and legal youth care. Each would be accessible by their own 
access portals, where youngsters are screened (and dispatched) to direct them to optimal 
care. Three IYC-principles are: (1) a single proper entrance/reception for the young person 
and optimal reference to the most appropriate care providers, (2) optimal coordination 
between care providers, and (3) continuity in the care trajectory of the involved youngster 
following steps 1 and 2. In order to make this work, the organization and structuring of the 
access portals is essential: the broad entry through RTJ, the societal necessity for legal 
youth care, the intersectoral portal for NRTJ, and the registration center for emergency youth 
care (Integrale Jeugdhulp, 2010).  
On the level of Flanders (i.e. the central level), the so-called management committee 
unites the top civil servants of the six sectoral administrations involved in IYC, supported by a 
policy support team (‘BOT’). They are supported by a staff of policy experts and an advisory 
board consisting of aid providers from different sectors and client representatives. They 
interact with the political level, involving at least two ministers, and are advised by an 
advisory council on IYC, made up of various stakeholders, like client representatives. A 
special task force with a program manager was created at the Flemish level. The Flemish 
administration also deployed regional teams to organize and monitor the policy lines 
concerned. In terms of financial resources, the picture is not very clear, but most resources 
involved manpower and time rather than direct financial support (some exceptions include 
limited budgets for regional projects). 
On a lower scale, there are six regions with regional steering groups. These include 
separate steering groups for networks for indirectly accessible youth care (14 in total) and 
networks for emergency care (10 in total). These network steering groups are supported by 
Flemish civil servants who act as network managers. Formally, network managers are 
responsible for supporting the local network steering groups and regional steering groups; 
supporting deliberation in the steering groups both related to substantive and practical 
matters; synthesizing information on progress of the network and providing feedback to 
network steering groups; communicating from other levels and structures to the network and 
vice versa; stimulating and facilitating the transition process in each stage; and monitoring 
agreements made in the network. They are also the liaison between the network and the 
government by monitoring policy evolutions in IYC, communicating them and linking them 
with regional dynamics, and safeguarding the goals, planning and rules of IYC.  
The most basic coordination level is the daily interaction between individual care workers 
in the field and their clients. This level has no separate structure – it is case-per-case 
dependent and ad hoc. ‘Regional Projects’ were created as an instrument, providing regions 
with more autonomy to deal with certain goals in their regional plan. These projects are 
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various and appreciated, but a major criticism is that the money is only available for a limited 
period of time and successful projects came to a halt once funding stopped. In Figure 9 a 
schematic overview of all the agencies, departments, champions and instruments is 
provided. This figure is solely intended to provide insight into the coordination structure and 
its instruments. It will not be further used in the analysis. The legend below the figure 
explains, number by number, which instruments and actors are shown in the figure. 
 
FIGURE 9: OVERVIEW OF THE COORDINATION ARRANGEMENT DEPLOYED IN INTEGRATED 
YOUTH CARE 
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Number Figure Explanation 
(1) * Responsible ministers:  
- Minister of Social protection and Health  
- Minister of Education 
(2) 
 
Decree Integrated Youth Care 
(3) * Policy support team (‘BOT’), part of the Department of Social 
Protection and Health  
(4) 
 
Management committee with CEOs of the involved 
administrations 
(5) 
 
Regional steering groups: 
- networks for indirectly accessible youth care 
- networks for emergency care 
(6) 
 
IYC advisory council, made up of various stakeholders, like 
client representatives 
(7) * Network managers supporting the local network steering 
groups and regional steering groups, representatives of the 
administration 
 
Time frame 
Concerning timing, Figure 10 explains the very complex implementation process. The 
numbers represent the policy lines mentioned under the paragraph ‘description of the cross-
cutting policy objective’.  
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FIGURE 10: IMPLEMENTATION STATUS OF IYC AND LINKAGES BETWEEN DIFFERENT POLICY 
LINES 
 
 ANALYSIS OF THE COORDINATION ARRANGEMENT 
The following paragraphs analyze the coordination arrangement using the elements of 
the IAD framework. Ultimately, the analysis concludes whether the arrangement is either 
tight or loose.  
4.3.3.1. Participant constellation  
Many departments and agencies of the Flemish government, political actors, and various 
civil society organizations are involved in Integrated Youth Care. As a consequence, there is 
a permanent multi-level coalition between these actors. On a lower level, in the policy sectors 
concerned (i.e. health/welfare, education), the social-profit/not-for-profit actors hold strong 
positions, through their umbrella organizations and connections to different political parties 
(Respondent 5). Various decrees and financial support sectoral government subsidies 
institutionalize their strong positions (Respondent 6).  
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4.3.3.2. Political positions 
De jure, the implementation of Integrated Youth Care (IYC) is based on a decree, or a 
unilateral agreement, with executive orders. De facto, implementing IYC is considered a 
rather ‘operational and technical’ matter, requiring much administrative effort (respondent 1). 
The issue seems, on the one hand, politically salient, because it involves troubled youth and 
addresses the problems of many families and citizens. Moreover, the policy issue concerns 
power bases and vested interests in the welfare, health, and education sectors linked to 
certain politicians and political parties. Therefore, the policy issue is always monitored by 
politicians (even by an ad-hoc committee in the Flemish parliament). On the other hand, 
frequent ministerial turnover and the risk aversion of involved ministers results in a lack of 
political attention and delays in the process (respondent 6, 5). 
4.3.3.3. Administrative positions 
On the central level, a so-called management committee unites the CEOs of the six 
sectoral administrations involved in IYC. This is a network governed form of steering, with a 
policy support team (in Dutch: ‘BOT’ – beleidsondersteunend team) from the Department of 
Welfare, Health and Family Affairs aiding the management committee (Respondent 6). The 
team includes one project manager, six staff members, and a secretary. While the Decree 
and execution orders install and operationalize all foreseen bodies and structures, their 
influence on the coordination process seems limited. For example, administrations often do 
not follow up on the decisions taken by the management committee (Respondent 6).  
4.3.3.4. Room for action  
By analyzing the mission statement of Integrated Youth Care (see underneath), we can 
assess if this is a strategy, norm, or rule (see Ostrom, 2005). The initial plan of Integrated 
Youth Care is a statement. It consists of an aim (intersectoral coordination) and attributes 
(youth care services).  
 
“Integrated youth care seeks to enhance the opportunities of minors (aim), their parents, 
their guardians and the people involved in their communities, and to promote their welfare 
and health. Integrated youth care contributes to the fullest possible integration of minors 
(aim) in society. It aims, through cross-sectoral cooperation (aim) between youth services 
providers and intersectoral coordination of the youth care services (attributes), to provide a 
continuum of youth care in response to a question of a youngster in need” (Integrale 
Jeugdhulp, 2004). 
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4.3.3.5. Information 
There are countless networks in this process and, as a result, mainly informal information 
transmitted through interpersonal contacts. Many partners feel disappointed with the use of 
their involvement. There is an impressive stream of written and impersonal communication 
and documentation to update participants (mostly regional and network steering groups, but 
also management committee). On the other hand, they soon lose overview (Respondent 7). 
A well-intentioned communication flow seems to achieve the opposite effect and leads to 
disinformation. Furthermore, information and feedback between government and network-
levels seems to get ‘filtered’ along the way. As a result, during the instrument development 
process (e.g. policy recommendations, tools), alienation occurs and partners no longer 
recognize themselves, their input, or their organizations (Respondent 4). 
4.3.3.6. Power distribution 
There was no lead coordinator in the process. Instead, there were multiple actors who 
employed democratic decision-making to determine actions. This was, however, a very 
challenging task (Respondent 7), as the following examples make clear. The development of 
a system for intersectoral data failed, despite preparatory work. Aligning the different 
systems in the involved sectors proved demanding and highly complex. Such a system 
proved crucial to achieve coordination, because the lack of intersectoral data impeded the 
clear diagnosis of problematic intersectoral trajectories, the number of ingoing and outgoing 
youth, and the effects of such care. A modularization of the ‘supply’ of youth care was 
prepared and a tool created (database and guide), but the desired effects were not achieved: 
providers did not think or act in terms of the modules, the modules did not make the supply 
more transparent, organizations did not adapt or create new care programs, and there was 
no identification and reduction of overlapping care. The lack of added value and the failed 
projects made it difficult to convince skeptical actors within different sectors, and reluctant to 
support this reform, that a better institutionalized coordination was indeed necessary (a.o. 
respondent 5 and 10). 
4.3.3.7. Accountability 
There is insufficient clarity about accountability and responsibility in the process. While 
there exists much dissemination of, and access to information, there exists no accountability 
system. Who is responsible for what? How are actors held accountable? What can and 
should a network do? What lies within its discretion? Management committee members 
declared that they take little responsibility for what goes wrong in the region, because the 
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committee does not have the space, authority, or instruments to intervene (respondent 6). 
There is, according to the respondents, perhaps too much belief that voluntary contributions 
and consultations can realize IYC (respondent 5). There is no mandate to fulfill a particular 
coordination or meta-governance (Sorensen, 2006) role, in whole process and in the 
organizations acting in network structures. Take, for example, the Intersectoral Portal. 
People hesitated to share responsibility for the intersectoral gateway, fearing their control, 
tools, and mandate would change. Clarifying what would happen and who is accountable 
and responsible for what could help, according to the respondents (a.o. respondent 6,7,4).  
4.3.3.8. Intensity 
While most coordination structures of otherwise independent action and joint planning 
were in place, many policy lines were not realized because of the interdependencies 
between actions and actors. Many final decisions depend on the installation of the 
Intersectoral Portal. Establishing Intersectoral Portal to indirectly accessible modules of youth 
care is key for IYC; yet this did not happen despite the decree deadline of 1/1/2008. This 
issue was salient and contested, because the Intersectoral Portal would affect the current 
division of tasks between the sectors and the corresponding interests. A participative 
decision making process was organized, but stalled several times, due to resistance from 
sectoral players. As most of the policy lines were strongly interlinked and the (non-)results 
achieved in one policy line affected the progress of others, cooperation, but not coordination, 
occurred (Van Tomme, Verhoest, Voets, & De Peuter, 2011).  
 INTERIM CONCLUSIONS 
The coordination arrangement of Integrated Youth Care can be described as loosely 
coupled (see Graph 4). The legend below scores all the different elements of the 
coordination arrangement. Although the policy program is based on a decree, and works with 
permanent coalitions between organizations to coordinate independent actions, the 
coordination arrangement is for the most part loose. The analysis shows that there is a 
mismatch between loose and tight coupling on different levels.  
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GRAPH 4: THE COORDINATION ARRANGEMENT DEPLOYED IN INTEGRATED YOUTH CARE 
 
ELEMENT IAD 
FRAMEWORK 
ANALYSIS 
(1) Participant 
constellation 
Permanent coalition 2 (tight) 
(2) Political positions Unilateral coercive regulation 1 (very 
tight) 
(3) Administrative 
positions 
Network governed 3 (loose) 
(4) Room for action Statement 4 (very 
loose) 
(5) Information Informal communication, with room to 
maneuver 
4 (very 
loose) 
(6) Power distribution Multiple participants, democratic 
decision-making 
3 (loose) 
(7) Accountability Dissemination and access to information 
– peer review 
4 (very 
loose) 
(8) Intensity Coordination of independent action 2 (tight) 
 
First, the IYC case shows that reciprocal interdependent issues allow for loose 
coordination arrangements. Such an approach works if the participants recognize its 
necessity. Loose coordination, however, has its limits in reciprocal interdependent issues that 
touch sectoral and organizational interests. In this case, the intersectoral goals not only 
require intersectoral consultation but also (the change of) sectoral policy instruments. 
Implementing such far-reaching measures through a network mode, with voluntary 
implementation is, given their urgency, welcome and noble. Nevertheless, this network-like 
2
1
3
4
4
3
4
2
(1) Participant
constellation
(2) Political positions
(3) Administrative
positions
(4) Room for action
(5) Information
(6) Power distribution
(7) Accountability
(8) Intensity
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approach mode cannot help to decide and implement policy measures that aim for 
fundamental changes in task allocations between sectors and organizations.  
Second, in the case of reciprocal interdependent objectives the mix of loose coupling with 
tight aspects creates non-implementation and alienation. The loose approach was followed in 
almost all aspects, but a more hierarchical, top-down mode was chosen to deal with the 
network structures (namely the steering groups and networks at different levels). These 
networks bring together (semi-)autonomous partners from various sectors to develop IYC 
initiatives that fit the needs and concerns in each area, in a bottom-up way. The government, 
however, started to coordinate them hierarchically, defining in a top-down way the goals that 
networks should have and the activities they should pursue. This approach did not fit, 
according to the interviewees, because actors do not accept top-down command—in line 
with, for instance, Jessop (1997)—and, therefore, this ended in non-implementation. 
Furthermore, because of the top-down approach, IYC is insufficiently ‘owned’ by the six 
sectors; many actors consider it to be a ‘new’ seventh sector (interview 6) competing with or 
even overruling their sector. Sectors must be responsible and held accountable for the 
implementation of cross-sectoral programs, creating an embedded intersectoral practice 
instead of a separate field.  
The case showed that the lack of political urgency and leadership led to unclear priorities 
and the absence of decisions. While IYC aims at creating linkages and coherence among six 
autonomous sectors, the IYC instruments were not linked to the coordination mechanisms 
and instruments already used within these sectors, i.e. the sectoral coordination instruments. 
As a result, the sectoral care organizations received separate and, at times, conflicting 
steering signals from the central level. On the one hand, they received horizontal 
coordination impulses of IYC (e.g. to draw up modules, to participate in networks,etc.). On 
the other hand, the traditional vertical coordination instruments in their sector did not focus 
on or refer to IYC objectives (and instead kept them focused on their services, target groups, 
and sectorally-defined result targets). The end goal of cross-sectoral collaboration, and, more 
importantly, how sectors should adapt their practices to achieve this should be made explicit 
and act as a ‘leidbild’ for the involved partners. Shared accountability, in particular, is crucial 
in (a field that requires) collaborative efforts. There was no clear allocation of accountabilities 
regarding the progress and success of the IYC reform and of the cross-sectoral 
collaboration. The top managers of the six involved administrations (department and 
agencies) were not held accountable by their minister or by parliament with regard to IYC. 
Moreover, there were no mechanisms to hold networks and steering groups accountable as 
platforms for joint decision making.  
The focus of the policy issue does not seem to bring about a certain type of coupling in 
the coordination arrangement. Although Integrated Youth Care focuses on providing care to 
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clients, most discussions about its coordination focus on the internal structure of the 
government.  
4.4. CONCLUSION — COORDINATION ARRANGEMENTS 
This paragraph summarizes the cases with respect to the influence of the policy issue 
characteristics on the coordination arrangement. The third column of Table 20 provides an 
overview of the hypotheses and the fourth column presents the results, explained in detail 
below.  
  
TABLE 20: RESULTS ON THE BASIS OF POLICY ISSUE CHARACTERISTICS  
Hypothesis Results 
Political 
urgency 
H1a. High 
Tight 
arrangement 
Data supports the hypothesis. High political 
urgency seems to tighten the arrangement 
(Austerity measures) 
H1b. Low 
Loose 
arrangement 
Mostly true. Loosens the arrangement, but 
also leads to no coordination (IYC/ 
Administrative simplification) 
Inter-
dependencies 
H2a. Low Tight 
arrangement 
Data supports the hypothesis. In the case of 
low interdependencies the arrangement is 
tight, to prevent uncertainty (austerity 
measures) 
H2b. High Loose 
arrangement 
Data seems to support the hypothesis. But 
even though arrangement is loose, a form of 
tight coupling of the arrangement seems to be 
necessary to prevent deadlock (Integrated 
Youth Care) 
Focus 
H3a. 
Internal 
Tight 
arrangement 
Partially true, creates a precondition/impetus 
to deploy a tightly coupled arrangement  
H3b. 
External 
Loose 
arrangement 
Partially true, creates a precondition/impetus 
to deploy a loosely coupled arrangement 
 
If a policy issue is urgent, the political attention for reaching the goals is, as a result, 
higher, which tightens the coordination arrangement. Political urgency is, according to the 
interviewees, needed to prioritize the issues. Especially in the Flemish government, where 
the ministers are the only principals, less political attention and urgency loosens the 
arrangement. Frequent ministerial turnover, risk-averse ministers, and a lack of political 
urgency in Integrated Youth Care led to deadlock. With few results after 10 years, the 
champions state that it is difficult to stay motivated. Furthermore, they explain that for those 
motivated people, adapting and attending meetings almost feels ‘like a secondary job’. 
Interviewees stress that organizations stall some dossiers and do not voluntarily contribute or 
change without a ministerial decision or an executive order. This was, according to them, 
needed to expedite the process and commit to the necessary harsh decisions to overcome 
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sectoral and organizational interests. With the administrative simplification objective, 
interviewees feel that the political urgency is that low, that there is de facto no coupling, 
although there is de jure a highly structured and institutionalized arrangement. In the 
austerity measures, this also became apparent. The political urgency and short time horizon 
led to a situation that required fast decisions, which tightened the arrangement quickly. The 
urgency of the issue let to a strong establishment of a political champion, who has the 
authority to sanction organizations.  
Second, let us look at the policy issue characteristic interdependencies. The influence of 
this policy issue characteristic is especially clear in the austerity measures and Integrated 
Youth Care. It seems that if there are interdependencies, either high or low, that they are 
dealt with through tight coupling, either during the decision-phase (ex-ante) or the 
adaptation-phase (ex-post). Most political and administrative actors assumed that the 
possible interdependencies in the austerity measures, when targeted cuts were announced, 
would lead to uncertainty and conflicts. These targeted cuts were unable to be effective 
because, according to the interviewees, both the political and administrative levels lacked the 
courage to commit to this. When the decision was left to the administration itself, so many 
conflicts arose that a proportional, across-the-board cut was chosen. Subsequently, 
uncertainty was reduced because all the involved administrators felt that all organizations 
were judged on the same results. Hence, the ‘possible interdependencies’ and subsequent 
uncertainty that could arise were ‘tamed’ through centralization, sanctions, and control in 
different forms. This is in line with Chisholm (1992) who states that policy makers assume 
that the best way to deal with interdependence is centralization and tight coupling. Reducing 
the uncertainty occurred ex-ante in the austerity measures, in the decision-making process. 
In Integrated Youth Care, and especially in the case of reciprocal interdependence, 
cooperation needs more intensive investment than just contributing some actions to a cross-
cutting program. In fact, it needs extensive adaptation and alterations. Integrated Youth Care 
intersectoral goals not only require intersectoral but also (the change of) sectoral policy 
instruments and that shared accountability is crucial in (a field that requires) collaborative 
efforts. A form of tight coupling of the arrangement seems to be necessary to overcome the 
deadlock. In the administrative simplification objectives there are almost no dependencies. If 
there are actions, these are focus of the organization itself or related to compliance with the 
cross-cutting agreement. So, there it is really not a question of interdependencies but of non-
coordination.  
Third, let us consider the focus of the policy issue. Focus seems to be an impetus or a 
precondition for either tight or loose coupling. The limits for enforcing a tight coupled 
approach are more distinct if a policy issues has a more external focus. This can be 
explained by the political urgency of some policy issues. Ministers are focused on ‘their’ own 
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substantive policies, with which they can ‘score’. Such a policy might impact the service 
delivery to citizens: for instance, a minister gives more leeway to establish participatory 
networks to consult citizens. This is clear from an example from administrative simplification. 
The RIA process is, according to the interviewees, too time-consuming for politicians. The 
tight approach that follows is only possible because the RIA is mainly an internal matter. 
Nearly all respondents who speak about administrative simplification explain that they have 
their own professional networks. In these networks, there are many ad-hoc consultations 
between policy implementers and dossier managers, who often do ‘find each other’ on 
operational targets and added value for the client/customer. They are, according to 
themselves, in closer consultation with the clients and organization, which brings about a 
loose arrangement to coordinate such cross-cutting policy initiatives. According to more than 
half of the respondents, a focus on core tasks, processes, citizens, and society might have 
led to more targeted cuts, instead of turf wars in the austerity measures. The difference in 
focus is not only mentioned with respect to the whole policy issue but also with respect to 
networks or collaborations. Sometimes there are two different champions with slightly 
different emphases when it comes to approaching the cross-cutting policy objective: for 
instance, the division between a focus on management and more policy-substantive matters 
that impede coordination. Coordinators, who have a generic helicopter view, and 
implementers, who know the substance of the policy and its relations to the grass roots, have 
different focuses in the dossiers. The former exhibit coordination and steering capacities, 
while the latter display information and implementation capacities. The former are, at the 
same time, responsible for monitoring what the latter see as administrative burdens. 
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5. ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION 
This chapter studies adaptation of ten organizations to three cross-cutting policy 
objectives under study. Organizational adaptation is the process in which organizations cope 
and weigh the environmental demands (e.g. the coordination arrangement) and adapt (or 
not) to comply with these demands (Gumport & Sporn, 1999, p. 18). Focus lays in this 
chapter on adaptation of organizational-specific structures to cross-cutting policy objectives: 
(1.) organizational goals, (2.) monitoring systems, (3.) financial resources, and (4.) 
responsible staff members. This chapter constitutes part 2 (see Table 21) of the thesis and 
tries to answer three sub-questions regarding organizational adaptation.  
 
TABLE 21: RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
Contrary to chapter four, this chapter builds both a framework to study organizational 
adaptation and presents the analysis afterwards. The framework to study the coordination 
arrangements (described in chapter four) is offered in the theoretical framework. However, to 
reduce the complexity of this section, the framework and analysis are in this chapter 
combined.  
The chapter is structured via the three sub-questions:  
- RQ 3: To what extent does the degree of coupling of the coordination arrangement 
(tightly or loosely coupled) explain the extent to which organizations adapt to cross-
cutting policy objectives? 
- RQ 4: Which organizational characteristics explain the extent to which organizations 
adapt to cross-cutting policy objectives?  
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- RQ 5: How does the coordination arrangement (tightly or loosely coupled) interact 
with the organizational characteristics to explain organizational adaptation to cross-
cutting policy objectives?  
The chapter ends with a discussion of the main results. In this discussion the results are 
compared to the hypotheses. This leads to a conclusion about which perspective can provide 
more insight in the organizational adaptation process, either the agency - or the stewardship 
perspective. Based on the agency and the stewardship perspective, three competing 
hypotheses - in relation to the three research questions - were formulated in the theoretical 
chapter. These hypotheses are shown in Table 22.  
 
TABLE 22: HYPOTHESES CONCERNING ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION 
5.1. WHAT DO DE JURE AND DE FACTO ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION 
MEAN?  
Organizational adaptation is operationalized as the extent to which organizations 
structurally adapt de jure and de facto to cross-cutting policy objectives. This is based on four 
elements that refer to structural adaptation: (1.) incorporation of the goals, (2.) monitoring 
systems, (3.) financial resources, and (4.) responsible staff members.  
 DE JURE ADAPTATION TO CROSS-CUTTING POLICY OBJECTIVES 
De jure adaptation is the extent to which organizations adapt their documents to comply 
with the cross-cutting policy objectives. This is based on the researchers’ assessment of the 
organizational planning documents. We collected from each organization: 
1. the multi-annual performance agreements from 2007-2010 and 2011-2015 
Research 
question  
Concept Agency perspective Stewardship perspective 
RQ 3 
Coordination 
arrangement  
H4a. Organizations under 
tightly coupled coordination 
arrangements adapt 
themselves highly 
H4b. Organizations under 
loosely coupled coordination 
arrangements adapt 
themselves highly 
RQ 4 
Organizational 
characteristics 
H5a. if organizations are close 
to the center of government (i.e. 
have low autonomy), of a large 
size and have a policy 
development task this will lead 
to high adaptation. 
H5b. if organizations are further 
away from the center of 
government, of a smaller size, 
and have a policy 
implementation task this will 
lead to high adaptation. 
RQ 5 
Interaction of 
organizational 
characteristics 
and 
coordination 
arrangement 
H6a. Being under tightly 
coupled coordination 
arrangements in combination 
with low autonomy, a large size 
and policy development as 
main task lead to high 
adaptation. 
H6b. Being under loosely 
coupled coordination 
arrangements in combination 
with high autonomy, a small 
size and policy implementation 
as main task lead to high 
adaptation. 
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2. the annual business plans from 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 
3. the annual reports from 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 
For more explanation about these instruments, see Annex 2. These documents help 
guarantee sound planning and evaluation at the organizational level. In the following 
paragraph we will present firstly ‘a simple’ measurement of de jure adaptation, and secondly 
an illustration of de jure adaptation.  
5.1.1.1. Simple measurement of de jure adaptation 
The documents were scored on the extent to which they refer to four elements of 
structural adaptation mentioned above, with a possible maximum score of 4. In Table 23 the 
ranking of the organizations is shown on this 5-point scale (ranging from zero to four) per 
coordination arrangement.  
 
TABLE 23: DE JURE ADAPTATION OF THE ORGANIZATIONS TO THE THREE COORDINATION 
ARRANGEMENTS 
RANK 
 Tight coupling 
(austerity measures) 
 Mixed coupling 
(administrative 
simplification) 
 Loose coupling 
(Integrated Youth Care) 
1  Organization 1 4  Organization 1 3    
2  Organization 2 3  Organization 3 3    
3  Organization 3 3  Organization 8 3    
4  Organization 8 3  Organization 2 2    
5  Organization 5 3  Organization 5 1    
6  Organization 9 3  Organization 9 1  Organization 8 3 
7  Organization 6 1  Organization 6 1  Organization 9 3 
8  Organization 4 1  Organization 4 1  Organization 6 2 
9  Organization 10 0  Organization 10 0  Organization 10 1 
10  Organization 7 0  Organization 7 0  Organization 7 0 
 
To give insight in how these scores were obtained, the next section shows the 
assessment of the first element of structural adaptation. This is the first indicator — of the 
four elements of structural adaptation — on which the rest of the chapter is based, i.e. the 
incorporation of the cross-cutting objective.  
5.1.1.2. An illustration of de jure adaptation 
 When an organization makes a goal concrete in its own organizational planning 
documents this indicates that they make the cross-cutting objective ‘tangible’. Those 
organizations, which make the goals very ‘smart’, make them visible in the organization and 
are planning ex-ante how the goals will be reached. Others, who do not make goals concrete 
in their documents rather commence ‘unplanned’.  
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Smart refers to: 
- Specific – the goal explains and targets an explicit area. 
- Measurable – the goal quantifies an indicator or norm to which the organization can 
be held accountable. 
- Achievable – the goal is well defined and clear enough to be achieved.  
- Realistic – the goal states what results can realistically be achieved given available 
resources. 
- Timely – the goal specifies when and with which paths the result(s) can be achieved. 
 
All the organizational documents were scored on these elements on a scale from 0 to 1 
(a mean was taken across the documents). In total organizations can reach a score of one, if 
it addresses all the smart elements fully. More explanation can be found in chapter three: 
methodology. In Table 24 a ranking is given of how concrete the organizations make the 
cross-cutting policy objectives. In the middle the mean across the organizations is shown. 
Above the mean, the organizations are situated which, compared to the mean, make the 
cross-cutting policy objectives smart to a large extent. In what will follow we will call these 
organizations having ‘huge plans’. Below the mean, organizations are ranked that, compared 
to the mean, do not make the goals smart. We will refer to these organizations as having 
‘little plans’.  
 
TABLE 24: SMARTNESS OF THE GOALS 
 
First of all, the ranking of organizations is about the same in each policy objective. Thus, 
organizations which make one cross-cutting policy objective smart, also make other 
objectives more concrete. This either means that they prioritize cross-cutting policy 
objectives, or that some organizations have the capacity to write thorough documents. 
RANK  Tight coupling   Mixed  Integrated Youth Care 
1  Organization 1 
↑ 
Highly 
smart, 
above 
mean 
 Organization 1 
↑ 
Highly 
smart, 
above 
mean 
 Organization 8 ↑ 
Highly 
smart, 
above 
mean 
2  Organization 2  Organization 3  Organization 9 
3 
 
Organization 3 
 
Organization 8 
 
Organization 10 
4  Organization 8  Organization 2  Mean: 0,2 
5  Organization 5  Mean: 0,418  Organization 6 Less 
smart, 
below 
mean 
↓ 
 
 
Mean: 0,384 
 
Organization 5 
Less 
smart, 
below 
mean 
↓ 
 
Organization 7 
6  Organization 9 Less 
smart, 
below 
mean 
↓ 
 Organization 9    
7  Organization 10  Organization 10    
8  Organization 6  Organization 6    
9  Organization 4  Organization 7    
10  Organization 7  Organization 4    
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Secondly, some goals seem hard to make smart. The administrative simplification objectives 
are made most smart, compared to the other goals. The austerity measures approximately 
have the same mean. Goals like administrative simplification and austerity measures are 
most likely easier to quantify, compared to the goals of Integrated Youth Care. Two reasons 
might explain this: 1.) the goals do not go across the organizational borders and 2.) they 
concern budget, time and staff, which are easier to quantify. 
 DE FACTO ADAPTATION TO CROSS-CUTTING POLICY OBJECTIVES 
De facto adaptation is the extent to which the organization adapts to the cross-cutting 
policy objectives, as perceived by the organizational linking pin in a face-to-face interview.17 
In every organization, interviews were conducted with linking pins who are responsible for 
implementing the cross-cutting policy into their organization: 
 1 per organization for the austerity measures - 10 in total;  
 1 per organization for administrative simplification - 10 in total and;  
 2 per organization for Integrated Youth Care18, except for one organization - 9 in 
total. 
In the following paragraph we will present firstly ‘a simple’ measurement of de facto 
adaptation, and secondly an illustration of de facto adaptation.  
5.1.2.1. Simple measurement of de facto adaptation 
The ‘simple measurement’ of de facto adaptation is the extent to which the organizational 
linking pins refers to the four elements of structural adaptation (mentioned before) in the 
interviews, with a possible maximum score of 4. In Table 25 the ranking of the organizations 
is shown on this 5-point scale per coordination arrangement. The 5-point scale was based on 
where the linking pin placed (either positive or negative) the Q-sort statements, and his/her 
explanation relating to:  
1. Goals: “The expertise of our organization is large enough to translate the very vague 
objectives to concrete actions”  
2. Monitoring: “In our organization the objective is part of the monitoring system, based 
on that we can take good management decisions”  
                                               
17 This was based on where the linking pin placed the Q-sort statements relating to:  
(1.) Goals: “The expertise of our organization is large enough to translate the very vague objectives to concrete actions” 
(2.) Monitoring: “In our organization the objective is part of the monitoring system, based on that we can take good management 
decisions” (3.) Financial resources: “We have linked budget to the cross-cutting goal” (4.) Responsible staff members: “We 
assigned the objective to a few staff-members, but they have other assignments as well”. The interview transcripts were 
checked to validate the scores of the linking pin, on which we based the de facto scores. 
18 This was done to ensure the diversity of cases, in terms coupling and organizational characteristics.  
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3. Financial resources: “We have linked budget to the cross-cutting objective”  
4. Responsible staff members: “We assigned the objective to a few staff-members, but 
they have other assignments as well”  
The interviews were all transcribed and coded, in order to validate the de facto scores. 
An overview of the interviews can be found in Annex 4. 
 
TABLE 25: DE FACTO ADAPTATION OF THE ORGANIZATIONS TO THE THREE COORDINATION 
ARRANGEMENTS 
RANK 
 Tight coupling (austerity 
measures) 
 Mixed coupling 
(administrative 
simplification) 
 Loose coupling 
(Integrated Youth 
Care) 
1  Organization 3 4  Organization 3 3    
2  Organization 10 4  Organization 4 3    
3  Organization 1 3  Organization 5 3    
4  Organization 2 3  Organization 6 3    
5  Organization 5 3  Organization 8 2    
6  Organization 4 3  Organization 10 2  Organization 6 3 
7  Organization 7 3  Organization 1 1  Organization 9 3 
8  Organization 8 2  Organization 2 1  Organization 10 3 
9  Organization 9 2  Organization 9 0  Organization 8 2 
10  Organization 6 1  Organization 7 0  Organization 7 1 
 
What we can conclude from this ranking is that de facto organizational adaptation 
fluctuates more strongly across cross-cutting policy objectives, compared to the de jure 
organizational adaptation. In other words, organizations adapt more strongly de facto to one 
cross-cutting objective, compared to another objective. This simple measurement only 
describes the scores on 4 Q-sort statements. These statements are part of the illustration 
which will be shown in the following paragraph, in which the linking pins had to sort 24 
statements concerning organizational adaptation.  
5.1.2.2. An illustration of de facto adaptation 
This paragraph shows the analysis of the 29 interviews which were conducted with Q-
methodology. Q-methodology is fully explained in the methodological chapter. In the 
interviews organizational linking pins had to sort 24 statements concerning organizational 
adaptation in a normal distribution (see Annex 5 for the statements and Annex 6 for the 
normal distribution grid). These were analyzed and the analysis resulted in a two distinct 
factors (see Table 26). This was concluded from the Eigen values. Factors which have 
eigenvalues of more than 1,00 were selected. The larger the eigenvalue, the more variance 
is explained by the factor (Du Plessis, 2005). The composite reliability lies for all the factors 
between .96 and .99, which is more than acceptable (Brown, 1980). The composite reliability 
of a factor depends on how many participants define it (McKeown & Thomas, 1988). 
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TABLE 26: FACTOR CHARACTERISTICS 
FACTORS Factor 1 Factor 2 
Eigen values 8.2 4.1 
Number of defining respondents 16 7 
Number of distinguishing statements 13 
Average relation Coefficient  0.8 0.8 
Composite reliability 0.985 0.966 
Standard Error of factor z-scores 0.124 0.186 
% Explained variance 28 14 
 
Table 27 presents how the 29 linking pins load on the factors. The individual factor 
loadings are correlations between the individual Q-sort and the factor. The grey cells indicate 
on which factor a linking pin loads. Participants who do not load significantly on any factor 
have viewpoints which cannot be pinpointed to one of the factors (McKeown & Thomas, 
1988).  
 
TABLE 27: FACTOR LOADINGS OF THE INDIVIDUAL SORTINGS 
Policy issue Organization  Factor 1 Factor 2 
Tight coupling 
(austerity 
measures) 
10 0.61  0.47 
2 0.57  0.19 
6 0.01  0.65 
7 0.70 -0.01 
8 0.55  0.20 
9 0.34  0.37 
5 0.90  -0.05 
3 0.67  0.22 
1 0.70 0.13 
4 0.71  0.34 
Mixed 
coupling 
(administrative 
simplification) 
3 0.47 -0.09 
7 0.36  0.42 
2 0.11  0.39 
5 0.59  -0.03 
1 0.06  0.88 
6 0.47  0.26 
8 0.07  0.29 
4 0.77  0.07 
9 -0.25  0.57 
10 0.34  0.23 
Loose 
coupling 
(Integrated 
Youth Care) 
6 0.33  0.19 
7 -0.33  0.66  
6 0.70  -0.26 
10 0.06  0.19 
8 0.05  0.82  
9 0.81  0.11 
8 0.29  0.70  
10 0.52  -0.00 
9 0.56 0.47 
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Discourse 1 – High de facto adaptation: huge action 
The first factor clusters sixteen respondents (see for an overview Table 27). Seven of the 
statements are distinguishing statements (marked with an asterisk in Table 28), which means 
that these statements are significantly different from what the group of respondents think, 
which load on the second factor. These respondents feel that talking about and attention 
from the top of the organization for cross-cutting policy objectives has a strong influence on 
how the organization adapts to the cross-cutting issue. In particular talking about problems 
and doubts of the staff is really important in times of uncertainty. The linking pins feel that the 
goals are not a myth in their organizational documents. Cross-cutting objectives are real 
actions for the organization, and therefore firmly anchored in the documents. Especially clear 
from this discourse is that these respondents do not feel small or vulnerable, but belief in the 
expertise of the organization to adapt to the goals and make them concrete. The 
organizational linking pins are positive about collaboration with others, to create added value 
and because it is necessary to avoid overlap. This explains why these organizations are 
labelled as delivering ‘huge action’.  
 
TABLE 28: DISTINGUISHING ELEMENTS FACTOR 1: HUGE ACTION19 
Factors Huge 
action 
Little 
action 
It requires attention of the management: coaching staff, be ready to help with 
problems and doubts (*) 
4  4 
As management team you should be willing to discuss this objective on a 
regular basis 
4 1 
The expertise of our organization is large enough to translate the very vague 
objectives to concrete actions (*) 
3 1 
Currently, there are actually many good collaborations, why? Because we 
realize that we have too few employees, we should not reinvent the wheel (*) 
3 -2 
We act sometimes like we are vulnerable and in need of help, in order to 
obtain cooperation (*) 
-3 -1 
The jargon that is often associated with the goals, ... you cannot understand it 
(*) 
-3 0 
That cross-cutting policy objective is not really an action, that it is in our 
documents does not mean that we are very active (*) 
-4 1 
The cross-cutting objective is only marginally mentioned in our documents, as 
in "we contribute to ... ', but that is very ad-hoc (*) 
-4 2 
 
Discourse 2 – low de facto adaptation: little action 
This second discourse clusters seven different respondents (see for an overview Table 
27). Five different elements are distinguishing statements, and therefore significantly different 
from the first factor (marked with an asterisk in Table 29). These organizations have a hard 
time prioritizing cross-cutting policy objectives and are therefore labelled as delivering ‘little 
action’. According to these organizational linking pins, adapting in terms of time, budget, and 
                                               
19 Asterisk (*) indicates significant difference with the other factors at P < .01 
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integrating the goals in the monitoring system is a struggle. The respondents point out that 
their organization does not link budget to the cross-cutting policy objectives, that these 
monitoring systems are not part of the monitoring and that they do not have enough staff to 
structurally adapt. The staff that is needed is not available because they have a lot on their 
to-do-list already, and for the cross-cutting policy objectives they have to put their efforts up a 
notch. However, these organizations do not prioritize their core-business or their clients 
above the cross-cutting issue. What these organizations more flexible and programmatically, 
for instance with horizontal teams is a solution to integrate the issues better.  
 
TABLE 29: DISTINGUISHING ELEMENTS FACTOR 2: LITTLE ACTION 
Factors Huge 
action 
Little 
action 
It requires attention of the management: coaching staff, be ready to help with 
problems and doubts 
4 4 
I think our organization should be much more flexible and has to work 
programmatically (*) 
0 4 
You need to have staff in the organization who want to invest in it. For cross-
cutting policy objectives they have to put it up a notch or do some things more 
explicit 
2 3 
We assigned the objective to a few staff-members, but they have other 
assignments as well  
2 3 
As an organization, you should only collaborate if it has a value for the 
customer/ client 
-2 -3 
In our organization the objective is part of the monitoring system, based on that 
we can take good management decisions 
2 -3 
You will find the cross-cutting policy objective everywhere in our operations, 
because it is a change of mentality 
1 -4 
We have linked budget to the cross-cutting objective  1 -4 
 
 COMBINING DE JURE AND DE FACTO ADAPTATION  
From this point on, the 5-point scale is used, following from the simple de facto and de 
jure measurement. Just to recapture what we have described in the previous section, an 
organization can reach a score of 4 when it adapts fully, an 0 when it does not adapt at all. 
Non-adaptation or adapting on maximum 2 elements is called low adaptation. Adapting 3 of 4 
organizational structural elements to the cross-cutting policy objectives is called high 
adaptation.  
The combination of the de jure and de facto 5-point scales lead theoretically to four types 
of adaptation. These types are shown in Table 30. These types can be built through the 
insight that the Q-sort and the SMART-measurement provided, mentioned in paragraph 
5.1.1.2 and 5.1.2.2 respectively. Table 30 shows these types, which are labelled with the 
names mentioned above. 
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TABLE 30: FOUR TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION 
 
 
Little plans, little action 
The first type of adaptation is called the ‘little plans, little action’ type (type 1 in Table 30). 
These organizations do not strongly adapt in their documents (de jure) nor strongly de facto. 
They do not strongly incorporate the cross-cutting policy objectives ex-ante in their 
documents, and rather commence ‘unplanned’. They neither strongly adapt de facto, and are 
therefore – with the knowledge following from the Q-sort labelled as delivering little action. In 
this category the organizations are situated which adapt to a low extent to the cross-cutting 
policy objectives.  
 
Huge plans, little action 
Secondly, the organizations belonging to the category ‘huge plans, little action’ (type 2 in 
Table 30) adapt their documents strongly to incorporate the cross-cutting policy objectives 
(high de jure), and are therefore labelled as delivering ‘huge plans’. However, this is not 
followed by de facto adaptation. The organizations which belong to this cluster are, based on 
the Q-sort referred to as having ‘little action’. This process - in which organizations write 
about proposed actions, but do not implement them - can theoretically be called ‘symbolic 
adaptation’ (Christensen, Lægreid, et al., 2007, p. 82).  
 
Little plans, huge action 
Organizations situated in category three of adaptation (type 3 in Table 30) do not 
incorporate the goals highly in their documents (de jure), and are therefore referred to as 
having ‘little plans’. They are proceeding without ex-ante planning in their documents about 
how they will reach the cross-cutting policy objectives. However, they do strongly adapt de 
facto, which makes them, based on the Q-sort factor organizations who deliver ‘huge action’.  
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Huge plans, huge action 
The organizations under the type ‘huge plans, huge action’ (type 4 in Table 30) are the 
organizations which adapt highly de jure, as well as highly de facto.  
 
On the basis of these types, the organizations can be plotted in graphs, which are shown 
in Graph 5. On the y-axis the de facto adaptation, and on the x-axis the de jure adaptation. 
These graphs clearly show how many organizations are in which quadrant (i.e. type of 
adaptation). The organizations which correspond with high or low de jure adaptation (in 
Graph 5) match the complex de jure measurement about the SMART measure, except for 
three cases (organization 9, austerity measures, organization 2, administrative simplification, 
and organization 10, Integrated Youth Care). Therefore, the organizations which adapt highly 
de jure are labelled as delivering ‘huge plans’, based on the knowledge following from the 
SMART measure. The organizations which adapt low de jure are labelled, as delivering: ‘little 
plans’. Organizations which fall in category high or low de facto adaptation (in Graph 5) 
match exactly with the two types that can be distinguished from the Q-sort analysis, except 
for one organizational linking pin (respondent 35 – organization 8 - talking about the austerity 
measures). Therefore, the organizations which adapt highly de facto are labelled as 
delivering ‘huge action’. Organizations which adapt low de facto adaptation are labelled, 
based on the knowledge stemming from the Q-sort analysis, as delivering: ‘little action’.  
 
What is clear from Graph 5 is that organizations are not always found in the same 
quadrant. It could be that the coordination arrangement has an influence on the 
organizational adaptation process. Unraveling the patterns which lead to either low or high 
adaptation is the object of study of the following paragraphs.  
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GRAPH 5: ADAPTATION OF THE ORGANIZATIONS UNDER DIFFERENT FORMS OF COUPLING 
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5.2. RQ 3: TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE DEGREE OF COUPLING OF THE 
COORDINATION ARRANGEMENT EXPLAIN THE EXTENT TO WHICH 
ORGANIZATIONS ADAPT? 
With the knowledge gathered from the SMART-measure and Q-sort, which lead to four 
types of adaptation, the researcher can dive deeper into the organizational adaptation 
process. In what will follow, organizational adaptation will refer to the four types of 
adaptation, based on the four elements referring to structural adaptation. This paragraph 
studies the extent to which organizations adapt under different coordination arrangements to 
find an answer to the third research question (RQ 3): To what extent does the degree of 
coupling of the coordination arrangement (tightly or loosely coupled) explain the extent to 
which organizations adapt to cross-cutting policy objectives? Chapter 4 described three 
different coordination arrangements, either tight or loose. Three different arrangements were 
distinguished:  
1. A tight arrangement (austerity measures) 
2. A mixed arrangement (administrative simplification) 
3. A loose arrangement (Integrated Youth Care) 
 
In Table 31 the structural adaptation of the organizations is shown, under different 
coordination arrangements. As shown in Table 31, under a tight coordination arrangement, a 
small majority of the organizations has ‘huge plans, and take huge actions’. The distribution 
is almost the opposite in the case of mixed coupling. Under mixed coupling, a small majority 
of the organizations is situated in the low adaptation quadrant: ‘little plans, little action’. 
Under loose coupling the organizations are quite evenly distributed among the categories of 
adaptation.  
  
TABLE 31: EXTENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION  
 
Little 
plans, little 
action 
Huge 
plans, little 
action 
Little 
plans, 
huge 
action 
Hugh 
plans, 
huge 
action 
Total 
 Low adaptation    high 
adaptation 
 
Tight 
coupling 
10% (n=1) 20% (n=2) 30% (n=3) 40% (n=4) 10 organizations 
Mixed 
coupling  
40 % (n=4) 20% (n=2) 30% (n=3) 10% (n=1) 10 organizations 
Loose 
coupling 
20% (n=2) 20% (n=2) 40 % (n=2) 20% (n=2) 5 organizations 
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Although Table 31 gives some indications about which coordination arrangements lead 
to the highest extent of adaptation, the patterns are not entirely clear. Based on the agency 
and stewardship perspective two hypotheses were formulated, respectively H4a and H4b, to 
explain the extent of adaptation. Based on the agency perspective on organizational 
adaptation the expectation is that tight coupling works best to get organizations to adapt to 
cross-cutting policy. The data gives more support for this hypothesis, H4a — based on the 
agency perspective — than for H4b. However, the data is not straightforward. Even under 
the tightly coordination arrangement there is a fair share of organizations that fall into other 
adaptation categories, i.e. adapt to a low extent. Under loose and mixed coordination 
arrangements there are organizations which are high adapters. So, it could be that the 
stewardship perspective could explain a share of organizations as well.  
An explanation for high or low adaptation can probably be found in other factors than 
solely the type of coordination arrangement. For instance, the type of organization, i.e. the 
organizational characteristics, might play a role as well. In the next paragraphs an analysis is 
made about which combinations of organizational characteristics lead to either low or high 
adaptation.  
5.3. RQ 4: WHICH ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS EXPLAIN THE 
EXTENT TO WHICH ORGANIZATIONS ADAPT? 
The analysis presented in the last section did not lead to clear conclusions. When 
looking into the organizational adaptation process the question may arise how the 
differences can be explained. The organizational characteristics of the organizations might 
lead to an explanation of the differences in structural adaptation.  
 ADAPTATION PER ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTIC 
If the organizations are split up in their organizational characteristics, the variation is as 
can be seen in Graph 6. Per organizational characteristic, the organizations are split up in 
two sets; large - small, high autonomy - low autonomy and policy development – policy 
implementation.  
First of all, let us look at the organizational characteristic size. A clear majority of the 
large organizations adapt themselves de facto ‘to a large extent’, with about 40 per cent of 
the large organizations delivering ‘little plans, huge action’ and one third of the large 
organizations delivering ‘huge plans, huge action’. Although small organizations appear in 
each quadrant, one third of that group is delivering ‘little plans, little action’, being the lowest 
extent of adaptation.  
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Secondly, let us consider the autonomy of the organizations. Most organizations with low 
autonomy are situated in the category of low de jure adaptation, with one third of them 
showing also low de facto adaptation (‘little plans, little action’), and one third high de facto 
adaptation (‘little plans, huge action’). The largest group of organizations with high autonomy 
(40 per cent) is situated in the ‘huge plans, little action’, but somewhat less than one third is 
delivering ‘little plans, huge action’.  
The third characteristic is the policy task of the organizations. Most organizations with a 
policy development task seem to be organizations which adapt de facto, they can be 
situated in the ‘little plans, huge action’ and ‘huge plans, huge action’ categories. This seems 
different compared to the organizations with a policy implementation task, they are divided 
proportionally over the adaptation categories.  
As can be seen in Graph 6, the patterns are not very clear. The differences are between 
the groups of organizations with a specific organizational characteristic falling in the different 
quadrants are not significant20, and therefore have to be interpreted with care. These unclear 
patterns might be due to the interaction of the organizational characteristics in their effect on 
organizational adaptation. In order to test this, we now turn to fsQCA-analyses. 
                                               
20 A two-sample t test and a Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test were executed to see whether level of 
adaptation differs among the organizations with different characteristics. These tests did not show any significant results. 
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GRAPH 6: ADAPTATION PER ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTIC 
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 A QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS TO UNRAVEL HOW ORGANIZATIONAL 
CHARACTERISTICS INTERACT 
Splitting the organizations up in their characteristics, like the last section did, did not lead 
to clear patterns. It could be the case that there are different patterns at the same time 
present to explain organizational adaptation. To unravel if specific combinations of different 
organizational characteristics lead to high or low adaptation, a Fuzzy set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis is applied (see for more explanation chapter 3: methodology).  
Fuzzy-set QCA relies on Boolean algebra and needs cases to be disentangled in series 
of conditions. This enables the researcher to compare the cases in a systematic and formal 
way. QCA follows a causes-of-effects stance, rather than an effects-of-causes position. The 
latter is typical for statistical approaches. In other words, QCA unravels individual outcomes 
and the paths leading to them, statistical approaches place emphasis on the average effect 
of a particular variable in a larger dataset (Vis, 2012). Fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (FsQCA) works as follows:  
 
1. Preparing the data set 
FsQCA requires the operationalization of conditions (comparable with an independent 
variable in statistics) and outcomes (comparable with a dependent variable in statistics) in 
binary terms. Conditions or outcomes assigned a score of 1 to .5 should be read as ‘present’ 
(indicated with a ●), while conditions with a score below 0.5 are ‘absent’ (indicated with a O). 
‘Present’ and ‘absent’ should not to be strictly interpreted. They mean large, small, high, low, 
etc. When the data is ‘calibrated’, i.e. dichotomized, the analysis can start. In Table 32 the 
calibration of the conditions and the outcome can be found. How the organizational 
characteristics interact (with the coordination arrangement) and how they link with the extent 
of adaptation is a typical FsQCA question. 
 
TABLE 32: CALIBRATION OF THE CONDITIONS AND OUTCOMES 
Condition Fuzzy value Meaning  
High autonomy 
1 = full membership in the set Public law agencies with a governing board 
.67 = more in than out the set Public law agencies  
.33 = more out than in the set Departmental agencies 
0 = fully out of the set Departments  
Large 
organization 
1 = full membership in the set > 901 FTE  
.67 = more in than out the set 350 – 900 FTE 
.33 = more out than in the set 61-349 FTE 
0 = fully out of the set 0-60 FTE 
Policy 
coordination task 
1 = full membership in the set Policy development organizations 
0 = fully out of the set Policy implementing organizations 
Strong coupling 
 
1 = full membership in the set Tight coupling 
.56 = more in than out the set Mixed coupling 
0 = fully out of the set Loose coupling 
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Outcome Fuzzy value Meaning  
High de jure/ De 
facto adaptation21 
1 = full membership in the set 4 elements of structural adaptation  
.75 = more in than out the set 3 elements of structural adaptation 
.45 = almost in the set 2 elements of structural adaptation 
0.25 = more out than in the set 1 element of structural adaptation 
0 = fully out of the set 0 elements of structural adaptation 
High adaptation 
(4 types) 
1 = fully out of the set Huge plans, huge action 
.67 = more in than out the set Little plans, huge action 
.33 = more out than in the set Huge plans, little action 
0 = fully out of the set Little plans, little action 
 
2. The truth table and the analysis22 
FsQCA is a set-theoretic method, which urges to describe cases as configurations. A 
configuration refers to a combination of conditions and an outcome. A configuration is also 
called ‘a path’. An example of a configuration or path is:  
 
Presence of high autonomy * (and) presence of being a large organization (size) -> 
(leads to) presence of high adaptation. 
 
FsQCA is intended to reveal the minimal set of conditions that are present or absent 
when an outcome is present or absent (Rihoux & De Meur, 2009).The list of configurations 
(‘the cases’) allows the researcher to control for contradictory configurations. These are 
configurations of conditions that in some instances correspond with the presence of the 
outcome, and in other instances with an absence of the outcome, and therefore are not 
unambiguously leading to an explanation. The core of the QCA analysis, is the minimization 
process. It involves a systematic and pairwise comparison of configurations of each case in 
order to uncover the regularities in the data. “If two configurations differ in only one condition, 
but show the same outcome, this particular condition can be eliminated” (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012, p. 105). Repeating this minimization-process until no minimization is 
possible anymore, results in an overview of paths, which do not longer include redundant 
conditions.  
 
  
                                               
21 Because the measurement is based on a 5-point scale, an organization can reach a score of 4 when it adapts fully, an 0 
when it does not adapt at all. Hence, five sub-categories. Non-adaptation or adapting on maximum 2 elements is called low 
adaptation. Adapting 3 of 4 organizational structural elements to the cross-cutting policy objectives is called high adaptation. 
While 2 is the median, but in the set low adapting organizations it is almost in the set (a border case).  
22 In most truth tables there are some logically possible combinations of conditions without empirical cases. These non-
observed empirical cases are called ‘logical remainders. However, since the organizations where selected to differ on all 
conditions in most analyses which logical remainders were rare and therefore ‘limited diversity’ is minimal. 
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3. Interpretation of the solution paths 
Relations are expressed in terms of necessity and sufficiency in FsQCA. A condition is 
necessary when it is always present whenever the outcome is present: X  Y (i.e. if we see 
a certain outcome, the condition is in the path). A sufficient configuration can be 
schematically explained as X  Y, i.e. a (combination of) condition(s) leads to a certain 
outcome. The consistency cut-off was set at 0.80 for the analysis of sufficient conditions and 
at 0.90 for necessary conditions. All the results in this chapter present sufficient conditions23. 
In the analyses no necessary conditions were found24. Two parameters are used to analyze 
sufficient configurations; coverage and consistency.  
1. The higher the coverage score, the higher the percentage of cases that exhibit a 
given combination of conditions and the outcome.  
2. The higher a consistency score, the higher the proportion of the cases consistent 
with a certain outcome. In other words, the higher the percentage of organizations 
which show that certain characteristics lead to a specific outcome.  
If the solution consistency and/or coverage scores drop below for instance .75, this 
points out that the ‘model’ - i.e. the conditions and the outcome - is badly chosen. This might 
derive from including irrelevant conditions or missing crucial conditions (Legewie, 2013). If 
consistency is high, but the coverage low, the solution is less interesting because the path 
describes only a few cases. In contrast, if the coverage is high, but the consistency low the 
solution is not strong enough to establish a causal relation. However, the empirical 
significance of a path (shown by its coverage) is not equivalent to its theoretical relevance. 
Some paths, which include many cases (high coverage) can be theoretically uninteresting or 
even trivial (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010, p. 20). Schneider and Wagemann (2010) 
therefore recommend not only to focus on a minimum value of consistency, and not to hide 
cases that deviate from expectancy.  
 
In what will follow:  
- Black circles: ● – indicate the presence of a condition 
- White circles: O - indicate the absence of a condition 
 
                                               
23 The paths present the complex solution. 1.) As this does not include assumptions on logical remainders and 2.) the 
automatically obtained parsimonious solution is the same as the complex solution. This means that the paths cannot 
automatically be minimized any further. 
24 The consistency cut-off was set at 0.80 for the analysis of sufficient conditions and at .9 for necessary conditions. 
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5.3.2.1. How interaction of organizational characteristics lead to de jure adaptation 
to cross-cutting policy objectives 
Emphasis is in this paragraph on research question four (RQ 4), which focuses on the 
organizational characteristics which can explain the adaptation process. Following the set-up 
of this chapter, de jure adaptation is analyzed first. Thus, this paragraph studies the 
combinations of organizational characteristics which lead to either high or low adaptation of 
the organizational documents (de jure). The analysis results in one path leading to high de 
jure adaptation, as well as a path leading to low de jure adaptation. The paths are shown in 
Table 33.  
 
TABLE 33: PATHS LEADING TO HIGH AND LOW DE JURE ADAPTATION 
DE JURE ADAPTATION25 
Conditions HIGH26 LOW27 
High autonomy O O 
Large size ● O 
Policy development task ● ● 
Raw coverage 
Unique coverage 
Consistency 
0.19 0.17 
0.19 0.17 
0.93 0.90 
Total number of 
cases 
2/25 3/25 
solution coverage 0.19 0.17 
solution consistency 0.93 0.90 
 
  
 
High de jure adaptation: Being a large organization, with low autonomy and policy 
development as a main task leads to high de jure adaptation. The solution path only covers 
two organizations, being two departments, which fall into the category ‘huge plans, huge 
action’. Departments typically have policy development as a main task which leads to 
extensive documents in which they pay attention to the cross-cutting policy objectives. Being 
a department is not enough, the organization needs to have certain size to really incorporate 
the cross-cutting objective in their documents. This is stressed by one of the organizational 
linking pins of an organization belonging to this cluster. Monitoring and evaluation are, mainly 
because of the policy developmental task of these departments, strongly structurally 
embedded in the documents: “we finally classified in our documents everything at the micro 
level: 220 processes, budgets, we appointed FTE on it,...” (Respondent 30). 
 
                                               
25 ● – indicate the presence of a condition, O indicate the absence of a condition 
26 Table includes truth table rows which lead consistently (.93) to the outcome of interest. 
27 Table includes truth table rows which lead consistently (.80) to the outcome of interest.  
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Low de jure adaptation: Being a small organization with a development task and low 
autonomy leads to low de jure adaptation. This path is covered by three departments. One 
department falls in the category ‘little plans, little action’ and two departments in the ‘little 
plans, huge action’ category. These organizations do not pay much attention to the cross-
cutting policy objectives in their documents. Being small might be a reason why these 
organizations do not incorporate the objectives. According to the linking pin of one of these 
organizations, its organization is a master in creating vague goals, but at the same time it 
initiates concrete actions. He/she explains why the objective is not incorporated. The cross-
cutting issue had to cope for a long time with an absent political leader, and: “currently there 
is no money. In other words, you are expected to implement those actions with the resources 
you already have”. This is according to the respondent very difficult (Respondent 49).  
 
The paths shown above consistently lead to either low or high de jure adaptation. 
Together, these paths explain all the five departments in the dataset. The condition, which 
differs between the paths explaining high and low adaptation, is size. Being small leads to 
low de jure adaptation, being large to high de jure adaptation, in combination with other 
factors. The paths do not explain the organizations with a policy implementation task. 
Apparently, there is no consistent pattern to explain de jure adaptation of organizations with 
a policy implementation task.  
5.3.2.2. How interaction of organizational characteristics lead to de facto adaptation 
to cross-cutting policy objectives 
The sufficient conditions in terms of organizational characteristics for de facto adaptation 
are presented in the paragraph underneath. In other words, this analysis focusses on the 
combinations of organizational characteristics which lead to either high or low de facto 
adaptation. Table 34 shows the two paths leading to high de facto adaptation and one path 
leading to low de facto adaptation.  
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TABLE 34: PATHS LEADING TO HIGH AND LOW DE FACTO ADAPTATION 
DE FACTO ADAPTATION28 
 High29 Low30 
Conditions PATH 1 PATH 2 PATH 3 
High autonomy O  O 
Large size  ● O 
Policy development task ● O O 
Raw coverage 
Unique coverage 
Consistency 
0.25 0.51 0.43 
0.25 0.51 0.43 
0.70 0.68 0.81 
Total number of 
cases 
5/25 10/25 5/25 
solution coverage 0.75 0.43 
solution consistency 0.69 0.81 
 
  
 
High de facto adaptation 
PATH 1: Being an organization with low autonomy and policy development as main task 
leads to high de facto adaptation. Like de jure adaptation, this path is covered by 
departments, and more specifically, all five departments of the sample. The solution 
consistency of this paths is a bit low, which indicates a contradictory case. When going back 
to the dataset, it reveals that one department adapts de facto low. Although close to the 
minister and being a department, one organization does not adapt de facto high, though 
other organizations with the same characteristics do (see path 1 - Table 34). The 
organizational linking pin explains that the austerity measures can be easily incorporated in 
the organization. Although small, the organization has leeway to absorb the staff reduction 
and budget cuts easily. The main reason why this organization does not adapt is, according 
to the linking pin, the fact that objective is not yet a focal point for the top management. The 
linking pin explains that proposals which are relatively easy to implement, “which will cost us 
less money and save a ton work, are not picked up by the management” (respondent 33). 
This organization shows that administrative leadership is important to prioritize cross-cutting 
objectives.  
One of the linking pins of the departments which are explained by the path stresses that 
cross-cutting policy objectives are internally within the department a clear interest. The 
minister stipulates this engagement. As stated by the respondent, numbers to report about 
cross-cutting policy objectives are easy to manipulate, but do not say a lot about the real 
implementation. This linking pin especially mentions the policy development task of his/her 
organization as an important factor for understanding a high level of de facto organizational 
                                               
28 ● – indicate the presence of a condition, O indicate the absence of a condition 
29 Table includes truth table rows which lead consistently (.80) to the outcome of interest.  
30 Table includes truth table rows which lead consistently (.81) to the outcome of interest. 
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adaptation. This brings about, according to him/her, a totally different view on cross-cutting 
policy objectives compared to the tasks of agencies, referring to a mentality to look for 
overarching elements in policy implementation, and issues related to co-ordination 
(Respondent 44).  
 
PATH 2: Being a large organization with policy implementation as a main task leads to 
high de facto adaptation. The solution consistency of this path is a bit low, so the proof to 
make a causal argument is not too strong. This cluster of organizations contains ten 
departmental agencies, as well as semi-autonomous agencies. Four out of ten cases 
contradict the pattern, they do not show high de facto adaptation. One of the organizational 
linking pins attributes this to the absence of political leadership and attention. He/she 
explains that the organization is not adapting to the administrative simplification objective, 
because:  
 
“if there is a new regulatory initiative [...] a RIA should be your starting point. In practice 
this is rarely the case because there is often political pressure to quickly do some thing about 
a particular problem, and then they start to draw up a proposal for new regulation and write 
the RIA ex-post. On the political level there are certain predetermined ideas for new 
regulation which block the ‘normal process’" (Respondent 38).  
 
One of the organizations which does belong the path, especially embeds the monitoring 
and evaluation strongly in the organization. The high de facto adaptation is triggered, 
according to the linking pin, by the political urgency of the issue (respondent 28).  
 
Low de facto adaptation 
PATH 3: Small organizations with low autonomy and which have policy 
implementation as their main task de facto adapt low. All five organizations belonging to this 
cluster are departmental agencies. One of the respondents of this organization refers 
remarkably often to the small size of the organization. He/she contemplates that most of the 
work on cross-cutting policy objectives, is not done as it should be: “it is done, de facto 
without additional funding, structures etc.… anyway if you consider our size, a small entity 
must simply work flexible. Often we work with project teams, there are a number of people 
are clustered together to work on these issues” (Respondent 29). This is an important quote 
because it underlines that there is a lot of de facto implementation without any change in 
organizational structures. This points to the importance of combining de facto and de jure 
adaptation.  
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It seems easier to find patterns to explain de facto adaptation, than paths to explain de 
jure adaptation. Although two of the paths contain contradictory cases, the paths explain a 
big share of organizations. Together, these paths explain twenty of the twenty-five cases in 
the dataset. Biggest difference between the paths explaining high and low adaptation, seems 
to be again the size of the organization. The last path, and especially the quote made a 
strong point for combining de jure and de facto adaptation. The next paragraph will analyze 
the four types of adaptation.  
5.3.2.3. Combining de jure and de facto adaptation to cross-cutting policy 
objectives: four types/degrees of adaptation 
The analysis presented in this paragraph focusses on the combinations of 
organizational characteristics which lead to either high or low organizational adaptation 
(according to the types defined in Table 30). The sufficient conditions for the four types of 
adaptation are presented in the paragraph underneath. The analysis of the combined 
measure, in which de jure and de facto are combined leads to only one path explaining high 
adaptation. 
 
 
TABLE 35: PATHS LEADING TO HIGH AND LOW ADAPTATION 
The four types of adaptation31 
 High Low 
Conditions PATH 1   
High autonomy O 
No solution paths 
Large size ● 
Policy development 
task 
● 
Raw coverage 
Unique coverage 
Consistency 
0.15 
0.15 
0.86 
Total number of 
cases 
2/25 
solution coverage 0.15 
solution consistency 0.89 
 
  
 
High adaptation 
PATH 1: Large organizations with low autonomy and policy development as their 
main task do highly adapt to cross-cutting policy objectives in terms of delivering ‘huge plans, 
and huge actions’. This path is referring to two organizations, being two large departments. 
                                               
Table includes truth table rows which lead consistently (.86) to the outcome of interest. ● – indicate the presence of a 
condition, O indicate the absence of a condition 
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The other departments in our sample, those with a small size, are not explained by this path. 
One of the linking pins of the two large departments explains that its organization aligns the 
goals, appoints champions and monitors and evaluates the progress of the cross-cutting 
policy objectives. Making the goals very explicit and concrete is according to the linking pin 
not a challenge for the organization. The cross-cutting policy objectives are also de facto fully 
integrated and established in this organization. Next, to adapting internally, this organization 
is involved in different bottom-up networks which work on the cross-cutting policy objectives 
(Respondent 40).  
 INTERIM CONCLUSIONS: HOW ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS EXPLAIN 
ADAPTATION TO CROSS-CUTTING POLICY OBJECTIVES 
In the preceding paragraphs, we studied how organizational characteristics explain the 
organizational adaptation to cross-cutting policy objectives. As can be included from these 
analyses, the size of an organization seems to be a good indicator to explain if an 
organization will adapt itself or not. Being large leads in all the paths presented above (in 
combination with other conditions) to high adaptation. This is also reflected by the interviews, 
many of the interviewees address the capacity or the time needed to spend on the cross-
cutting policy objectives, which is greater in large organizations. If de facto adaptation is 
analyzed, a policy development task (in combination with other factors) seems to lead to 
strong adaptation, irrespective of the size of the organization. High autonomy appears in no 
path, and is redundant in explaining organizational adaptation. Low autonomy is present in 
many paths, both explaining high and low adaptation. Single conditions do not seem to be 
conclusive to explain organizational adaptation. From the agency perspective the hypothesis 
was derived that organizations with low autonomy, a large size, and policy development as 
their main task (hypothesis H5a) would adapt to the strongest extent. The data seems to 
support this hypothesis.  
5.4. RQ 5: INTERACTION OF THE COORDINATION ARRANGEMENT (TIGHTLY 
OR LOOSELY COUPLED) WITH THE ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
In this paragraph the analysis focuses on which types of organizations (in terms of 
organizational characteristics) do most strongly adapt to specific coordination arrangements 
in terms of their degree of coupling (tight, mixed or loose coupling). The paragraph tries to 
find an answer on research question five (RQ 5): how does the coordination arrangement 
(tightly or loosely coupled) interact with the organizational characteristics to explain 
organizational adaptation to cross-cutting policy objectives? In other words, does it matter if 
organizations with different characteristics are subjected to a tightly or loosely coupled 
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coordination arrangement? The same organizational characteristics are taken into account 
as in the analysis above, with addition of the different types of coordination arrangements32.  
 HOW INTERACTION OF COORDINATION ARRANGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
CHARACTERISTICS LEAD TO DE JURE ADAPTATION TO CROSS-CUTTING POLICY 
OBJECTIVES 
In this paragraph the sufficient conditions for de jure adaptation are presented. This 
analysis focusses on the interaction of the coordination arrangement and the organizational 
characteristics, to explain high or low adaptation of the organizational documents (de jure). 
One path leading to high de jure adaptation, as well as three paths leading to low de jure 
adaptation can be distinguished. The paths are shown in Table 36.  
 
 
TABLE 36: HIGH AND LOW DE JURE ADAPTATION, INTERACTION WITH COORDINATION 
ARRANGEMENT 
DE JURE ADAPTATION33 
 HIGH34 LOW35 
Conditions PATH 1 PATH 2 PATH 3 PATH 4 
High autonomy O O O ● 
Large size ● O  ● 
Policy development task ● ● O O 
Strong coupling ●  O  
Raw coverage 
Unique coverage 
Consistency 
0.16 0.17 0.31 0.40 
0.16 0.17 0.10 0.18 
0.92 0.90 0.91 0.79 
Total number of cases 2/25 3/25 2/25 5/25 
solution coverage 0.16 0.67 
solution consistency 0.92 0.83 
 
  
 
 
High de jure adaptation 
PATH 1: Large organizations with low autonomy and policy development as main 
task, under tightly coupled coordination arrangement adapt de jure to a high extent. This path 
is covered by two departments, which both belong to the cluster ‘huge plans, huge action’. 
Compared to all the other organizations one of these two is according to the document 
                                               
32 ‘Coupling’ is operationalized as : 1 = Tight coupling - full membership in the set, .56 = Mixed coupling - more in than out 
the set, 0 = Loose coupling - fully out of the set  
33 ● – indicate the presence of a condition, O indicate the absence of a condition 
34 Table includes truth table rows which lead consistently (.92) to the outcome of interest.  
35 Table includes truth table rows which lead consistently (.80) to the outcome of interest. 
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analysis adapting most strongly to cross-cutting objectives. Apart from their own de facto 
initiatives, the organization just wants to comply de jure with what the administrative 
champions want from the organization: “there is a particular list of numbers which should be 
updated annually [...] this numeral exercise is not relevant, but we do it anyway” (respondent 
40). 
 
Low de jure adaptation 
PATH 2: Being a small organization with low autonomy and policy development as a 
main task leads to a low level of de jure adaptation. The three organizations, which belong to 
this cluster of organizations, are departments. For this cluster of organizations, the 
coordination arrangement (tightly or loosely) proves to be redundant in explaining the 
organizational adaptation. One of the interviewees of this cluster is skeptical about the 
organizational contribution to cross-cutting policy objectives. According to the interviewee, 
the staff of his/her organization will never be able to have time to work on the cross-cutting 
policy objectives. This is partially attributed to its small size, but also because the added 
value of reporting about cross-cutting policy objectives is not always seen by the 
organization. Many of the cross-cutting policy objectives that come from the center are 
perceived as ‘numeral exercises’, which does not say anything about de facto 
implementation (Organization 33). 
 
PATH 3: Organizations with low autonomy and which have policy implementation as 
their main task do adapt de jure to a low extent, if they are loosely coordinated. This cluster 
contains two departmental agencies. As an example, one of the organizational linking pins 
explains that his/her organization does not adapt strongly to cross-cutting objectives in its 
documents, but these objectives are slightly interwoven in the existing policies which the 
organization implements. The intensity of the co-operation and the final results largely 
depend – according to this linking pin – on whether people can ‘find’ each other and can 
create added value, as well as on whether individual employees in the organization are 
willing to collaborate (Respondent 54).  
 
PATH 4: Large organizations with low autonomy and implementation as their main 
task adapt de jure to a low extent. The way of coupling proves to be redundant in this cluster 
of organizations. The cluster contains five semi-autonomous agencies. Inside of his/her 
organization, one of the respondents notices a lot of fragmentation. The linking pin explains 
as an illustration that the largest unit in the organization is very much on its own, because of 
the amount of money and the mandates it has. The organization is, as stated by the 
respondent, very specialized, and therefore strongly vertically oriented: “while the challenges 
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we face demand that we cooperate. That is why we try to introduce project work and 
horizontal groups”. The organization decided in 2014 to introduce a part about cross-cutting 
policy objectives or collaborative efforts in their planning documents in order to demand 
attention for these issues. He/she thinks that the larger the organization, the harder it is for 
the organizational management to see the added value of collaborating with other 
organizations, because the organization has all the necessary capacity internally. The added 
value of collaboration is easier found and seen by smaller organizations (Respondent 42). 
 
The analyses above showed that adding the coordination arrangement to the analysis 
is improving the ‘model’. The paths are now consistent, and half of the organizations can be 
explained by the four conditions. While being large in previous analyses was only present in 
the paths leading to high adaptation, being large (in combination with other conditions) leads 
also to low adaptation. Especially if combined with high autonomy (the only path in this whole 
chapter were this condition turns up). It could be that these large organizations have a hard 
time to see the added value, because they are at a (legal) distance from the center of 
government. Furthermore, it seems that a linking pin has, in such a large organization, a hard 
time convincing others internally to collaborate on the cross-cutting objectives. This is 
validated by the interviews (see quote path 3). A tight coordination arrangement is (combined 
with other conditions) present in the path leading to high adaptation. A loose coordination 
arrangement appears in one of the paths leading to low organizational adaptation.  
 HOW INTERACTION OF COORDINATION ARRANGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
CHARACTERISTICS LEAD TO DE FACTO ADAPTATION TO CROSS-CUTTING POLICY 
OBJECTIVES 
The sufficient conditions for de facto adaptation are presented in the paragraph 
underneath and shown in Table 37. First, the paths leading to high de facto adaptation are 
described. Afterwards, we present the paths leading to low de facto adaptation. This analysis 
focusses on the interaction of the coordination arrangement and the organizational 
characteristics, to explain high or low de facto adaptation.  
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TABLE 37: HIGH AND LOW DE FACTO ADAPTATION, INTERACTION WITH COORDINATION 
ARRANGEMENT 
DE FACTO ADAPTATION36 
 HIGH37 LOW38 
Conditions PATH 1 PATH 2 PATH 3 PATH 4 
High autonomy O  O  O   
Large size ●  O  
Policy development task  O ● O 
Strong coupling ● ● O O 
Raw coverage 
Unique coverage 
Consistency 
0.41 0.37 0.10 0.46 
0.08 0.09 0.05 0.46 
0.83 0.77 1.00 0.66 
Total number of cases 6/25 8/25 1/25 4/25 
solution coverage 0.55 0.46 
solution consistency 0.82 0.66 
 
  
 
 
High de facto adaptation 
PATH 1: Large organizations with low autonomy, under a tightly coupled coordination 
arrangement belong to the path that leads to high de facto adaptation. This path is covered 
by one department and five departmental agencies. One of the linking pins of the involved 
departmental agencies explains that cross-cutting policy objectives are strongly embedded in 
his/her organization. However, the organization experiences sometimes that the tools, which 
are provided by the horizontal departments are ‘a tool in themselves’. In other words, the 
framework which is offered by the horizontal departments is often very rigid and strict. 
Instead, cross-cutting policy objectives should focus on mentality change. They should start 
from the questions: where do we want to change things, what is the impact of some 
objectives? (Repondent 48).  
 
PATH 2: Organizations with low autonomy and which have policy implementation as 
their main task, adapt under a tightly coupled coordination arrangement de facto to a high 
level. This cluster contains eight departmental agencies. One of the organizations feels the 
tightly coupled coordination arrangement in the austerity measures very hard, as alleged by 
the respondent. The objectives are obliged and therefore have to be implemented: 
“eventually you will be forced, you cannot set this cross-cutting policy objective aside”. 
Nonetheless, he/she fears that at certain point this organization has too few staff to keep 
running smoothly. An indicator to justify this fear is, according to the respondent, the massive 
                                               
36 ● – indicate the presence of a condition, O indicate the absence of a condition 
37 Table includes truth table rows which lead consistently (.80) to the outcome of interest. 
38 Table includes truth table rows which lead consistently (.82) to the outcome of interest. 
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amount of overtime at the moment. Many staff members have to work extra hours to get 
things done. Moreover, the uncertainty that comes along with the cross-cutting objective 
needs constant attention from the management team (respondent 29). 
 
PATH 3: Being a small organization, with low autonomy and policy development as 
main task, under a loosely coupled coordination arrangement leads to a high level of de facto 
adaptation. The only organization belonging to this path is the department which is 
coordinating the policy issue itself. The linking pin from this organization explains that he/she 
feels that their organization has ‘a neutral interest’ in the involved cross-cutting policy 
objective. In many other organizations, interest groups have a stake in that cross-cutting 
issue and voice this stake through these organizations. This leads to instances in which 
these other organizations feel that they might lose some of their responsibilities and tasks. 
The linking pin notices that he/she has a broader view, certainly in the case of cross-cutting 
policy objectives, a given from the organizational task. Whereas agencies have a specific 
task as well as specific clients and hence could have to defend specific interests, an 
organization with a policy development task can look broader (Respondent 50). 
 
Low de facto adaptation 
PATH 4: Organizations with policy implementation as their main task, subjected to a 
loosely coupled coordination arrangement, adapt de facto to a low level. This is surprising, 
because the combination of tightly coupled coordination with low autonomy and a policy 
implementation task leads organizations to adapt de facto to a high extent. It might be that 
coordination arrangements, which are tight, can put more pressure on organizations to get 
them to adapt. The solution consistency of this path is a bit low, so the proof to make a 
causal argument is not too strong. Two cases contradict the path, and adapt de facto strong.  
One of these organizational linking pins has a positive view on the loosely 
coordinated arrangement. He/she does not believe in formalizing or imposing collaboration, 
but rather in encouraging and facilitating cooperation, to make sure that co-ownership 
evolves. He/she mentions for instance the creation of liaison functions, or partially working in 
another organization. Having an innovative culture, with room to experiment is according to 
the linking pin the key to adapt to new demands. Focus on the client and a structure like 
Integrated Youth Care helps to create a common goal, language and culture, which benefits 
cross-cutting collaboration, as stated by this respondent (respondent 55). From this follows 
that even when we discuss the same coordination arrangement, linking pins perceive them 
very differently. This means that the design of the coordination arrangements brings about 
very different perceptions from different linking pins and organizations, which most likely also 
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influences the different patterns of adaptation of these organizations. Furthermore, it might 
also explain why a one-size-fits-all mode of coordination does not work.  
One of the organizational linking pins who does belong to this cluster of organizations 
states that the organization is not so active to embed the cross-cutting objective. This 
organizational linking pin feels that the impact of the cross-cutting policy objective was for a 
long time misjudged in the organization. The management felt that the impact would be so 
large once they started with the objectives, that they adopted a wait-and-see attitude. The 
interviewee also mentions the policy implementation task of the organization, which brings 
about a stronger link between practice and policy according to him/her, and a less stronger 
link with cross-cutting policy objectives (Respondent 52).  
 
Two of the paths are not totally consistent (path 2 and 4 of Table 37), but nevertheless, 
we can explain nineteen organizations with this ‘model’. Low autonomy is present in all the 
paths leading to high de facto adaptation (in combination with other conditions). A tight 
coordination arrangement with low autonomy and being large OR a policy implementation 
task leads to high de facto adaptation. A loose coordination arrangement and a policy 
implementation task leads to low de facto organizational adaptation. Again and again we can 
see a split between organizations with a policy development task, and an – implementation 
task. The first are rather explained by the paths leading to high adaptation, the latter are fairly 
explained by the paths leading to low adaptation.  
 INTERACTION OF COORDINATION ARRANGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
CHARACTERISTICS  
This analysis in the paragraph underneath focusses on unraveling the paths of the 
interaction of the organizational characteristics and the coordination arrangement to explain 
high or low adaptation. The analysis leads to five different paths, shown in Table 38. 
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TABLE 38: HIGH AND LOW ADAPTATION, INTERACTION WITH COORDINATION ARRANGEMENT 
The four types of adaptation 39 
 
High adaptation  
(little plans, huge action, huge plans, huge 
action) 40 
Low adaptation  
(little plans, little action – huge plans, little 
action)41 
Conditions PATH 1  PATH 2 PATH 3 PATH 4 PATH 5 
High autonomy O  O    O  
Large size O ● O ● ● 
Policy development 
task 
● ● O  O  O  
Strong coupling O ● O ●  
Raw coverage 
Unique coverage 
Consistency 
0.11 0.12 0.30 0.39 0.44 
0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.02 
1.00 0.83 0.97 0.68 0.76 
Total number of 
cases 
1/25 2/25 2/25 8/25 5/25 
solution coverage 0.18 0.63 
solution consistency 0.87 0.71 
  
   
 
High adaptation 
PATH 1: Small organizations with low autonomy, with policy development as their 
main task, and functioning under a loosely coupled coordination arrangement adapt to a high 
extent to cross-cutting policy objectives by delivering ‘huge plans and huge action’. The path 
explains one department, and is exactly the same as path 3 explaining high de facto 
adaptation in above analysis. It is surprising that an organization, which is small and under a 
loosely coupled coordination arrangement adapts to a high extent. This might lead us to say 
that the stewardship perspective is applicable. However, the path describes the organization 
which is the lead organization in the cross-cutting objective. At the same time, it is close to 
the minister. Although, a bit counter-intuitive, the case-knowledge leads us to say that the 
agency perspective is applicable to this case.  
 
PATH 2: When under a tight coupled coordination arrangement, large organizations 
with low autonomy and a policy development task adapt to a high extent to cross-cutting 
policy objectives. The linking pin explains this high extent of adaptation of his/her 
organization because the organization experiences a lot of control in this cross-cutting policy 
objective, with no room to maneuver or to deviate from what is imposed in terms of this 
cross-cutting issue. The objective is mentioned very prominently in the organization’s 
documents and is de facto in their day-to-day operations a ‘hot topic’. Due to the tightly 
                                               
39 ● – indicate the presence of a condition, O indicate the absence of a condition 
40 Table includes truth table rows which lead consistently (.83) to the outcome of interest.  
41 Table includes truth table rows which lead consistently (.80) to the outcome of interest. One path explain low adaptation 
was left out, because it has a unique coverage score of 0.000. This means that the cases are already covered by another path. 
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coupled coordination arrangement, organizations have little to say at the moment, according 
to the respondent: “This is also an own fault of the organizations themselves. Through BBB 
(Flemish Agencification Reform, red.) they got a lot to say and they did not well cope with 
that freedom, so therefore a tightly coupled coordination arrangement has been installed. 
The price of the past has to be paid” (Respondent 30).  
 
Low adaptation 
PATH 3: Small organizations with an implementation task under a loosely coupled 
coordination arrangement adapt to cross-cutting policy objectives to a low extent. Two semi-
autonomous agencies belong to this cluster. In terms of structurally adapting to the cross-
cutting policy objectives, one of the respondents remarks that it has not been structurally 
embedded in the organization. The organizational linking pin contributes the low extent of 
adaptation to the former leadership and the size of the organization. He/she thinks that the 
management team of the organization was not fully informed about the tasks that has to be 
done for these cross-cutting objectives. The perception internally within the organization is, 
according to the respondent that the involved cross-cutting issue is on the agenda already for 
a very long time, without real decisive steps. The organizational reflex was therefore in the 
last years not to be pro-active in the cross-cutting policy objectives (Respondent 53).  
 
PATH 4: Under a tightly coupled coordination arrangement, large organizations with an 
implementation task adapt to a low extent to the cross-cutting policy objectives. Four 
departmental agencies and four semi-autonomous agencies belong to this cluster. Although 
this path covers a lot of cases - the solution consistency is a bit low - so the proof to make a 
causal argument is not too strong. One organization contradicts this path. It has high 
autonomy and considers the austerity measures as a loss for the organization. In the opinion 
of the linking pin too much focus is (in the Flemish Government and in the current thesis) on 
cross-cutting issues that have been assigned, in terms of competences, exclusively to 
horizontal departments. According to him/her this is a narrow view on cross-cutting issues, 
because most cross-cutting issues are dealt with in a bottom-up manner in the Flemish 
Government. In these cases it is necessary to collaborate with many organizations to reach 
intended objectives. He/she tries to say that all results, and organizational adaptation is 
context-bound: “depending on the cross-cutting policy issue you want to address, it leads to 
totally different results”. 
According to one of the respondents explained by this path, the organization does not 
mention the objectives very prominently in its documents. The linking pin explains that they 
are in documents sometimes a bit vague, because of distrust towards the horizontal 
departments. This stems from having high autonomy, the staff identifies most strongly with 
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organization, instead of with ‘the Flemish Government’. Besides that, internally, the 
organization is a bit fragmented and organized in clusters, this affects the de facto adaptation 
(Respondent 36).  
 
PATH 5: Large organizations with an implementation task and low autonomy adapt to a 
low extent to the cross-cutting policy objectives. Whether these organizations are under a 
tightly or loosely coupled arrangement proves to be redundant in this cluster of organizations. 
Five organizations belong to this cluster, all departmental agencies. One of the linking pins 
explains that he/she is the only one that is active to embed the objective in the organization. 
As a consequence, discussions about the objective are rather bilateral and not a common 
concern in the organization. Although the minister is, according to this respondent, very well 
aware of the goal and is fully supporting the organization in its efforts, the objective is not a 
priority (respondent 38). 
 INTERIM CONCLUSIONS: INTERACTION OF COORDINATION ARRANGEMENT AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS  
It is clear that explanations for the degree of organizational adaptation are quite complex. 
Most of the conditions may have different effects depending on the combination with other 
conditions. Moreover, consistency and coverage is not always high, which means that there 
are other factors at play, and that we must be careful to confirm conclusions. With some 
certainty we can say that when we study the interaction with the degree of coupling in the 
coordination arrangement (i.e. tightly or loosely), the resulting paths look similar to the ones 
only considering the organizational characteristics. Furthermore, a tightly coupled 
coordination arrangement in combination with other factors leads in almost all paths to high 
adaptation. 
De jure adaptation: the coordination arrangement (i.e. tightly or loosely) does not seem to 
play a major role in the case of de jure adaptation, because it is not often included in paths 
(see Table 36). However, a tight coordination arrangement (in combination with other 
conditions) is present in the path leading to high de jure adaptation. A loose coordination 
arrangement (in combination with other conditions) in the paths leading to low de jure 
adaptation.  
De facto adaptation: The degree of coupling appears as a condition in most paths leading 
either to high or low de facto adaptation (see Table 37). A tight coordination arrangement is 
only present in the paths leading to high adaptation. This coordination arrangement (in 
combination with other factors) leads to high adaptation. A loosely coupled coordination 
arrangement in combination with a policy development task and being small leads to high de 
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facto adaptation. However, if the organization has implementation as its main task and if it is 
coordinated by a loose coordination arrangement it subsequently adapts de facto to a low 
extent.  
Four types of adaptation: When we look at the paths (In Table 38) explaining high 
adaptation, we can see that these only explain three departments. In particular, small 
departments adapt de facto when subjected to a loosely coupled coordination arrangement, 
large departments when the coordination arrangement is tight. Small organizations with an 
implementation task adapt to a low extent under a loose coordination arrangement. Large 
organizations with an implementation task under a tight coordination arrangement seem to 
adapt to a low extent. They might have the capacity to ignore the tight coordination 
arrangement.  
These paths can be plotted in Venn-diagrams (see Graph 7) following an idea offered in 
Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). In such a diagram relations between the organizational 
characteristics and coordination arrangement are better to distinguish. This Venn diagram is 
based on the paths described in Table 38 about the four types of adaptation, and is line with 
the analysis of de facto and de jure (shown in Table 36 and 37). In this graph we can see a 
clear division in the different types of organizations.  
There seems to be a hard split between departments and agencies. Departments which, 
by definition all have low autonomy and a policy development task, are represented by the 
paths leading to high adaptation. A tight coordination arrangement seems to get large 
departments to adapt to a high extent and a loose coordination arrangement leads small 
departments to adapt to a high extent. Organizations with a policy implementation task are at 
the core of the paths leading to low adaptation (see right Venn-diagram – Graph 7). 
Organizations with a policy implementation task which are large seem to have room to ignore 
the tightly coupled coordination arrangement and adapt subsequently to a low extent. Under 
loosely coupled coordination arrangements, small policy implementing organizations will 
adapt to a low extent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
148  Chapter 5 
GRAPH 7: VENN DIAGRAMS OF PATHS LEADING TO HIGH ADAPTATION AND LOW ADAPTATION 
(BASED ON TABLE 38) 
HIGH ADAPTATION LOW ADAPTATION 
 
n= 3 
Consistency: 0.87 
 
n=15 
Consistency: 0.71 
5.5. CONCLUSIONS — ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION 
This chapter studies organizational adaptation. In the theoretical framework hypotheses 
were formulated about (1.) the extent of adaptation under different coordination 
arrangements, (2.) the influence of organizational characteristics, and (3.) the interaction 
between the coordination arrangement and the organizational characteristics on 
organizational adaptation. Based on the agency and stewardship perspective, specific 
hypotheses about organizational adaptation were formulated. The original hypotheses, but 
also the results of the analysis are shown in Table 39. The results will be discussed in detail 
after the table.  
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TABLE 39: HYPOTHESES AND RESULTS 
 
Extent of adaptation 
The first research question guiding this chapter was RQ 3: To what extent does the 
degree of coupling of the coordination arrangement (tightly or loosely coupled) explain the 
extent to which organizations adapt to cross-cutting policy objectives? Based on the agency 
and stewardship perspective two hypotheses were formulated, respectively H4a and H4b 
(row 1 of Table 39), to explain the extent of adaptation. Based on the agency perspective on 
organizational adaptation the expectation is that tightly coupled coordination arrangements 
work best to get organizations to adapt to cross-cutting policy objectives. The data gives 
more support for this hypothesis. The austerity measures – coordinated with a tightly coupled 
coordination arrangement are made most smart and concrete both in documents and de 
facto, compared to administrative simplification and Integrated Youth Care. This gives some 
indications, but the patterns to explain this process are not entirely clear. Even though the 
majority of the organizations under the tightly coordination arrangement adapt to a high 
extent there are also organizations that fall into other adaptation categories. In other words, 
also under loose and mixed coordination arrangements there are organizations which adapt 
high and others, who adapt to a low extent. Probably, the explanation for high or low 
Agency perspective Stewardship perspective 
Hypothesis Result Hypothesis Result 
H4a. Organizations 
under tightly coupled 
coordination 
arrangements adapt 
themselves highly 
Indeed majority of cases 
under a tightly coupled 
coordination arrangement 
adapt highly 
H4b. Organizations 
under loosely 
coupled coordination 
arrangements adapt 
themselves highly 
More support for 
contrary hypothesis, 
but there are also 
organizations under a 
loosely coupled 
arrangement which 
adapt to a high degree 
H5a. if organizations 
have low autonomy, a 
large size and a policy 
development task this 
will lead to high 
adaptation. 
Data seems to support the 
hypothesis, low autonomy 
leads to high adaptation if 
combined with a being large 
and a policy development 
task. Low autonomy and 
having a development task 
is sufficient to lead to high 
de facto adaptation 
H5b. if organizations 
have high autonomy, 
a small size, and 
have a policy 
implementation task 
this will lead to high 
adaptation. 
True for de facto 
adaptation: having a 
policy implementation 
in combination with 
being large 
H6a. Being under 
tightly coupled 
coordination 
arrangements in 
combination with low 
autonomy, a large 
size and policy 
development as main 
task lead to high 
adaptation. 
Data supports the 
hypothesis. However, at the 
same time a loosely coupled 
coordination arrangement is 
enough to get organization 
with low autonomy, policy 
development as main task 
and a small size to adapt to 
a high extent 
 
H6b. Being under 
loosely coupled 
coordination 
arrangements in 
combination with 
high autonomy, a 
small size and policy 
implementation as 
main task lead to 
high adaptation. 
Data does not support 
the hypothesis. A 
loosely coupled 
coordination 
arrangement in 
combination with a 
small size and policy 
implementation as 
main task adapt leads 
to low adaptation. 
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adaptation is not straigthforward. Other factors, the type of organization, i.e. the 
organizational characteristics, might play a role as well.  
 
Influence of organizational characteristics 
Secondly, this chapter adressed the fourth research question (RQ 4): Which 
organizational characteristics explain the extent to which organizations adapt to cross-cutting 
policy objectives? The size of an organization seems to be a good indicator to explain if an 
organization will adapt itself or not. Many of the interviewees address the capacity or the time 
needed to spend on the cross-cutting policy objectives, which is more present in large 
organizations. Large organizations are more often situated in the paths leading to high 
adaptation, either de jure or de facto. If de facto adaptation is considered, organizations with 
a policy development task adapt strongly, irrespective of the size of the organization. Size 
does seem to play a role if we look to the policy implementing organizations, being a large 
implementing organization leads to high de facto adaptation. High autonomy appears almost 
in no path. Thus, high autonomy does not lead to high nor low adaptation or is redundant in 
explaining adaptation. Low autonomy is present in many paths, both explaining high and low 
adaptation. In the case of low adaptation, low autonomy is always combined with being a 
small organization.  
 
Interaction organizational characteristics and coordination arrangement 
Thirdly, the following research question was addressed (RQ 5): How does the 
coordination arrangement (tightly or loosely coupled) interact with the organizational 
characteristics to explain organizational adaptation to cross-cutting policy objectives? When 
we look into the analyses, we can see that the consistency and coverage measures is not 
always high, which means that there are other factors at play, and that we must be careful to 
confirm conclusions. When combined with different coordination arrangements, the paths 
look similar to the ones not considering the arrangements. Supprising is that the solution 
consistency and solution coverage are a bit higher compared to the analyses including only 
the organizational characteristics as conditions. The ‘model’ including the different 
coordination arrangements seems to explain more cases in a consistent way (Legewie, 
2013). The coordination arrangements appear in all paths of de facto adaptation, and seems 
to play less role in the case of de jure adaptation. While it is included in much less paths 
explaining a low level of de jure adaptation. 
Low or high organizational adaptation can firstly be explained by the policy task of the 
organization. Departments, which have by definition a policy development task and low 
autonomy are mostly present in the paths leading to high adaptation. The size of a 
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department seems to be a good indicator to select the mechanisms to coordinate the cross-
cutting objectives. Small departments adapt highly if they are under a loose arrangement, 
large departments if they are under a tight coordination arrangement. Organizations with a 
policy implementation task are mostly present in the paths leading to low adaptation. If they 
are large, they seem to have room to ignore the tightly coupled coordination arrangement, 
and adapt subsequently low. Small organizations with a policy implementation task, under 
loose coupling adapt to a low extent. The size of these policy implementing organizations 
could play a role in two ways: capacity to participate in cross-cutting policy objectives or 
capacity to ignore coordinate signals. 
As will be clear from these conclusions the hypotheses, which were formulated based on 
the agency perspective (H4a, H5a and H6a), seem to be supported by the data. However, 
eight organizations which have a policy implementation task and have to capacity to align 
(i.e. large organizations – path 2 of Table 34 and Table 37) do de facto adapt highly to the 
cross-cutting objectives. Thus, organizational adaptation is not so easily explained. The 
many paths that follow from the analyses show that there are a lot of explanations that 
account for high or low adaptation to cross-cutting objectives.  
 
Alternative explanations for organizational adaptation 
The analysis shows very complex explanations for organizational adaptation. The model 
that was chosen (including the organizational characteristics and the coordination 
arrangement) is not always fit to explain organizational adaptation to cross-cutting policy 
objectives. In other words, the analysis shows some deviant cases. Deviant cases are 
organizations that inhibit the same organizational characteristics, compared to others 
covered by a path, but for some reason do not behave in the same way as the other 
organizations do (Legewie, 2013; Schneider & Rohlfing, 2013). We need an explanation why 
- if all the organizational characteristics are present - this leads in the deviant cases not to 
the same outcome.  
The interviews point out different explanations. Political and administrative leadership 
seems to be important. Political leadership and attention for the cross-cutting objectives 
makes the organizations prioritize the objectives, while a lack of attention leads often to no 
adaptation. This also applies to administrative leadership and attention. Moreover, some 
linking pins do not feel ‘backed-up’ by the management if they have certain proposals, or feel 
that they do not have enough authority or mandate to get other units of individuals in the 
organization to cooperate. Linking pins have very different perceptions about the 
coordination arrangements. One of the deviant cases has shown that the linking pin is in 
favor of the coordination approach, which leads in their organization to organizational 
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adaptation. Including the perception about the coordination arrangement in further research 
might lead to a better explanatory model. Another deviant case points out that bottom-up 
processes and initiatives are not taken into account in the model and get less attention in the 
Flemish Government. The necessity to collaborate with many organizations to reach 
intended objectives and the bottom-up processes can enrich our model to explain 
organizational adaptation.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
Coordination is a recurrent problem in public administration, and has been around – as a 
concept - in both scholarly literature and practice for decades. However, the field of research 
is still relatively young. This dissertation tries to add to the theoretical and substantive 
knowledge about coordination of cross-cutting policy objectives. Throughout this thesis the 
concept of coordination is linked to organizational adaptation. Organizational adaptation is 
seen as the process in which organizations cope and weigh cross-cutting policy objectives 
and adapt (or not) to comply with these demands (Gumport & Sporn, 1999, p. 8). In the case 
of horizontal cross-cutting policy objectives, studying coordination is particularly interesting. 
Such issues vary in their characteristics and approaches but always need - by definition – 
multiple organizations, which do not have a hierarchical relation with each other, to reach a 
coordinated response. These cross-cutting policies may vary in complexity, meaning the 
knowledge and solvability of the problem, the political urgency, the focus, interdependencies 
and the number of actors involved. 
Many scholars claim that current policy problems are more complex, and necessitate a 
coordinated response from all involved actors to deal with them. Coordination arrangements 
for cross-cutting policy objectives are deployed to (1.) bundle the information necessary to 
address the problem, (2.) stimulate innovative practices as they bring people together with 
different expertise, professions and know-hows, (3.) reduce inconsistencies, (4.) improve 
service delivery, and (5.) make efficient and effective use of resources by removing overlaps, 
lacunae and redundancies (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Peters, 1998; Pollitt, 2003). 
Coordination can be done in a relatively tight or loose manner (Chisholm, 1992). Literature 
points out that the characteristics of the policy issue might lead to indications about how to 
coordinate actors in a way which leads to organizational adaptation (Alexander, 1995; 
Peters, 1998; Turnpenny et al., 2009). 
Next to the complexity of problems, a second particularity makes this subject also 
interesting. The inherent complexity of the Flemish government structure makes coming to a 
coordinated response to deal with cross-cutting policy objectives challenging. The 
agencification reform (Beter Bestuurlijk Beleid - BBB) of 2006 created many semi-
autonomous agencies, and thirteen ministries. Besides that, policy development and policy 
implementation were split up, and assigned to departments and agencies. However, there is 
no hierarchical relation between departments and agencies nor between line and horizontal 
ministries. Furthermore, BBB left mechanisms for horizontal cross-cutting collaboration 
underdeveloped. This combination of features makes the Flemish government an extreme 
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case. Its structural features seem to necessitate loosely coupled coordination arrangements. 
In such a deviant case, processes and outcomes are often not what traditional theories 
would lead us to expect. By selecting such an extreme case we expected to disclose more 
knowledge about coordination arrangements and basic mechanisms at play, which can be 
used as insights for other countries and cross-cutting policy objectives.  
The main question of this dissertation is: what explains organizational adaptation to 
cross-cutting policy objectives? To find an answer to the main research question the 
dissertation is split up in two parts. The first part describes and explains the coordination 
arrangements deployed to coordinate the implementation of specific cross-cutting policy 
objectives across public organizations. An in-depth analysis of the extent of organizational 
adaptation towards these cross-cutting policy objectives and an explanation thereof was 
conducted in the second part. Two research questions concerning the coordination 
arrangements for cross-cutting policy objectives were answered, in the first part. The second 
part addresses three different research questions. In what will follow these research 
questions will be answered. Afterwards, focus is on what these results mean in light of the 
theoretical framework that was set-up to study the phenomenon of coordination and 
organizational adaptation. Afterwards, this chapter sums up the ideas for further research. 
6.1. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND THEORETICAL 
REFLECTION 
 
RQ 1: How does the Flemish government organize the coordination of specific cross-
cutting policies? 
The first research question focused on describing three horizontal cross-cutting policy 
objectives that necessitate - according to the Flemish Government or other governmental 
actors - a coordinated approach: the austerity measures, administrative simplification and 
Integrated Youth Care. The concept ‘coordination arrangement’ was used to describe and 
assess the coordination instruments and mechanisms, and was operationalized based on the 
elements of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework of Elinor Ostrom (2005). 
Combined with different dimensions stemming from organizational studies, network theory, 
policy analysis and the coordination literature the framework provides an analytical toolbox to 
describe cross-cutting policy coordination arrangements. On the one side of the scale, there 
are the tightly coupled coordination arrangements, on the other side, there are loosely 
coupled arrangements.  
A tightly coupled coordination arrangement has a closed and restricted participant 
constellation with an intense relationship in which a (political) leader takes decisions. It is 
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based on unilateral agreements, rules and performance based accountability, and is 
governed by an administrative lead organization (Provan & Kenis, 2008) and formal 
information channels. In tightly coupled coordination arrangements, the actions of 
subordinates are determined by superiors. Moreover, authority, instruction, and command 
are the causal mechanisms to get organizations to adapt to the cross-cutting objectives 
(Chisholm, 1992). 
A loosely coupled coordination arrangement has an informal, open and temporary 
participant constellation, in which multiple organizations take their separate decisions and 
govern their own actions. The arrangement is lead minister governed, based on a mission 
statement. Moreover, information exchange happens through informal communication 
channels and the accountability system is based on peer review. In loosely coupled 
coordination arrangements roles, tasks and problem definitions are set not by an authority, 
but by the organizations or members themselves. Organizations stay quite flexible and have 
room to maneuver to deal with conflicting or complex demands (Jessop, 1998). 
Given the fact that the Flemish Government is strongly agencified and characterized by 
non-hierarchical relationships between organizations, the first research question addressed 
the following: How is the coordination of specific cross-cutting policies organized in the 
Flemish Government? (RQ1). On the basis of an assessment of the instruments, positions 
and structures which are used to coordinate the three cross-cutting policy objectives, a 
tightly, mixed and loosely coupled coordination arrangement can be distinguished. The tightly 
coupled coordination arrangement is deployed to coordinate the austerity measures, the 
mixed coordination arrangement coordinates the administrative simplification objectives, and 
the loosely coupled coordination arrangement is used for coordinating Integrated Youth 
Care.  
The austerity measures began with a loosely coupled approach, which was tightened 
swiftly. In this case, the participant constellation, political and administrative positions were 
clearly established. After a short period in which organizations had the opportunity to 
democratically come to decisions, the political level deployed top-down steering, introduced 
sanctions, and subsequently a more tightly coupled approach.  
The second, mixed coordination arrangement is deployed in the administrative 
simplification objectives. There are, de jure, some elements of tight coupling in the 
administrative simplification dossiers —for instance the obligation to execute a Regulatory 
Impact Analysis when introducing new regulation, and the decentralized regulatory units in 
ministries — but two main reasons show that the coordination arrangement is de facto more 
loose. The administrative simplification objectives have to cope with fragmentation, because 
of the Flemish government’s structure, which is exacerbated by establishing units to 
coordinate this objective in the ministries. Moreover, the central and decentral units which 
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were established to create a cross-cutting dynamic have little authority, capacity and tools to 
do so. 
Integrated Youth Care is coordinated via a loosely coupled coordination arrangement. To 
achieve non-hierarchical intersectoral and multi-level collaboration, IYC policies and actions 
are developed through permanent coalitions between multiple partners, who democratically 
decide on the course of action. It is a loosely coupled arrangement, mainly characterized by 
informal communication and network governance. However, this case shows that loosely 
coupled coordination arrangements have their limits. Such an arrangement does not facilitate 
decisions and implementation of policy measures that aim for fundamental changes in task 
allocations between sectors and organizations. A form of tight coupling, by establishing 
strong political positions or ‘by casting a shadow of hierarchy’ (Voets, Verhoest, & Molenveld, 
2015) over the cross-cutting policy arena seems to be necessary to overcome the deadlock. 
This seems to confirm Ostroms’ (1990) argument that governments needs mixtures of 
coercive and deliberative instruments to coordinate cross-cutting policy arenas. 
The cases show that even within the Flemish government, which is considered to be an 
extreme case of agencification, with strictly non-hierarchical relationships, policy issues can 
be coordinated with tightly coupled arrangements. However, from all the cases follows that 
tight coupling in the administrative apparatus is very difficult. Although, there is a central 
administrative lead organization (Provan & Kenis, 2008)— the Department for Public 
Governance in the austerity measures, the central Regulatory Management Unit in case of 
administrative simplification and the Department for Social Protection and Health in 
Integrated Youth Care— it has to rely on network-principles. The agencification-reform of 
2006 introduced more degrees of freedom regarding the management of departments and 
agencies, and more result oriented steering of these organizations by their portfolio minister, 
with direct accountability to the latter. It created a structure in which organizations are 
juxtaposed. On the one hand, this approach gives leeway to participation processes and the 
possibility to interact in the decision-making process. On the other hand, this leads to 
situations in which organizations do not trust the administrative lead organizations (or 
champions), do not give their information away (also stressed by Rommel & Christiaens, 
2009), and to role-conflicts among the champions – who have to convince and persuade 
people to collaborate, but have to combine this with a ‘police-role’ (see also Cordova-Novion, 
2011).  
 
RQ 2: What policy issue characteristics explain the type of coordination arrangement 
deployed in cross-cutting policies?  
Literature (Alexander, 1995; Peters, 1998; Turnpenny et al., 2009) points out that some 
policy issues urge for a tight coordination arrangement, and others necessitate a loosely 
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coupled arrangement. This was object of the second research question. The theoretical 
framework describes the influence of three policy issue characteristics on the choice for 
either a loose or tight coordination arrangement. Focus was on the influence of political 
urgency, interdependencies and focus (either internal or external) on the design of the 
coordination arrangement. The expectation is that cross-cutting policy objectives with a high 
level of political urgency, which are pooled interdependent and with an internal focus (the 
austerity measures) are coordinated with a tightly coupled coordination arrangement. The 
second is that cross-cutting policy objectives with a low level of political urgency, which are 
reciprocal interdependent (O’Toole Jr. & Montjoy, 1984) and with an external focus are 
coordinated with a loosely coupled coordination arrangement. These expectations informed 
the cross-cutting policy case selection.  
In the case of the austerity measures the political urgency led to the establishment of a 
strong political champion, who has the authority to sanction organizations. Moreover, 
urgency leads to a situation in which the political actors and ministerial cabinets give 
authority to central departments to monitor and control the behavior of line ministries (Peters, 
2011; Pollitt, 2010). This mirrors tendencies in other countries to (re-) strengthen the center 
of government (Bouckaert et al., 2010; Christensen & Lægreid, 2008). Politicization and the 
conflicts that arose during the policy preparation phase necessitated such an approach.  
With respect to the administrative simplification objectives, the declining political urgency 
led to a loosening of the coordination arrangement. Although there are quite some elements 
of tightly coupling in the arrangement, the lack of political attention undoes them. Though 
political urgency was initially present, all interviewees claim that it declined over the years. 
For the respondents, attention from political actors is essential for its success. Without this 
attention, the legitimacy and value of coordination instruments is nonexistent. 
Focus is merely a precondition for either loosely or tightly coupled coordination 
arrangements. With a precondition I mean that a certain focus does not necessarily brings 
about a certain coordination form, but whether the target group is taken into account informs 
the design of the coordination arrangement, e.g. an impetus. In Integrated Youth Care 
participation and engagement of stakeholders in policy decisions is part of the process in 
order to improve services, products and processes. Taking this target group into account 
leads to a loosely coupled approach in which sectoral and stakeholder interests play a big 
role. However, focus of the discussions in the networks were often about the internal 
operations. The interviewees stress that a focus on the target group instead can help to 
bridge organizational differences, to bring about a collaborative approach. However, this only 
works if participants recognize the necessity of the collaboration. An internal focus creates a 
precondition for tightly coupled coordination arrangements. A tightly coupled coordination 
arrangement does not always follow from this internal focus (see the case of administrative 
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simplification), but the focus informs the design of the coordination arrangement for the 
austerity measures. As soon as the political and administrative level noticed the ‘turf wars’ 
and organizational conflicts that arose, they quickly decided upon a tightly coupled 
coordination approach.  
Interdependencies between organizations seem to be dealt with via tightly coupled 
coordination arrangements. Hence, the ‘possible interdependencies’ and the subsequent 
uncertainty that could arise, are in the austerity measures ‘tamed’ through centralization and 
control. This is in line with authors (Chisholm, 1992) who describe that the best way to deal 
with high levels of interdependence is tight coupling. However, tight coupling, e.g. formal 
tools and consistent supervision are not enough. The case of administrative simplification 
showed that some coordination arrangements can be perceived as just a ‘numeral exercise’ 
or ‘a tool in themselves’, which get implemented because of ‘force’, but they are not seen as 
added value.  
Especially, political urgency and interdependencies seem to have an influence on 
coordination arrangements in terms of their extent of coupling (tightly or loosely). First of all, 
political urgency is according to the interviewees needed for organizations to prioritize the 
cross-cutting policy objectives. Especially in the Flemish Government, where the portfolio 
ministers and their ministerial cabinets are the main principals for departments and agencies 
(as administrative principals are absent), a lack of political attention and urgency makes the 
coordination arrangements unclear. If political priorities and objectives are not clearly set and 
stipulated, there is uncertainty or even non-implementation. Respondents seem to urge 
conscious policy choices (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007). They explain that they need cross-
cutting programs which are focused, with clear priorities and clearly state what is envisioned, 
further completion should be done by the organizations with room to maneuver. The clearer 
the cross-cutting policy objectives, the less conflicts between and within organizations when 
interpreting and implementing the objectives there will be. Subsequently, the easier it is to 
prioritize the involved objective and the less ambiguous it becomes successfully adapt to the 
objective (Bouckaert et al., 2010; Christensen & Lægreid, 2008; Sabel & O’Donnell, 2000).  
 
RQ 3: To what extent does the degree of coupling of the coordination arrangement 
(tightly or loosely coupled) explain the extent to which organizations adapt to cross-
cutting policy objectives? 
Organizational adaptation is the process in which organizations cope and weigh 
environmental demands and the adaptation required to comply with them (Gumport & Sporn, 
1999, p. 18). The level of organizational adaptation refers in this thesis to the extent to which 
the organizations coordinated by a coordination arrangement are integrating the cross-
cutting policy objectives in its organizational goals, structures, and actions (Meyer & Rowan, 
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1977). In this thesis the concept is operationalized as structural organizational adaptation, 
the extent to which the organization aligns its organizational goals, monitors the cross-cutting 
policy objectives, allocates resources, and appoints tasks and responsibilities to specific staff 
members with respect to the implementation of the cross-cutting objectives.  
Ten organizations of the Flemish Government of two policy sectors were selected on the 
basis of their characteristics (autonomy, size and policy task - see RQ4). In these 
organizations the structural organizational adaptation towards three cross-cutting policy 
objectives was studied. Organizational planning documents were collected (in total 88 
documents) to study the de jure adaptation. This is the extent to which the organization 
adapts its documents to comply with the cross-cutting policy objectives, based on the 
researchers’ assessment of the organizational planning documents. Moreover, de facto 
adaptation is the extent to which the organization adapts to the cross-cutting policy 
objectives, as perceived by the organizational linking pin in a face-to-face interview. 
Combining de jure and de facto adaptation led to four types (i.e. extents of) adaptation.  
Based on the agency and stewardship perspective two hypotheses were formulated to 
explain the extent of organizational adaptation of the organizations to coordination 
arrangements. From the agency perspective followed the expectation that tightly coupled 
coordination arrangements will induce organizations to adapt to cross-cutting policy 
objectives to a high extent. According to the stewardship perspective, organizations under 
loosely coupled coordination arrangements adapt themselves highly.  
Although, the patterns found are rather diffuse, the majority of cases under tightly 
coupling adapt highly, compared to the mixed and loosely coupled coordination arrangement. 
Although, this intensive, detailed, and ‘hard’ coordination arrangement met its goal, many 
interviewees stress that they missed substantive discussions about the topic and did not see 
the added value of the tight arrangement, like Argyris (1964) stressed. There is relatively 
more support for the proposition based on the agency perspective, but there are also 
organizations under a loosely coupled arrangement which adapt to a high degree. All the 
coordination arrangements do have elements of tight coupling in them, which could also 
mean that this leads stewards to adapt to a low extent, because they feel distrusted by their 
principals and lose their intrinsic motivation (Argyris, 1964; Davis et al., 1997). Most likely, 
more factors are at play to explain organizational adaptation than solely the degree of 
coupling of the coordination arrangement. The next research question examines if the 
organizational characteristics could lead to a better understanding of the adaptation process. 
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RQ 4: Which organizational characteristics explain the extent to which organizations 
adapt to cross-cutting policy objectives? 
Based on the agency and stewardship perspective two hypotheses were formulated 
about which organizational characteristics explain the extent to which organizations adapt to 
cross-cutting policy objectives. From the agency perspective followed the expectation that 
organizations with low autonomy, a large size and policy development as main task adapt 
highly. From the stewardship perspective can be argued that organizations with high 
autonomy, a small size and policy implementation as main task adapt highly.  
The data seems to support the hypothesis following from the agency perspective: having 
low autonomy leads to high organizational adaptation if combined with being a large 
organization and having a policy development task. In other words, large departments adapt 
most strongly to cross-cutting policy objectives42. These large departments have ‘huge plans 
and huge actions’. However, also organizations which have an implementation task and are 
large adapt highly de facto. So, there are large agencies which adapt highly de facto. For this 
group of large agencies with ‘little plans but huge action’, the level of autonomy does not 
matter that much. The combination of being an organization with low autonomy and a policy 
implementation task (i.e. departmental agency), but with a small size leads to a low level of 
organizational adaptation (de jure and de facto). This most probably has to do with capacity 
issues, as this is also reflected by the interviews (and other studies, e.g. Lowndes & 
Skelcher, 1998).  
Hence, the organizational size is a relevant factor to explain whether an organization will 
adapt itself or not. According to interviewees, some cross-cutting policy programs are too 
encompassing, have too many objectives and forget to focus on crucial priorities. This leads 
to a feeling of overburdening in terms of participation in the structures (also stresses by 6 et 
al., 1999). Furthermore, the respondents give as an explanation that intra-ministerial and 
certainly inter-ministerial collaboration is a continuous effort in terms of staff and time (see 
also: Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; Lægreid, Sarapuu, Rykkja, & Randma-Liiv, 2014).  
From the agency perspective the hypothesis was derived that organizations with low 
autonomy, a large size, and policy development as main task would adapt to the strongest 
extent. The data renders relatively more support for this hypothesis. Although there are some 
consistent paths, some cases remain unexplained and the model based on organizational 
characteristics to explain organizational adaptation does not give the full picture. The 
analysis that followed to answer research question RQ5 takes into account the interaction 
between the coordination arrangement and the organizational characteristics.  
                                               
42 Irrespective of their size, departments always show high levels of de facto adaptation (‘huge action’), but they only show 
high levels of de jure adaptation (‘huge plans’) in case they are large.  
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RQ 5: How does the coordination arrangement (tightly or loosely coupled) interact 
with the organizational characteristics to explain organizational adaptation to cross-
cutting policy objectives?  
From the agency perspective can be derived that being under a tightly coupled 
arrangement in combination with having low autonomy, a large organizational size and policy 
development as main task would lead organizations to adapt to the cross-cutting objectives 
to a high level. The hypothesis that loose coupling, in combination with high autonomy, a 
small size and policy implementation as main task leads organizations to adapt a high extent 
follows from the stewardship perspective.  
All the propositions which were formulated based on the agency perspective are more 
strongly supported by the data. The stewardship perspective does not seem to explain 
organizational adaptation very well. Based on the data can be stated, with reasonable 
certainty, that when being under a tightly coupled coordination arrangement large 
departments adapt strongly. However, being under a loosely coupled coordination 
arrangement leads small departments to adapt highly. Apparently, for departments the type 
of coordination arrangement interacts with their organizational size in determining the level of 
adaptation to cross-cutting policy objectives. Under tightly coupled coordination 
arrangements large-sized departments adapt both de jure and de facto (huge plans and 
huge actions). However, small sized departments under loosely coupled coordination 
arrangements will adapt de facto but not de jure, stated differently, they deliver ‘little plans 
but huge action’. It could be, like stated in the literature that adapting is easier if an 
organization has a policy development task (contributing ‘texts’, vision development etc.), 
compared to the task of agencies who have to coordinate or adapt actions (Bakvis & Juillet, 
2004).  
Organizations with a policy implementation task (i.e. agencies) are at the core of the 
paths leading to low levels of adaptation. In they are large, they seem to have room to ignore 
the pressures stemming from a tightly coupled arrangement and adapt subsequently to a low 
level. It could be that larger organizations, at greater distance from the central government 
can resist control efforts (also stressed by de Zilwa, 2010) from central departments and 
portfolio ministers better than organizations closer to the center of government and hence 
lower levels of autonomy.  
An indication of this is that although some departmental agencies (low autonomy and 
policy implementation task) under a tightly coupled coordination arrangement show high 
levels of de facto adaptation (cfr Table 37), large-sized departmental agencies show low 
levels of adaptation in general, irrespective of the coordination arrangement they are 
subjected to (cfr Table 38). Small organizations with an implementation task only seem to be 
able to resist loosely coupled coordination arrangement, in which case they show low levels 
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of adaptation (cfr Table 38). This explanation might describe the capacity problems, as 
mentioned before, these are small or poorly resourced organizations with little opportunity to 
invest in cross-cutting policy objective (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998). 
6.2. METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS  
 STUDYING COORDINATION ARRANGEMENTS 
This dissertation has a value in having developed a more refined way to study 
coordination arrangements by distinguishing several dimensions which together form more 
loosely or tightly coupled coordination arrangements. This conceptualization and 
operationalization overcomes some of the problems of the hierarchy, market and network 
typology which is based on ideal-types of coordination mechanisms which hardly ever are 
observable in reality. The H-M-N typology is insufficiently operationalized to grasp the 
hybridity and complexity of coordination arrangements, because it describes them as ideal 
types. The eight coordination-dimensions developed in this thesis, on the basis of the 
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (Ostrom, 2005), give more insight in 
different elements of a complex coordination arena. The analysis showed, in line with what 
Hood (2000) describes, that coordination arrangements inhibit de facto both tightly as well 
loosely coupled elements and that coordination arrangements are often hybrid. In the current 
era - where contrasting images of coordination prevail (like NPG and post-crisis 
management) - it seems fruitful to develop the dimensions further and to apply them to other 
governments and cross-cutting policy objectives.  
The influence of the coordination arrangement on organizational adaptation is hard to 
describe, and the analysis shows that explanatory paths are complex. The adaptation 
process seems to have an organization-specific explanation. We can say, with reasonable 
certainty, that the perception and interpretation of the organization about the coordination 
arrangement is an intermediate factor that explains whether organizations adapt or not. 
Another study by the author (Molenveld & Verhoest, 2015) showed that even when 
respondents talk about the same coordination arrangements, they perceive and interpret 
them very differently. The perception about the coordination arrangement and the 
interpretation thereof by organizational actors acts like a ‘filtering process’ which is also 
central to the autopoiesis concept of Niklas Luhmann (1986). With this concept, the author 
tries to describe a process in which an organization makes sense of the overly complex 
environment, by thought and digestion, which can trigger organizational adaptation. An 
organization only adapts if the structures and perceptions of the organization “allow for 
reactions to ‘important’ environmental events” (Seidl, 2004, p. 4). This might explain why a 
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one-size-fits all mode of coordination does not work. As coordination arrangements bring 
about very different perceptions (‘numeral exercise’, too intrusive, overburdening of network 
structures etc.) and this interpretation most likely also influences the different patterns of 
adaptation (see for more explanation paragraph 6.3).  
 
 STUDYING ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION 
The measurement of organizational adaptation was based upon the premise that how the 
organizational adaptation is de jure framed and designed (Sorensen, 2006) in the 
organizational documents, can deviate from the de facto organizational adaptation. 
Combining de facto and de jure showed its usability. First of all, the empirical material shows 
that there is a lot of de facto implementation without any change in organizational documents 
and vice versa. Secondly, measuring this in very systematic way, by addressing the same 
structural adaptation indicators in different organizations with very different tasks made cases 
very comparable on different levels and across the cross-cutting policy issues we have 
studied. However, this measurement of structural adaptation (both formal and de facto) did 
not include a study of the de facto organizational actions or the goal achievement. The extent 
of structural adaptation refers to what extent the organizations formulate goals, assign 
responsibilities, employ monitoring systems and allocate budgets, but we do not actually 
measure in our cases whether the organizations actually implement the cross-cutting 
objectives by substantive actions and to which extent they achieved the goals which were 
set. Including the measurement of these actions and goal achievement in further research is 
important, for instance because some organizations in our cases stress that they reach the 
objectives, without structural adaptation (see for more explanation paragraph 6.3).  
The explanation for organizational adaptation was sought in the interaction of different 
variables, mainly because organizations are sets of different characteristics. Fuzzy-set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) offered a way to study these complex interactions. 
As FsQCA minimizes explanations to their core conditions, which allowed us to seek for 
consistent patterns. The case-knowledge enriched the understanding of the patterns. 
However, the explanatory models leave much unexplained, as most conditions can have 
different effects depending on the combination with other conditions.43 The combined model 
(Legewie, 2013) with the coordination arrangements as well as organizational factors does 
not explain the organizational adaptation process fully. It shows that irrelevant conditions 
were included or that crucial conditions were missed.  
                                               
43 This is clear from the analysis. The FsQCA consistency and coverage measures are not always high, which means that 
there are other factors in play, and that we must be careful to confirm hypotheses. 
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With Q-methodology part of this problem is solved, because it adds supplementary 
information to the discussion about, and the knowledge of organizational adaptation. The 
analysis of the Q-sorts points to two different perspectives on organizational adaptation. 
Firstly, a perspective from organizational linking pins who claim to adapt strongly to the 
cross-cutting policies. These organizations seek to align their actions to the cross-cutting 
policy objectives. They want to serve the collective and are especially motivated by social 
goals. The second type of organizations have a hard time prioritizing cross-cutting policy 
objectives. According to these respondents adapting in terms of time, budget, and integrating 
the goals in the monitoring is a struggle. This is an obstacle which is mentioned in many 
other studies (e.g. 6 et al., 1999).  
Both approaches, the Q-methodology and FsQCA can be positioned in the critical realist 
tradition. This approach was chosen because large-N approaches (e.g. quantitative surveys) 
inform us how specific policy issues are translated into organization-specific goals and 
structures; they do not, however, inform us about specific organizational characteristics and 
how these influence actors and instruments. Case studies on the other hand, on the level of 
cross-cutting policy objectives and organizations, are useful because of propositional depth 
and insight; they do not, however, show general trends.  
Future research into organizational adaptation can be done in different manners, either in 
a positivist or constructivist fashion. Implicitly, this thesis followed a functionalist approach. It 
assumes that a certain organizational structures (i.e. the four elements of structural 
adaptation) work better to create a positive outcome (i.e. more adaptation). However, the 
thesis showed the need to incorporate more conditions to explain organizational adaptation, 
and especially the perception on the coordination arrangement as intermediate factor. The 
thesis showed the need to embed perceptions. Therefore a more constructivist approach 
seems to be the way forward (see for more explanation paragraph 6.3).  
This thesis started from the beginning of a policy process and traced the process up to 
the level of the implementers. This is what some authors call forward-mapping (Elmore, 
1979). Since the state machinery left the bureaucratic model more and more, it is working 
differently and far more flexible than a few decades ago. Policy plans often change, 
incorporate ideas along the way, and have very difficult processes to trace. Backward 
mapping might be an alternative method to study organizational adaptation. It: “questions the 
assumption that explicit policy directives, clear statements of administrative responsibilities, 
and well-defined outcomes will necessarily increase the likelihood that policies will be 
successfully implemented” (Elmore, 1979, p. 604). Starting from the objectives that 
organizations got, at the bottom of the process, backward mapping measures the operational 
success up to the original policy intentions. 
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6.3. FURTHER DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH 
Studying organizational adaptation and coordination arrangements is difficult task, as this 
dissertation has shown. The answers to the research questions, and the way in which the 
concepts are explained and analyzed lead to a few ideas for further research. These can be 
summarized as shown in Figure 11. The black text and boxes constitute the original 
conceptual framework. The new concepts, characteristics and ideas are displayed in grey. 
The latter will be described number by number in the text below the figure.  
 
FIGURE 11: REFINED CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
 
 
1.) Political leadership 
A theory about organizational adaptation should include theoretical expectations about 
political leadership and urgency. Political leadership is important on different levels.  
Firstly, political leaders are capable to be the ‘meta-governor’ (Sorensen, 2006) and 
decide on how to govern and design the coordination arrangement. This can be done on the 
one hand hands-off, by designing or facilitating the processes and conditions. On the other 
hand more hands-on, by establishing strong political positions or ‘by casting a shadow of 
hierarchy’ to overcome deadlock or stalling (Scharpf, 2000; Sorensen, 2006; Voets et al., 
2015). For instance, political leaders have a task in setting clear priorities. Many interviewees 
point out that the success of many coordination processes (and the subsequent 
organizational adaptation) are also a question of how well the cross-cutting objectives are 
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set, and how clear the framework is. In other words, some goals or sets of goals allow for 
leeway in their interpretation. If goals are ambiguous (Chun & Rainey, 2005), organizations 
can press for one definition over another and allocate resources different internally in pursuit 
of this choice (Pandey & Wright, 2005), which enhances the chance for overlap and un-
harmonized policy. Especially in the Flemish Government this political leadership is 
important, because they are the only hierarchical overruling actors.  
Second, policy issues inhibit characteristics, but some characteristics can be ‘tamed’ by 
political actors, for instance, by giving the assignment to solve the problem to a few actors. 
This reduces the likelihood of conflicts (Roberts, 2000). Reducing the number of actors 
reduces interdependencies and subsequently the institutional uncertainty (Head, 2008). 
Thirdly, political leaders can directly influence the organizational adaptation processes. As 
the thesis showed, cross-cutting policy objectives are often seen a side-issue by 
organizations, unless the minister pays attention and encourages the organization to 
implement the goal. The interviewees stress a decline in adaptation, usefulness, and 
legitimacy for the objectives, when ministers do not pay attention to objectives and 
instruments. Organizations do not seem to adapt to new ways of thinking until a significant 
threshold of political urgency is crossed (this also followed from research by Jones & 
Baumgartner, 2008). Interviewees stress on the one hand sometimes the absence of a 
political leader who prioritizes the objectives, on the other hand others stipulate that their 
portfolio minister places attention on the incorportation of cross-cutting objectives. The latter 
seem bring about an incentive to prioritize the objectives in the organization.  
 
2.) Coordination arrangement 
Future research can focus on discussing the roles of the various individual elements and 
instruments of a coordination arrangement, to see how variations in these instruments 
influence organizational adaptation and goal achievement. A possible research angle can be 
to study collaborative bases. For instance, by looking at which instruments could stimulate 
cross-cutting collaboration. For instance, the inflexible government budget is according to 
many respondents a main source of implementation deficit. Cross-cutting policies are often 
established late in the legislative term, when budgets are already set (see also 6 et al., 
1999). In terms of financial possibilities, options are in this case limited. Shifting budgets or 
re-allocating internal budget to a cross-cutting objective is difficult. Furthermore, it is hard to 
spread budgets across different organizations, which are organized vertically, per portfolio 
minister. Pooling of budgets could create an extra incentive to cooperate. Other instruments 
to study in further research (see also point 8 – feedback loop) could be ‘shared 
accountability’ and how cross-cutting objectives can be integrated in vertical accountability 
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systems (Thomson & Perry, 2006; Voets et al., 2015) or the consolidation of policy cycles 
(i.e. of policy design, implementation and evaluation – see Verhoest et al., 2007),  
 
3.) Administrative leadership  
On the administrative level we see some of the same issues come to a front as on the 
poltical level. The Q-sort points out that attention from the top-management is essential and 
has a strong influence on how strongly the organization adapts to the cross-cutting policy 
objectives. This has also been mentioned in many other studies (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004; 
Boyle, 1999). Linking pins are sometimes appointed to implement a cross-cutting goal in the 
organization, but do not feel ‘a back-up’ from the management or other parts of the 
organization. They stress that the organization is internally fragmented, causing a situation in 
which the linking pins feels no support of the rest of the organization nor the management.  
4.) Perception about the coordination arrangement 
Organizations face multiple ‘environmental demands’. Cross-cutting policy objectives are 
often only one of the many other policy demands. The thesis pointed out that public 
organizations have to ‘weigh’ different priorities and goals coming from different ministers, 
other organizations, external stakeholders etc. Explaining organizational adaptation by 
looking to the coordination arrangement and the organizational characteristics is too 
straightforward. It needs a more fine-grained measure about how policy demands are 
‘weighed’ by the organization. As described before the perception about the coordination 
arrangement and the organization-specific interpretation thereof is seen as an intermediate 
variable which can explain the organizational adaptation process more thoroughly. This 
implies that the fit between the coordination arrangement (seen as environmental demand), 
the organizational perception and interpretation of that arrangement (as filtering process) and 
the organizational characteristics should be object of further research to explain 
organizational adaptation.  
 
5.) Organizational actions 
The way in which structural adaptation was measured (de jure by looking what is in the 
planning documents, and de facto by asking for perceptions) says nothing about the actually 
performed activities, what motivates organizations to incorporate these goals and ‘the 
internal life of the organization’. A theory about organizational adaptation necessitates 
questions about why, how and what the organizations actually do in terms of substantive 
actions regarding cross-cutting objectives, next to the extent of structural adaptation (i.e. 
goal-setting, monitoring, budgeting and assigning responsibilities). Furthermore, actions to 
comply with cross-cutting demands are performed in multiple organizations (connected 
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arenas - Benz, 2007), which in conjunction tells us something about the goal achievement 
towards these cross-cutting policy issues.  
6.) Goal achievement 
The focus of this thesis was on coordination as a process (Wollmann, 2003), and did not 
focus on the result of the actual performed activities, i.e. the outcomes of the cross-cutting 
policy program. However, the actions performed say something about this outcome and goal 
achievement. Studying this can be done by studying goal achievement as programmatic 
operational success. This is the extent to which a policy program is implemented according 
to objectives laid down. As March and McConnell (2010, p. 573) describe; goal achievement 
can be considered policy success, especially in complex coordination arenas. 
7.) Connected arenas (Benz, 2007) 
This thesis tried to incorporate some elements of the connectedness of the central 
coordination arena and the organizational arena. However, this was not done in depth. The 
thesis only took in account the central level and the organizational level, though there are 
many other connected arenas between the central and organizational arena. Benz (2007) 
stresses the connectedness of different arenas. We can discern different connections 
between arenas.  
Firstly, the coordination arena and organizational arena: a study of the mandates, the 
resources and the power bases that organizations have and can bring to the cross-cutting 
policy arena would be an insightful addition to our currently deployed approach. This could 
add information about why some organizations do not adapt.  
Second, the connectedness of multiple organizational arenas could be object of study. 
Some respondents mention bottom-up networks and cross-cutting initiatives which emerge 
without a central coordination arena. This can be studied by focusing on actual collaborations 
to reach cross-cutting objectives, which has not been done in this thesis. For instance, some 
organizations form coalitions for, or against cross-cutting objectives which they pursue, for 
example through connected arenas or through political contacts.  
 
8.) Feedback loop 
On the basis of the goal achievement of the organizations, administrative and political 
champions, the network or individual actors can decide to alter dimensions of the 
coordination arrangement. This asks for thorough overthinking how to evaluate cross-cutting 
programs, goal achievement and mandates. It is for instance important to stress who bears 
the ultimate responsibility, and who is (made) competent for monitoring and evaluation. 
These mandates should be clear, to prevent legitimacy issues and to prioritize evaluation of 
goal achievement and the functioning of the coordination arrangement.  
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To sum up, organizational adaptation is a process which is difficult to trace and study. 
Many factors play a role and have different effects, depending on their combination with 
other factors. However, studying this process and looking for ways to develop the knowledge 
about coordination arrangements and organizational adaptation further remains important, 
because policy challenges ask for coherent policy responses and governments are in search 
of tools and instruments that can help them accomplish this task. 
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7. SUMMARY 
The institutional complexity inherent to the governmental apparatus and the 
agencification trend of recent decades make reaching a coordinated response to new policy 
demands a challenge for public organizations. In this thesis cross-cutting policy objectives 
are seen as new policy demands for organizations to which they can comply or not. This 
compliance process is called organizational adaptation. How to strengthen and explain 
organizational adaptation, adds to the theoretical and substantive knowledge about the 
design of coordination arrangements and the influence of certain policy and organizational 
characteristics. Horizontal cross-cutting policy objectives are particularly interesting to study, 
because they challenge the governmental apparatus to respond. The strongly agencified 
Flemish Government — in which relationships between organizations are strictly non-
hierarchical and horizontal coordination mechanisms are underdeveloped — is selected to 
study the coordination and organizational adaptation process.  
On the basis of their policy characteristics, including political urgency, interdependencies 
between organizations and the focus of the policy (either internal management issues or 
external substantive policy issues) three very different cross-cutting policy objectives were 
chosen as object of study. By using eight coordination dimensions — developed based on 
the Institutional Development Framework of Elinor Ostrom — we study which coordination 
arrangements are deployed in 1) austerity measures, 2) administrative simplification and 3) 
Integrated Youth Care. These coordination dimensions prove to be suitable to grasp the 
hybridity of coordination arrangements.  
In line with expectations, very different coordination arrangements are disentangled: a 
tight arrangement in the austerity measures, a mixed in administrative simplification and a 
loosely coupled coordination arrangement in Integrated Youth Care. Authority (exercised by 
superiors) is the prime causal factor to coordinate organizations in tightly coupled 
coordination arrangements. A loosely coupled coordination arrangement lies on the other 
end of the continuum and is similar to self-organization.  
In particular, political urgency and interdependencies seem to have a strong influence on 
the design of coordination arrangements. Strongly expressing political urgency can lead to 
the establishment of strong political champions, and subsequently ‘taming strategies’. Such 
strategies can reduce complexity and interdependencies through centralization of decision-
making or clear priorities. Moreover, political leadership is important, because these actors 
can be the ‘meta-governor’ and therefor both design the coordination arrangement (hands-off 
approach) or directly coordinate organizations, for instance by ‘casting a shadow of 
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hierarchy’ (hands-on approach). The focus of policy issues does not necessarily bring about 
a certain coordination form. However, a focus on clients or society often informs the design 
and can lead to a more loosely coupled coordination arrangement.  
 
Organizational adaptation is studied in ten organizations of two ministries, by 
triangulation of methods and data. Four elements referring to structural adaptation are the 
main focus, in terms of data collection: the extent to which the organization 1) aligns its 
organizational goals, 2) monitors the cross-cutting policy objectives, 3) allocates resources, 
and 4) appoints tasks and responsibilities to specific staff members with respect to the cross-
cutting objectives. Firstly, a content analysis of organizational planning documents is used to 
study how organizations address the cross-cutting objectives. Secondly, a Q-sort study 
among organizational linking pins — responsible for implementing cross-cutting objectives 
into their organizations — enriches the data from the document analysis, by adding 
perceptual data. These two measurements are combined to create an in-depth method to 
study organizational adaptation.  
The influence of the coordination arrangement and three different organizational 
characteristics (size, degree of autonomy and policy task) are included to study and explain 
structural organizational adaptation. Multiple angles are analyzed with FsQCA. This analysis 
shows that there is a big difference between departments and agencies. Departments, which 
by definition have policy development task, adapt to a high extent to cross-cutting policy 
objectives. They are tasked with coordination, and focus especially on adapting and 
preparing policy texts, visions etc., which might be easier than adaptation in terms of actions. 
The latter is mainly the task of agencies. A tight coordination arrangement seems to induce 
large departments to adapt, and a loose coordination arrangement leads small departments 
to adapt. Organizations with a policy implementation task are adapting, in general, to a low 
extent. Large organizations with a policy implementation task seem to have room to ignore 
the tightly coupled coordination arrangement and adapt subsequently to a low extent. Small 
policy implementing organizations will adapt, under loosely coupled coordination 
arrangements, to a low extent.  
Studying organizational adaptation and coordination arrangements is difficult task. 
Explanations for organizational adaptation almost seem to be organization specific. The 
original conceptual framework — including the influence of policy characteristics on the 
coordination arrangement and, secondly, the influence of the coordination arrangement and 
organizational characteristics on organizational adaptation — is too straightforward. On the 
basis of the analysis we add a few extra ‘building blocks’ to the conceptual framework.  
Coordination is seen as a process in this thesis, and did not focus on the actual 
organizational actions and goal achievement. However, a study of organizational adaptation 
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necessitates questions about why, how and what the organizations actually do in terms of 
substantive actions. Future research can therefore take up this angle and focus on the goal 
achievement of the intended objectives, as set in the policy program. Moreover, to reach the 
intended program the goal achievement of multiple organizations has to be taken into 
account. A possible research angle is to study collaborative bases, instruments and 
coalitions that organizations have and use to reach the intended cross-cutting objectives. 
This asks for thorough overthinking how to evaluate the goal achievement and the 
coordination arrangement deployed in cross-cutting programs.  
Another angle, which is not incorporated in the current thesis, is that organizations face 
multiple ‘environmental demands’, which they have to ‘weigh’ to other internal demands, like 
their core-business. The perception about the coordination arrangement seems to add to the 
explanation about how the organization weighs the ‘environmental demands’. Some 
arrangements are for instance seen as a numeral exercise, too intrusive or an overburdening 
in terms of participation in network structures. Lastly, how political and administrative 
leadership can strengthen this process and help to set priorities and clear objectives can be 
object of future research.  
In summary, organizational adaptation to cross-cutting policy objectives is a process 
which cannot be unambiguously interpreted. Many factors play a role. However, studying and 
looking for collaborative bases and coordination instruments which leads the government 
apparatus to respond coherently to new policy demands remains important. Predominantly 
because society is constantly changing, and because governments throughout the world 
continue their search to find solutions for new policy demands and coordination challenges.
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8. SAMENVATTING 
De institutionele complexiteit van de overheid, onder andere door de 
verzelfstandigingstrend van de afgelopen decennia, maakt dat het bereiken van een 
gecoördineerde reactie op nieuwe en complexe beleidsproblemen vaak een uitdaging is. In 
dit proefschrift bekijken we horizontale beleidsdoelstellingen als een nieuwe uitdaging voor 
organisaties, die zij kunnen naleven of niet. Dit ‘naleving-proces’ wordt organisatie adaptatie 
genoemd. Inzicht in hoe dit nalevingsproces kan worden versterkt en de invloed van 
bepaalde beleids- en organisatorische kenmerken, is nuttig voor het ontwerpen van 
coördinatieprocessen en –instrumenten. Horizontale beleidsdoelstellingen zijn interessant 
om te bestuderen, omdat het komen tot een coherente beleidsreactie bij dergelijke 
doelstellingen vaak complex is. De sterk verzelfstandigde Vlaamse Overheid — zonder 
hiërarchie tussen organisaties en met onderontwikkelde horizontale 
coördinatiemechanismen — is gekozen om coördinatie en organisatie adaptatie te 
bestuderen. 
Op basis van hun beleidskenmerken, politieke urgentie, onderlinge afhankelijkheden 
tussen organisaties en de focus van het beleid (zowel interne managementvraagstukken als 
externe inhoudelijke beleidskwesties) zijn drie zeer verschillende beleidsdoelstellingen 
geselecteerd om te bestuderen. Met behulp van acht coördinatie dimensies — ontwikkeld op 
basis van het ‘Institutional Development Framework’ van Elinor Ostrom — brengen we in 
kaart welke arrangementen worden gebruikt om 1) besparingen, 2) administratieve 
vereenvoudiging en 3) Integrale Jeugdhulp te coördineren. Deze coördinatie dimensies zijn 
geschikt om de hybriditeit van de coördinatie-arrangementen te ontrafelen. In de lijn der 
verwachting kunnen er drie zeer verschillende arrangementen worden ontward: een strakke 
coördinatie vorm in de besparingen, een mengvorm in administratieve vereenvoudiging en 
losse coördinatie in Integrale Jeugdhulp. In strak georganiseerde coördinatie-arrangementen 
vormt autoriteit (uitgeoefend door bovengeschikten) de belangrijkste factor om organisaties 
aan te sturen. Een losse vorm van coördinatie ligt aan de andere kant van het continuüm en 
is vergelijkbaar met zelforganisatie. 
Vooral politieke urgentie en onderlinge afhankelijkheden blijken een sterke invloed te 
hebben op het ontwerp van coördinatie-arrangementen. Politieke urgentie kan leiden tot het 
benoemen van administratieve trekkers met sterke mandaten, en de mogelijkheid tot het 
introduceren van strategieën die complexiteit kunnen ‘temmen'. Dergelijke strategieën 
kunnen bijvoorbeeld de onderlinge afhankelijkheid verminderen door centralisatie van de 
besluitvorming en het stellen van duidelijke prioriteiten. Bovendien is politiek leiderschap 
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belangrijk, vooral omdat deze actoren de 'meta-coördinatie’ kunnen opnemen en kunnen 
beslissen over het ontwerp van de coördinatie-arrangementen (hands-off benadering) of 
direct organisaties kunnen coördineren, bijvoorbeeld door politieke druk te zetten (hands-on 
benadering). De focus die een beleidsvraagstuk heeft, leidt niet per se tot een zekere 
coördinatie vorm. Echter, aandacht voor cliënten, de samenleving of burgers leidt wel vaak 
tot inclusie van stakeholders en daardoor tot een meer losse vorm van coördinatie.  
 
Organisatie adaptatie is bestudeerd in tien organisaties uit twee beleidsdomeinen, door 
triangulatie van methoden en data. Vier elementen die te maken hebben met structurele 
adaptatie zijn de belangrijkste focus: de mate waarin de organisatie 1) de organisatiedoelen 
aanpast aan de horizontale doelstellingen, 2) de horizontale beleidsdoelstellingen monitort, 
3) budget toekent aan de beleidsdoelstellingen, en 4) taken en verantwoordelijkheden aan 
specifieke medewerkers toewijst. In de eerste plaats is er een inhoudsanalyse van 
planningsdocumenten uitgevoerd om te onderzoeken hoe organisaties de horizontale 
doelstellingen opnemen in hun documenten. Met behulp van Q-methodologie zijn, ten 
tweede, interviews uitgevoerd met ‘linking pins’. Dit zijn medewerkers die verantwoordelijk 
zijn voor de implementatie van horizontale doelstellingen in hun organisatie. Deze studie 
verrijkt de data van de inhoudsanalyse door het toevoegen van perceptie data. De 
verschillende metingen zijn gecombineerd om een grondig beeld te schetsen van 
organisatie-adaptatie.  
De invloed van de coördinatie-arrangementen en drie verschillende organisatie 
kenmerken (grootte, mate van autonomie en de beleidstaak) worden gebruikt als verklarend 
model voor structurele organisatie adaptatie. De FsQCA analyse laat zien dat er een groot 
verschil is tussen departementen en agentschappen. Departementen, die per definitie een 
beleidsvoorbereidende taak hebben, passen zich in hoge mate aan. Zij zijn belast met 
coördinatie en focussen zich vooral op de aanpassing en de voorbereiding van 
beleidsteksten, -visies, etc. Dit is waarschijnlijk gemakkelijker dan een organisatie 
aanpassen op het niveau van acties. Dit laatste is vooral de taak van agentschappen. Een 
strak gecoördineerd arrangement lijkt in het geval van grote departementen te leiden tot 
aanpassing, een los coördinatie-arrangement leidt tot aanpassing van kleine departementen. 
Agentschappen met een uitvoerende beleidstaak passen zich, over het algemeen, in geringe 
mate aan. Grote agentschappen met een uitvoerende beleidstaak lijken ruimte te hebben om 
het strakke gecoördineerde arrangement te negeren en zich vervolgens in lage mate aan te 
passen. Kleine uitvoerende agentschappen, passen zich onder een losse coördinatie vorm in 
geringe mate aan. 
Het bestuderen van organisatie-adaptatie en coördinatie-arrangementen blijkt een 
moeilijke taak. Verklaringen voor organisatie-adaptatie lijken bijna organisatie specifiek te 
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zijn. Het originele conceptueel kader — met inclusie van beleidskenmerken enerzijds, en 
anderzijds de invloed van het coördinatie-arrangement en organisatorische kenmerken — is 
te eenvoudig. Op basis van de analyse en de resultaten kunnen we een paar extra 
'bouwstenen' toevoegen aan het conceptuele kader. 
Coördinatie wordt gezien als een proces in dit proefschrift, en focust niet op de werkelijke 
organisatorische acties of doelrealisatie. Echter, een studie over organisatie adaptatie zou 
noodzakelijkwijs wel moeten ingaan op waarom, hoe en wat de organisaties daadwerkelijk 
doen in termen van acties. Toekomstige studies kunnen daarom de focus leggen op deze 
doelrealisatie, in termen van de oorspronkelijk beoogde doelstellingen, zoals vastgesteld in 
bijvoorbeeld een beleidsprogramma. Bovendien zou een dergelijk kader rekening moeten 
houden met doelbereiking van meerdere organisaties. Een mogelijke invalshoek voor 
toekomstig onderzoek kan zijn om te bekijken welke instrumenten, coalities of gezamenlijke 
gronden organisaties hebben en gebruiken om de beoogde horizontale doelstellingen te 
bereiken. Dat vraagt om het grondig nadenken over hoe doelrealisatie en coördinatie-
arrangementen geëvalueerd kunnen worden. 
Een andere invalshoek voor toekomstig onderzoek is dat organisaties geconfronteerd 
worden met meerdere 'beleidseisen' die zij moeten afwegen ten opzichte van bijvoorbeeld 
hun corebusiness. Het toevoegen van de perceptie over het coördinatie-arrangement als 
intermediërende factor kan kennis toevoegen over hoe een organisatie deze eisen afweegt. 
Sommige arrangementen worden bijvoorbeeld gezien als ‘cijferfetisjisme’, te ‘intrusief’, of als 
een overbelasting in termen van deelname aan netwerkstructuren. Tot slot, hoe politieke en 
ambtelijke sturing dit proces kan versterken en kan helpen om prioriteiten duidelijk te stellen, 
kan een onderwerp zijn voor toekomstig onderzoek. 
Samengevat, organisatie adaptatie is een proces dat niet eenduidig kan worden 
geïnterpreteerd. Vele factoren spelen een rol. Echter, het bestuderen en op zoek gaan naar 
samenwerkingsverbanden en coördinatie-instrumenten en hoe deze kunnen leiden tot een 
coherente beleidsreactie blijft een belangrijk onderwerp in de bestuurskunde. Vooral omdat 
de maatschappij voortdurend verandert en overheden wereldwijd op zoek zijn naar 
oplossingen voor hun coördinatie problemen en complexe beleidsuitdagingen.
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Annex 1: Tight or loose coupling 
 
 
 
 
  Tight coupling                                                                                                                                                  Loose coupling 
Participant 
constellation 
 
Closed/restricted, ordered 
linkages, Multi-level (more than 
two) linkages within the ministry 
Permanent coalition multi-
level (more than two) 
linkages within the ministry 
Ad-hoc relationships (based on 
committee-, advisory work). 
Multiple juxtaposed agencies or 
departments, cross-ministry 
Open/fluent, ad-hoc temporary, 
horizontal linkages, Multiple 
juxtaposed agencies, departments 
and external stakeholders  
Political 
positions 
Unilateral coercive government 
regulation (with executive orders)- 
agreement, strong position entire 
government 
Interministerial committee, 
bi- or multi-lateral 
agreements 
Lead minister 
governed - negotiated 
covenants, without regulation or 
executive orders  
Lead minister governed, with 
voluntary contribution, no written 
agreement 
Administrative 
positions 
Administrative organization 
governed (separately created) 
Lead organization (either 
department or agency) 
governed  
Network governed  Internally participant governed  
Room for action  Rule Norm Strategy Statement  
Information Direct formal information, 
standardized information. 
Everybody the same task and 
information 
Direct formal information, 
standardized information. 
Everybody different task  
Information from a coordination 
function, with possibility to 
‘notice and comment’  
Informal communication, 
information with room to 
maneuver.  
Power 
distribution 
Leader takes decisions, with 
mandate, sanctions – incentives 
Unicentric, e.g. coordinator 
without sanctions – 
incentives 
Multiple participants, democratic 
decision-making  
Pluricentric; coordinators in 
multiple organizations  
Accountability Performance-based accountability, 
with sanctions or rewards, with 
possibility to investigate  
actual institutional behavior (e.g. 
inspections) 
Institutional answerability to 
specific coordination 
function, with sanctions or 
rewards  
Institutional answerability to 
specific coordination function, 
no inspections, sanctions or 
rewards 
Dissemination and access to 
information, no sanctions or 
inspections - Peer review  
Intensity  Collaboration: synergize to create 
something new/systems change 
Coordination of otherwise 
independent action; joint 
effort/joint planning 
Cooperation: dialogue, 
information sharing 
Informal 
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Annex 2: Instruments of the Flemish Government 
 
Annual report 
The annual report of the organization contains an overview of the progress on 
(strategic and operational) organizational goals stemming from the multi-annual 
performance agreement.  
 
Business plans 
A business plan is the yearly translation of the multi-annual performance agreement 
and, if relevant, new initiatives of the minister. The organization describes in this 
document how it will achieve the goals which were put forward in the multi-annual 
performance agreement. This is an internal planning document, outlining detailed 
actions, which enables the senior management to control the daily operations throughout 
the organization.  
 
CAG (in Dutch: College van Ambtenaren-Generaal) 
The CAG is a horizontal group, Flemish Government wide, which consists of one 
leading civil servant of each ministry (thirteen in total). This council has the formal, 
decision making power about Flemish Government-wide harmonization, coordination 
and control of internal, operational matters.  
 
Management committee 
The management committee is a forum where all the leading civil servants of one 
ministry come together, to discuss and set out policy objectives to control the ministry. 
 
Multi-annual performance agreement  
The multi-annual performance agreement contains the rights and obligations of both 
the minister and the organization (department or agency). With the document both 
parties mutually agree on the organizational goals and the deliverables (outputs). 
Furthermore, it is a formal document to ensure the resources to achieve organizational 
goals. The use of the performance and strategic agreements as a steering instrument 
has been, since the major BBB-reform of the Flemish government in 2006, intended as a 
catalyst for internal organizational change and has potential coordination benefits for 
both the Flemish Government/ministers and leading civil servants of department and 
agencies (Ministerie Van De Vlaamse Gemeenschap, 2001, pp. 19–21).  
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Policy council 
The policy council has the same function as the management committee, but these 
meetings are attended by the minister responsible for the ministry.  
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Annex 3: Word queries 
Word queries 
Austerity measures Administrative 
simplification 
Integrated Youth Care 
Saving(s), staff savings, 
austerity, austerity measure(s), 
budget (cuts), number of 
employees, staff reduction, 
personnel reduction, heads, 
workforce 
staff expenditure, staff 
appropriations, staff numbers, 
reduce, reduce staffing budget, 
personnel budget 
"administrative 
simplification", 
deregulation, regulation 
management, "qualitative 
regulation", red tape, 
planning burden, 
planning burden 
reduction, "administrative 
burden", Regulatory 
Impact Analysis, RIA, 
"standard cost model", 
cral, regulation. 
"Integrated Youth Care ", 
IYC, Intersectoral Portal, 
NRTJ, RTJ, A-document 
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Annex 4: Interviews 
 
# of respondent Who Used for? 
Respondent 1 Participant coordination arena Description coordination-arrangement, 
preparation Q-sort  
Respondent 2 Participant coordination arena “”     “” 
Respondent 3 Administrative champion “”     “” 
Respondent 4 Participant coordination arena “”     “” 
Respondent 5 Administrative champion “”     “” 
Respondent 6 Administrative champion “”     “” 
Respondent 7 Participant coordination arena “”     “” 
Respondent 8 Participant coordination arena “”     “” 
Respondent 9 External expert “”     “” 
Respondent 10 Participant coordination arena “”     “” 
Respondent 11 Political champion “”     “” 
Respondent 12 External expert “”     “” 
Respondent 13 Administrative champion “”     “” 
Respondent 14 Administrative champion “”     “” 
Respondent 15 External expert “”     “” 
Respondent 16 Political champion “”     “” 
Respondent 17 Administrative champion “”     “” 
Respondent 18 Administrative champion “”     “” 
Respondent 19 Administrative champion “”     “” 
Respondent 20 Extra interview – respondent not attached to 
one of the cross-cutting policy objectives 
under study  
Preparation Q-sort  
Respondent 21 Extra interview – respondent not attached to 
one of the cross-cutting policy objectives 
under study  
Preparation Q-sort  
Respondent 22 Extra interview – respondent not attached to 
one of the cross-cutting policy objectives 
under study  
Preparation Q-sort  
Respondent 23 Extra interview – respondent not attached to 
one of the cross-cutting policy objectives 
under study  
Preparation Q-sort  
Respondent 24 Extra interview – respondent not attached to 
one of the cross-cutting policy objectives 
under study  
Preparation Q-sort  
Respondent 25 Extra interview – respondent not attached to 
one of the cross-cutting policy objectives 
under study  
Preparation Q-sort  
Respondent 26 Administrative champion Description coordination-arrangement  
Respondent 27 Administrative champion Description coordination-arrangement  
Respondent 28 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 29 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 30 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 31 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 32 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 33 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 34 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 35 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 36 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 37 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 38 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 39 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 40 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 42 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 43 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 44 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 45 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 46 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 47 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 48 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 49 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 50 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 51 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 52 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 53 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 54 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
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Respondent 55 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 56 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
Respondent 57 Organizational linking pin Q-sort  
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Annex 5: Statements organizational adaptation 
My organization integrates the austerity measures, integrated youth care and administrative simplification in the following way in the organization 
Adaptation in terms of  DESIGNATIVE EVALUATIVE ADVOCATIVE 
CULTURE 
 
 
(Respondent 1 & 6) There is a lot of 
material, but that is not easy to 
swallow, you must personally 
‘translate’ it, with your staff 
(Respondent 7 & 15) You need to have staff in the 
organization who want to invest in it. For cross-cutting 
policy objectives they have to put it up a notch or do 
some things more explicit 
(Respondent 1 & 21) As an organization, you 
should only collaborate if it has a value for the 
customer/ client  
(respondent 25) It requires attention of 
the management: coaching staff, be 
ready to help with problems and 
doubts 
(Respondent 9) We act sometimes like we are 
vulnerable and in need of help, in order to obtain 
cooperation 
(Respondent 3 & 10) You will find the cross-
cutting policy objective everywhere in our 
operations, because it is a change of mentality  
(Respondent 20) On managerial topics 
we find comprises with other 
organizations easily, on policy 
substantive issues less 
(Respondent 11) Currently, there are actually many 
good collaborations, why? Because we realize that we 
have too few employees, we should not reinvent the 
wheel 
(Respondent 14) I think our organization should 
be much more flexible and has to work 
programmatically 
STRUCTURE 
 
 
 
(Respondent 21) Maybe there is a gain 
on the overall government level, but for 
us cross-cutting policy objectives are 
often a loss 
(Respondent 6 & 3) The top management usually 
knows what should be done, but that is not 
communicated to the middle management and the 
street level bureaucrat level 
(Respondent 22) The objective is fed back to our 
own management team, and also to the 
management committee and the policy council of 
our ministry 
(Respondent 22) The expertise of our 
organization is large enough to 
translate the very vague objectives to 
concrete actions 
(Respondent 11) The cross-cutting policy objective is 
a topic in the evaluation of the top civil servant, and 
also in individual planning meetings 
(Respondent 21) In our organization the objective 
is part of the monitoring system, based on that 
we can take good management decisions 
(Respondent 6 & 1) We assigned the 
objective to a few staff-members, but 
they have other assignments as well 
(Respondent 14) We have linked budget to the cross-
cutting objective 
 
(Respondent 25) As management team you 
should be willing to discuss this objective on a 
regular basis  
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MYTH 
 
(Respondent 8) That cross-cutting 
policy objective is not really an action, 
that it is in our documents does not 
mean that we are very active 
(Respondent 11) The cross-cutting objectives are only 
a very small piece of our workload, they're not going 
throw us out if we score well on the rest 
(Respondent 2 & 8) The cross-cutting objective is 
only marginally mentioned in our documents, as 
in "we contribute to ... ', but that is very ad-hoc  
(Respondent 16) We are sometimes a 
bit ‘creative’ in our reports, there is not 
much control anyways  
(Respondent 4) The jargon that is often associated 
with the goals, ... you cannot understand it 
(Respondent 24) The minister sometimes asks: 
how are you progressing on the objective? But 
that is actually a minor point, attention often goes 
to the main priorities of the minister 
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Annex 6: Q-sort grid – organizational adaptation 
 
When integrating the cross-cutting policy objectives, my organization is experiencing the following elements 
 
DISAGREE 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 AGREE 
1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  8.  9.  
10.  11.  12.  13.  14.  15.  16.  17.  18.  
  
19.  20.  21.  22.  23.  
  
    
24.  
    
         
DISAGREE 
NEUTRAL 
(OR IRRELEVANT) 
AGREE 
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Annex 7: Interview protocol (based on van Exel & De Graaf, 
2005) 
 
This interview is part of a study which focuses on the way in which the Flemish 
government coordinates cross-cutting policy objectives (focused on internal 
management as well as external objectives, on the society) and how Flemish 
organizations integrate these objectives into their internal structures. Cross-cutting 
objectives go beyond organizational boundaries and need an integrated coordination 
response. Some examples: equal opportunities policy, poverty, Integrated Youth care, 
austerity measures and administrative simplification. 
 
1. We are curious about the experiences of your organization. You have been 
selected because you are in your organization responsible for one of the 
objectives that we are studying. Your name and the name of the organization will 
remain completely anonymous. We report only on the aggregate level, for 
example, only about big/small organizations or departments compared to 
organizations with more autonomy. 
 
2. During the interview, we are going to sort a set of cards with statements about 
the extent to which your organization adapts to the cross-cutting objective. By 
this we mean the extent to which the organization translates the goal to 
organizational specific goals, budget, responsibilities etc. 
 
3. Take the 24 cards in your hand. All 24 cards in the set deal with organizational 
adaptation to cross-cutting policy objectives. The question is to rank order these 
on a scale, to the extent to which you agree with the statements on the cards, 
from the perspective of your organization. The numbers on the cards (from 1 to 
24) are randomly placed on the cards and have no meaning. 
 
4. Read the 24 statements carefully out loud and divide them into three piles: a pile 
for statements with which you disagree, a stack of cards with which you agree, 
and a stack of cards about which you are indifferent, or for the cards which are 
not applicable or not relevant to you. 
 
5. Use the three boxes "AGREE", "NEUTRAL or irrelevant" and "DISAGREE". 
When you have finished sorting the statements we will continue with the next 
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step. If you think that a statement is unclear, I will clarify it. While sorting the 
cards, you may think aloud, so you can give first reflections about the statements 
immediately. After sorting, we will discuss the 'extreme scores'. 
 
6. Take the cards from the "AGREE" pile and read them again. Select the two 
statements with which you agree most and place them in the box on the right of 
the grid (vertical order does not matter), under number "9 (agree)". Then select 
the two statements with which you agree most of the remaining cards and place 
them in the two boxes under the number "8". Follow this procedure for all cards 
from the "AGREE" pile.  
 
7. Take the cards of the "DISAGREE" pile and read them again. As in the previous 
step, select the two statements you disagree with most strongly, and place them 
in the first box on the left of the table, under "1 (disagree)." Follow this procedure 
for all cards of the "DISAGREE" pile. 
 
8. Finally, take the remaining cards and read them again. Arrange the cards in the 
other, still empty boxes of the grid. 
 
9. When all cards are placed, you may of course shift some cards, if you wish. 
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